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INTRODUCTION
A movement is afoot to impose cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on financial
regulation (CBA/FR).' The housing and financial crises of 2008 led to the
Dodd-Frank Act,2 which restructured the financial regulatory agencies, man-
dated more than 200 new rules, and required changes to many older rules.'
The sweep of regulatory change has reignited criticism for failure to base the
changes on adequate CBA/FR.4 Bills have been introduced to provide explicit
authority for the President to require CBA/FR from independent agencies,'
even as critics argue that existing law already requires the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) to conduct a particular form of CBA/FR: judicially enforced quantifi-
cation. 6 One panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
1. Throughout, I use the awkward acronym "CBA/FR" to flag that the analysis focuses on CBA
of financial regulation, and that my conclusions may but do not necessarily carry over to
CBA in other regulatory domains. Part IV.A, infra, discusses potential differences between
financial and other regulation.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. A trade group recently sued to enjoin the
most prominent rule under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volcker Rule, in part on grounds that
the agencies ignored economic effects of one small part of the rule on small banks. Matthew
Goldstein & Peter Eavis, Banks' Suit Tests Limits of Resisting Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Dec. 24, 2013, 8:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.con/2o13/12/24banks-suit
-tests-limits-of-resisting-volcker-rule [http://perma.cc/Y78M-CKY7]. For the plaintiffs
motion for an emergency stay in the case, see Emergency Motion of Petitioners for Stay of
Agency Action Pending Review, Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve, No. 13-1310 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 24, 2013). On the current state of the law of CBA/FR, see infra Part II.A; for a discus-
sion of the Volcker Rule and the trade group's lawsuit, see infra Part III.D.
3. See Regulatory Tracker, DAvIS POLK & WA.DWELL LLP, http://www.davispolk.com/dodd
-frank/regulatory-tracker [http://perma.cc/G7PQ-sLHZ].
4. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, A BALANCED APPROACH TO COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS REFORM 3, 9 (2o13) [hereinafter CCMR REPORT] (citing the Dodd-Frank Act as
the reason for Congress to pass a law requiring CBA by independent agencies and noting
that "the SEC and the CFTC still often fall short of conducting meaningful cost-benefit
analysis of new regulations"); see also Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial
Regulators, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 569 (2013).
5. See, for example, the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S. 1173, 113th
Cong., described infra Part II. For other bills, see infra note 146.
6. CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (using legislative history to argue that the National Secu-
rities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 11o Stat. 3416 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) requires the SEC to conduct CBA based on the
statutory requirement that the SEC consider "efficiency" as one of a number of factors in
rulemaking); PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER WALKER, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVE-
NESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 24-33 (2o13)
[hereinafter CCMC REPORT]. Critics also point to an efflorescence of decisions by the D.C.
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lumbia Circuit, composed entirely of Republican-appointed judges, held that
existing law requires the SEC to quantify the costs and benefits of its proposed
rules, 7 while another judge -appointed by President Obama to the D.C. Cir-
cuit- subsequently held that such quantification is not mandatory, at least
when the SEC is required by statute to adopt a rule, and the benefits sought to
be achieved are humanitarian and not economic in nature.8
This Article critiques efforts to impose judicially reviewed, quantified CBA
on independent financial agencies, while also attempting both to explore how
conceptual CBA/FR could lead to better policy and to advance the substantive
project of quantitative CBA/FR itself. This combination of objectives repre-
sents a moderate stance, between the polar positions that often characterize de-
Circuit striking down SEC regulations as "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1946), because of the agency's failure to
.consider" certain costs as part of its "efficiency" analysis; these cases are discussed in Part II
below. Critics also note that the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491
(1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 f) requires the CFTC to "consider the costs
and benefits" of its regulatory actions. Id. S 19(a)(1). The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is required to consider the "potential benefits and costs" as part of its rulemaking au-
thority. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022.
7. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). I discuss this case in more detail in
Part II below. See infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text. The decision was written by
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, joined by Chief Judge David Sentelle and Judge Janice Brown,
each appointed by a Republican President. Commentators have extensively criticized this
decision, see infra note 116, but it remains a binding precedent. For completeness, I note that
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a party to the case, paid two professors who wrote a report
defending the decision. See CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at ii (discussing "financial and
administrative support" for the report).
8. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d. 43 (D.D.C. 2013), affd in part, 748 F. 3d 18
(D.C. Cir. 2014). The trial court decision was by Judge Robert L. Wilkins, who was subse-
quently nominated to the D.C. Circuit by President Obama, only to have his nomination fil-
ibustered by Senate Republicans. Todd Ruger, Senate Blocks Robert Wilkins' Nomination to
D.C. Circuit, LEGAL TIMES: BLT (Nov. 18, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/blt/20 13/11/senate-blocks-robert-wilkins-nomination-to-dc-circuit.html [http://perma
.cc/75P8-PYM6]. This occurrence helped prompt the Senate to abolish filibusters of lower
court appointments. Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.con/2o3/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-
motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-fdibuster.html [http ://perma.cc/68ME-L8VL]. Judge Wilkins
was confirmed to the D.C. Circuit under the Senate's new rules. Pete Kasperowicz, Senate
Confirms Third Judicial Nominee, THE HIL (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:22 PM), http://thehill
.com/blogs/floor-action/votes/195305-senate-confirms-wilkins-to-dc-court [http://perma.cc
/6GA5-84ZW]. Earlier, a panel of the D.C. Circuit upheld a decision of the Office of Thrift
Supervision against a CBA-based challenge, Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569
F.3d 514 (2009), and another Obama-appointed judge upheld a decision of the CFTC
against a CBA-based challenge in 2012, despite the CFTC's not having quantified the bene-
fits or certain costs of the rule, Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 891 F.
Supp. 2d 162 (2012).
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bates over CBA; the Article neither rejects it utterly nor embraces it naively.
Rather, the Article explores how CBA is likely to function in the near term as
applied to financial regulation and assesses the costs and benefits of using
CBA/FR. In other words, the Article begins to develop a CBA of CBA/FR itself.
The results of the exploration not only call into question simplistic efforts to
mandate CBA- particularly quantified CBA, and particularly when enforced
through judicial review by generalist courts -but also should help those who
favor economic analysis of law to appreciate how CBA might advance and clari-
fy policy analysis of financial regulation, rather than retard or obscure it.
Part I analyzes CBA generally, noting that it (a) can be either a framework
for policy analysis or a legal means to discipline agencies and (b) can consist of
either conceptual analysis or efforts at quantification. Part I also briefly reviews
CBA's origins in U.S. legal history to show that it can be used to camouflage as
well as to discipline, referring to the Taylor Rule to explain why even CBA's
advocates do not propose to require CBA for monetary policy. Often, CBA is
defended in part on the grounds that supposed alternatives - such as expert
discretionary judgment-are no better, and often worse, than CBA. In fact,
Part I suggests, CBA may turn out not to be an alternative to reliance on judg-
ment: instead, expert judgment is a core and necessary component of CBA, as
it is for any process of assessing and adopting financial regulations.
Part II describes existing law relevant to CBA/FR and investigates ongoing
efforts to promote quantified CBA/FR. Chief among these efforts has been a
string of high-profile CBA cases over the last decade in which courts have
struck down financial regulations. Part II critically assesses those cases, show-
ing they have been poorly reasoned, premised on mistakes, inconsistent with
precedent, and based on misunderstandings about what CBA/FR can reasona-
bly be expected to do. Nevertheless, those decisions have fueled efforts in the
agencies themselves to undertake more CBA/FR. More problematically, those
cases have also fueled efforts in Congress to give courts an even more expanded
role in enforcing a general mandate for the independent agencies to include
quantified CBA in rulemaking.
Part III develops case studies of how quantified CBA/FR might be con-
ducted on six significant and representative financial regulations, drawing on
relevant academic research to outline the tasks that need to be tackled to con-
duct CBA/FR on those rules. The case studies show that quantified CBA/FR
amounts to no more than "guesstimation," entailing: (a) causal inferences that
are unreliable under standard regulatory conditions; (b) the use of problematic
data; and/or (c) the same kinds of contestable, assumption-sensitive macroe-
conomic or political modeling used to make monetary policy.
Part IV concludes by reviewing the implications of the case studies. Anyone
who supports CBA should agree that CBA should be conducted only to the ex-
tent it passes its own test-that is, only if CBA itself will produce more benefits
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
than costs. Perhaps surprisingly, given that CBA has been part of administra-
tive law for decades, CBA of CBA has itself never been adequately conducted,
leaving the first-stage choice of when to perform CBA/FR itself in the realm of
judgment rather than science. Part IV begins the task of outlining a CBA of
CBA, both generally and in the context of financial regulation. It argues that
the benefits of CBA/FR have been low in the past and are likely to remain low
in the near future, while its costs will depend on the precise institutional and
legal context in which it is pursued.
CBA/FR's benefits are likely to remain low because it is by definition about
finance: finance is at the heart of the economy; is social and political; and is
characterized by non-stationary relationships that exhibit secular change (that
is, long-term structural changes). These features undermine the ability of sci-
ence to precisely and reliably estimate the effects of financial regulations, even
retrospectively. Whenever agencies face such sensitive and speculative forecast-
ing abilities, quantified CBA is not capable of disciplining regulatory analysis.
It will generate low benefits in the form of reduced agency costs (in part by
counteracting cognitive biases) or increased transparency. Moreover, CBA/FR
will produce costs: resources consumed, regulatory delay, diffusion of regula-
tory focus, and potential decreases in regulatory transparency -particularly if
regulatory agencies and courts involved in reviewing agency action do not have
strong incentives to be honest about the limits of the results.
At the same time, CBA/FR is a useful conceptual framework, and quanti-
fied CBA/FR is a worthy long-term research goal. Attempts to quantify may ad-
vance the research needed to achieve reliable, precise estimates, and this makes
quantified CBA/FR a worthwhile project for agencies to pursue. But the cur-
rent benefits of CBA/FR remain low, because their real effects remain far off in
time; like any regulatory benefits, the benefits of CBA/iFR should be discount-
ed to present value.
Completing a full, quantified CBA of CBA would require evidence and new
research methods: studies of the degree to which CBA results in better regula-
tions or more transparency in the regulatory process, as well as quantified es-
timates of the costs-delay, confusion, camouflage, partisanship -that CBA
can introduce. Until evidence is developed to illuminate when CBA/FR passes
its own test, courts and secondary agencies (that is, agencies other than those
charged with rulemaking responsibility) should have no role in second-
guessing the choice of when to conduct CBA/FR, or the details of CBA/FR
when it is used.9 Not only should new legal CBA/FR mandates be resisted as
9. For a different but consistent critique of judicial review of agency decisions under conditions
of uncertainty, see Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law)
(Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper No. 13-24, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239155
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likely to worsen policy outcomes, but existing interpretations of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) and financial agencies' governing statutes should
also be reversed. A safe harbor should be created to shelter the CBA/FR that
the agencies choose to conduct, so as to reduce the influence of concentrated
interests through litigation and of politically partisan but unaccountable judges
on regulatory outcomes.1" In sum, CBA/FR remains a potentially valuable reg-
ulatory tool, but only if implemented with a light touch.
As reflected in Part IV, this Article's critique of CBA/FR is not sweeping.
Rather, it is focused on one specific institutional arrangement for CBA/FR:
mandates (whether through new statutes or judicial interpretations of existing
statutes) for judicially reviewed, quantified CBA. Other arrangements that in-
clude CBA-such as the use of conceptual CBA on a voluntary basis by inde-
pendent agencies - are much more promising. In between are a wide variety of
possible arrangements, such as interagency review of CBA/FR (whether con-
ceptual or quantitative) by a separate agency, as is currently done for rule-
makings by executive agencies. Each such arrangement deserves its own fact-
specific analysis. For example, for any interagency process, one should ask:
How much of the interagency dialogue would become part of the public rec-
ord, available for use in a subsequent judicial challenge? What real resources
could the alternative agency bring to bear on the discussion? Would that other
agency face genuinely different incentives in evaluating a given regulation, and
how much value would participation by such an agency add if included in pre-
rulemaking discussions? How important is it to achieve uniformity on specific
kinds of CBA inputs, and alternatively, how important is it to allow for flexibil-
ity in such inputs over time and across agencies? As a result of the complexity
of these questions, the full range of possible alternative institutional arrange-
ments is not analyzed in detail in this Article. However, some of the reasons of-
fered as to why judicially reviewed quantitative CBA/FR may not satisfy a cost-
benefit test may also extend to those other arrangements, and the analysis here
should at least illuminate policy debates over those alternatives.
[http://perma.cc/ 5AY8-WN7L] (arguing that courts should defer to agencies when agencies
must act under conditions of uncertainty, even when the action is arbitrary).
1o. In a related paper, I make further recommendations on how law and legal institutions can
promote good CBA/FR as policy analysis, without risking the negative consequences of ju-
dicially enforced quantification. See John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis:
An Essay on Regulatory Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2471682 [http://perma.cc/WsKF-44KT].
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I. WHAT DO PEOPLE MEAN BY "COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS"?
The literature on cost-benefit analysis is voluminous and multi-
disciplinary." Not surprisingly, writers often talk past one another when they
discuss the topic. Three distinctions are often elided: whether by CBA one
means policy analysis or law; whether by CBA one means a conceptual frame-
work or quantification; and whether CBA is likely to camouflage or discipline
regulation.'2 In this Part, I begin by presenting a brief typology of CBA and
conclude by sketching the alternatives to CBA.
A. Policy Versus Law
Lawyers instinctively understand the difference between a norm or a policy,
on the one hand, and a law, on the other-even when that law tracks a norm or
policy. They know, for example, that the effects of a law (assumed to be justici-
able) requiring an agency to act reasonably will not simply equate to the actions
that an agency, acting reasonably, would take. A requirement imposes a set of
burdens on the agency that the demands of reason do not. Law introduces new
agents into the picture-usually, courts. Those agents are no more perfect than
others, and their decisions will be uncertain. Agencies subject to court over-
sight will anticipate judicial error (or bias).
A law will lead an agency to keep more careful track of what it does, and
why, than reason on its own would do. Agencies will incur costs to keep track
in this way, just as they will incur costs to defend decisions against court chal-
lenges. They will refrain from acting when the expected cost of a challenge and
record keeping falls below the expected benefit of the action, discounted for the
risk that the court will wrongly overturn the decision. These consequences
ii. For overviews outside the financial regulatory context, see MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC Pos-
NER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYsIS (2006); CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-
BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
THE COST-BENEFIT STATE]; and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2003).
12. Supporters and critics of CBA alike tend to elide distinctions between different meanings of
'cost-benefit analysis." Supporters-who, ironically, often defend CBA as promoting trans-
parency- elide these distinctions to make CBA look appealing to the broadest possible audi-
ence, including skeptics and optimists about quantification, advocates of regulation and de-
regulation, regulators and the regulated, and intended regulatory beneficiaries and
taxpayers. Critics of CBA elide the distinctions because they see efforts to promote CBA as
policy as a step on a slippery slope to CBA law. Of late, others have taken a more nuanced
position, supporting CBA/FR as policy without supporting CBA/FR law. See, e.g., Bruce
Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG.
289 (2013).
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arise from enforcement and oversight by courts. Law changes behavior even
when a law on its face only requires what someone would try to do anyway.13
Lawyers also know that a law requiring an agency to act reasonably will
sound innocuous to most non-lawyers: who could be against acting reasona-
bly? Lawyers know that non-lawyers systematically underestimate enforcement
costs and their effects. They know that a clever way to shape regulation is to
propose a law that tracks a general norm, the enforcement of which will have
predictable effects that are not intuitive to non-lawyers. The asymmetry in per-
ceived effect will allow political gains at a lower political cost than a straight-
forward law mandating or forbidding regulation.
These themes play themselves out when lawyers discuss CBA with non-
lawyers. Specifically, non-lawyers typically mean by CBA the conduct of cost-
benefit analysis itself-whether by researchers, regulators, or courts. Lawyers
sometimes use CBA in the same way, referring to a particular type of policy
analysis. But lawyers also often mean by CBA a set of legal requirements aimed
at inducing regulatory agencies to conduct CBA exclusively or as part of their
policy analysis in choosing to adopt or change regulations. When lawmakers,
for example, describe a proposed law as requiring CBA, many non-lawyers will
think of CBA as policy analysis and, if they favor using CBA in policy analysis,
will assume that the law is a good idea. They will effectively conflate CBA as
policy analysis with CBA as legal requirement. As with a requirement of rea-
sonableness, however, a requirement of CBA will predictably have effects that
diverge from those that would arise if CBA were simply used as a routine part
of an agency's policy toolkit, without a legal requirement.' 4
B. Quantities (or Guesstimates) Versus Concepts
A second source of confusion arises even within CBA as policy analysis.
Most advocates of CBA expect it to include quantification and monetization.
This type of cost-benefit analysis-if supported by strong consensus theory,
reliable research designs, and good, representative evidence-could properly be
called quantified CBA, s but- if supported only by weak, contested theory, un-
13. Lawyers negotiating contracts know the difference, too. For example, they do not view a
clause requiring a party to act reasonably or the like as innocuous: it is a "get" by the coun-
terparty and a "give" by the party subject to the requirement.
14. Part W, infra, develops this point in further detail.
15. See Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's
Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 47 (2oo6) (arguing that "[t]he
SEC's failure to express the costs and benefits of its proposed rulemakings in numerical
terms represents a significant shortcoming in its analysis"); see also U.S. GOV'T AccOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM
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reliable research designs, or poor, unrepresentative evidence -better deserves
the label guesstimated CBA. Robert W. Hahn and co-authors, for example, criti-
cized executive agencies for failing to comply with Executive Orders requiring
CBA,' 6 based on the authors' assessment that
agencies only quantified net benefits - the dollar value of expected ben-
efits minus expected costs-for 29 percent of the forty-eight rules [re-
viewed by the authors], even though the Executive Order directs agen-
cies to show that the benefits of a regulation "justify" the costs ...
Although agencies may present reasons not to quantify and monetize
benefits and costs, . . . we believe they should be able to meet the re-
quirements of the Executive Order for a majority of regulations.17
Expectations of quantification have found their way into legal decisions over-
turning financial regulations, as discussed in Part II. For example, in Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously for failing to undertake some effort to quantify the costs of the
mutual fund governance rule changes it had adopted.' 8
Others accept - indeed, often make rhetorical show of conceding 9 - that
quantification or monetization is not possible in some policy areas but none-
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 17-18 (Nov. 2011) ("Without monetized or quan-
tified benefits and costs, or an understanding of the reasons they cannot be monetized or
quantified, it is difficult for businesses and consumers to determine if the most cost-
beneficial regulatory alternative was selected....").
16. For a discussion of these Executive Orders, see infra text accompanying note 81.
17. Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies To Com-
ply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859, 861, 864 n.22 (1999-2000)
(citing Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 3 C.F.R. S 638, 645 (1993)). The authors
acknowledge that the agencies were required to quantify costs and benefits only to "the ex-
tent feasible," id. at 864 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 645), and that "[i]t is ar-
guably not always possible or desirable to monetize all benefits and costs," id. at 864 n.18
(citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638-39; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (Jan. 11, 1996)). More
recently, supporters of proposed legislative CBA mandates, including former commissioners
of some of the independent agencies, have argued in favor of the bill on the ground that
.not one of the 21 major rules issued by independent agencies in 2012 was based on a
complete, quantified" CBA. Letter from Nancy Nord et al. to Thomas R. Carper, Chair
of the Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm., and Thomas A. Coburn,
Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm. 2 (June 18,
2013) (emphasis added), http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File
_id=8ebodbd9- 5 631-4 878-bfb2-eo 4 o4o7cfoba [http://perma.cc/BB9B-HER8].
18. 412 F. 3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
19. Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1021, 1049-50 (2004) (rebutting critiques of CBA by noting that it "does not require
that costs and benefits be expressed in the same units or that agencies monetize benefits that
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theless believe that CBA can function as a disciplined framework for specifying
baselines and alternatives, for ensuring that (at least conceptually) both costs
and benefits of a rule are considered, and for encouraging reliance on "evi-
dence" rather than solely on intuitive judgment.' ° These types of CBA are best
distinguished from quantified or guesstimated CBA with the label conceptual
CBA.
Transforming conceptual CBA into quantified CBA is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. Some effects of a given rule might be reliably quantified and mon-
etized, while others might not be. Some inputs to CBA may be quantified, for
example, to "scope" the domain of a proposed rule -how many people, trans-
actions, entities, and the like would be covered by the rule. But quantified CBA
in its ideal form-which some of its advocates refer to as "complete" quantified
CBA' - entails specification and quantification of all benefits and costs in a
single, uniform bottom-line metric (typically, dollars) representing the net
welfare effects of a proposed rule. Some CBA supporters acknowledge that
such an idealized version will not be feasible in "some" instances and have con-
ceded that in such instances a more limited CBA- guesstimated CBA- should
not determine regulatory outcomes. For example, in a 1996 policy article in
Science, Kenneth Arrow and ten other economists advocated CBA but were
careful to note that
[b]enefits and costs of proposed policies should be quantified wherever
possible.... In most instances, it should be possible to describe the ef-
fects of proposed policy changes in quantitative terms; however, not all
impacts can be quantified, let alone be given a monetary value. There-
may not be quantifiable" and arguing that CBA should "be careful to reflect those uncertain-
ties and account for qualitative factors"); Cass R. Sunstein, Nonquantifiable (May 1,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2259279 [http://perma.cc/H6N8
-KZTT].
2o. Office of Management and Budget guidelines are not entirely consistent on whether CBA
entails quantification. On the one hand, they emphasize that CBA should contain, in addi-
tion to quantification, the specification of baselines, alternatives, and a qualitative description
of how a rule will produce benefits and what side effects it may have, Circular A-4:
Regulatory Analysis, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET 2 (2003) [hereinafter OMB Guidance],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory-matters-pdf/a-4.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TZ3F-S8UU], and they explicitly provide that where full monetization of
all costs and benefits is not feasible, agencies should relate what can be quantified to what
cannot be, so as to specify how large unquantified benefits could be or how small unquanti-
fled costs could be before a rule would "yield zero net benefits," id. On the other hand, the
guidelines contain statements suggesting that CBA entails full quantification; for example,
the guidelines state that "[a] distinctive feature of [CBA] is that both benefits and costs are
expressed in monetary units, which allows you to evaluate different regulatory options with
a variety of attributes using a common measure." Id. at 6.
21. Letter from Nancy Nord et al. to Thomas R. Carper and Thomas A. Coburn, supra note 17.
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fore, care should be taken to assure that quantitative factors do not
dominate important qualitative factors in decision-making.
Particularly difficult to quantify or monetize are non-market goods and exter-
nalities. In non-financial regulatory domains, non-market goods, such as life,
health, beauty, and biodiversity, have proven difficult to monetize with any de-
gree of precision and confidence.2"
In financial regulation, relevant non-market goods include trust, investor
confidence, liquidity, and the psychological consequences of unexpected finan-
cial losses. 4 In non-financial regulation, measurement of externalities has
proven difficult, not only because these externalities are often non-market
goods, but also because simply specifying and estimating their size is challeng-
ing. Financial regulation poses equally if not more difficult problems in meas-
uring externalities, in part because financial markets are tightly interconnected
systems (hence the now mainstream phrase "systemic risk"), in which one par-
ty's losses can be rapidly transmitted to multiple related parties.2" As explained
in Part III and discussed further in Part IV, full quantification in CBA/FR is
likely to be difficult because finance is at the heart of the economy, involves
22. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 222 (1996). Neither Arrow et al. nor Hahn et al., supra
note 17, provide evidence or cite to research supporting their views that quantification
"should be possible" in "most" instances as applied to executive agencies. Sunstein likewise
asserts without evidence that quantification will be impossible only in "rare" instances: "In
the most extreme (and admittedly rare) cases, agencies may be operating under circum-
stances of ignorance, in which they cannot specify either outcomes or probabilities." Sun-
stein, supra note 19, at 7.
23. For discussions, see, for example, FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); David S. Brook-
shire et al., Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 165 (1982); David S. Bullock & Nicholas Minot, On Measuring the Value of a
Nonmarket Good Using Market Data, 88 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 961 (2006); and Karl-Goran
Maler, A Method of Estimating Social Benefits from Pollution Control, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 121
(1971).
24. See infra Part III for further discussion of the relevant non-market goods affected by finan-
cial regulation.
25. Consultative Document: Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer
Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD. & INT'L ORG. SEC.
COMM'NS 3 (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_140lo8
.pdf [http://perma.cc/LS8E-TAHJ] (identifying three transmission mechanisms for system-
ic risk: (i) direct exposure to failed institutions; (2) forced asset liquidations by failed insti-
tutions that disrupt trading or funding in key markets; and (3) disruption of a critical ser-
vice or function without substitutes); see also Stephen L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO.
L.J. 193 (2008) (identifying relationships between markets and institutions and noting how
risk can spread through interconnected financial systems).
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groups of people (firms, markets) interacting in complex, difficult-to-study
ways, and is shaped by forces that change rapidly over time.
Short of full monetization, CBA can include efforts to estimate ranges of
costs and benefits, to bound them, to conduct "threshold" analyses comparing
a rule's quantified costs to unquantifiable benefits (or vice versa), and, more
generally, to use empirical methods and data to generate evidence relevant to
quantified or conceptual CBA. While ranges, bounds, threshold analyses, and
incomplete but relevant evidence may all be viewed as part of quantified CBA,
they begin to move the final result of CBA toward guesstimation, leaving it a
matter of judgment whether and how the results of CBA should influence deci-
sion making. For example, guidelines from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) provide little help in determining how to conduct threshold
analyses if important benefits and costs are both unquantifiable, simply sug-
gesting that agencies "exercise professional judgment" in weighing unquantifi-
able elements in the CBA.26 This recommendation is hard to criticize. But it al-
so suggests that there may be circumstances in which a feasible but partial
quantification will not be cost-justified. For example, it may be the case that
the quantifiable elements are likely (based on judgment) to be trivial relative to
the unquantifiable elements. It may also be that partial quantification is costly,
or otherwise will undermine the value of a conceptual CBA, by- for example-
conveying a false degree of precision to a general audience.
One also can draw a distinction within CBA law-analogous to the one be-
tween conceptual and quantified CBA-between CBA mandates and CBA pro-
cess, although this is not typical in prior CBA scholarship. CBA mandates con-
sist of efforts to require agencies to conduct some or all elements of CBA
policy-presumably because legislators believe agencies must be forced to con-
duct it. CBA mandates include laws subjecting the CBA policy analysis itself to
review by another agency (such as the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), a unit of OMB), or by courts (as in review of rules as "arbi-
trary" and "capricious" under the APA).27 The objectives of this review are to
ensure that the agencies take statutory CBA mandates seriously and (in theory)
to improve the quality of CBA analyses. CBA mandates encompass binding ex-
ecutive orders or other interagency guidelines that specify particular compo-
nents of CBA policy analysis, such as discount rates, or methods to quantify
benefits or costs, with the goal of achieving uniformity across governmental
agencies.' 8 Finally, CBA mandates can be a component of regulation itself-
that is, an agency could require a private actor to demonstrate that a new activi-
26. OMB Guidance, supra note 20, at 2.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
28. E.g., OMB Guidance, supra note 20.
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ty or product would have greater benefits than costs before it could be permis-
sibly sold.29
CBA process, by contrast, includes requirements for agencies to publicly
disclose any CBA they conduct, or the sources of their data, and to solicit pub-
lic comment and feedback on their CBA analyses (as under the APA).3° CBA
process laws can require agencies to discuss how they took comments into ac-
count in their final rulemaking decision, to present their CBAs in particular or
standardized formats, or to include specific kinds of information, such as
standard statistics or data analyses that bear on the reliability of the primary
findings of a quantified CBA. Such indicators of reliability include, for exam-
ple, confidence intervals, p-values, test statistics, correlation matrices, sensitivi-
ty analyses, and the results of "Monte Carlo" simulations. Such "soft law" re-
quirements may be viewed as a means of enhancing the quality of the agencies'
decisions by encouraging deliberation and care, or as a means of increasing
public understanding and the legitimacy of adopted rules. These process re-
quirements can also have less desirable effects, however, including delay, regu-
latory inertia, ill-informed judicial second-guessing, creation of incentives for
agencies to engage in CBA for show, and waste of regulatory resources.
29. E.g., Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM.
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 393, 397 (2o13) (arguing that CBA "should be applied to the
introduction of new [derivatives] products into markets by private participants"). This ap-
proach is close to the one currently used in regulation of mutual funds in both the United
States and the European Union, which generally forbid innovation in the design of collec-
tive investments without prior regulatory approval; as a result, proponents are generally re-
quired to demonstrate that the benefits of the design will outweigh its risks to investors. See
John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Le-
gal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591 (2009).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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Table i.




Policy Alternatives Causal inferences
Pros, cons31  Non-marketgoods
"Evidence" Externalities'
Process Mandates
Disclosure Requirements to conduct CBA policy
" Data sources Agent-monitors (courts, OIRA)
Law - Format Uniformity on key inputs:
" Secondary statistics * Discount rates
Solicitation of feedback * Models of demand
Putting the first two dimensions of CBA together, Table i illustrates the
multiple meanings that apparently synonymous uses of "cost-benefit analysis"
might have for different speakers or audiences. Table i suggests that it is possi-
ble to be an advocate for CBA/FR-whether conceptual or quantified-as a
form of policy analysis without wanting to entangle it in the legal system; or
that it is possible to favor efforts to quantify CBA/FR without wanting to man-
date quantification. One might even be skeptical that CBA/FR law will have
any effect at all. 3 Alternatively, if CBA/FR has clear virtues as policy analysis,
one might believe that those virtues would lead agencies to use it, at least
sometimes, without being legally required to do so, just as private businesses
adopt "best practices" on a voluntary basis. Likewise, one can favor CBA/FR
process laws without agreeing that courts or any other agency should have any
substantive role in evaluating or constraining the content of CBA/FR. Or one
could imagine mandating that a second political agent (a specialized court or
another agency) conduct the CBA/IFR analysis itself; the analysis would then
31. See, e.g., CAssR. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 199 n.1
(2014) (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, MR. FRANKLIN: A SELECTION FROM His PERSONAL LET-
TERS (Whitfield J. Bell Jr. & Leonard W. Labaree eds., 1956)).
32. See ANDREU MAS-COLLEL ET AL., MICROECONoMIc THEORY 350 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Introduction, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Eco-
nomic, and Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL ST=D. 837, 841 (2000) ("Much has been
written about whether the cost-benefit analysis executive orders have actually influenced the
behavior of agencies. Knowledgeable scholars in this area seem to doubt that the executive
orders have had much influence.").
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have to be used by the primary agencies as inputs into their rulemaking deci-
sions, without necessarily adding other process requirements to CBA/FR law.
C. Camouflage Versus Discipline
A third dimension along which CBA can vary is the motive of the person
using it-and, relatedly, its effects on third parties. The conventional, optimis-
tic view of CBA advocates - generally assumed or asserted rather than support-
ed with evidence' - is that CBA is an agency cost-control device, used by polit-
ically accountable representatives (Congress or the President) to discipline
expert but less accountable agencies (made up of appointed bureaucrats) in
their rulemaking efforts. In this view, CBA will improve the care that agencies
exercise in deciding whether a possible rule change is good for society while
limiting agencies' ability to adopt welfare-reducing rules.3" CBA optimists tend
to assume or assert that CBA will enhance public understanding of why regula-
tions are adopted (increase transparency) 6 and engage more people in the
34. No published study examines empirically whether CBA produces benefits that outweigh its
costs -whether CBA in practice passes its own test. Closest are studies assessing whether ex
ante quantitative CBA by executive agencies produced CBA that was consistent with retro-
spective estimates. E.g., ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MOR-
TALITY? 19 (2000) (finding that nine of twenty-four rules passed a cost-benefit test); Win-
ston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 297, 314 (2000) (finding that for fourteen of twenty-eight Occupational Safety and
Health Administration or EPA rules, total costs were overestimated, while for only three
were they underestimated, and overestimates were often due to difficulties in determining
the baseline and incomplete compliance). These studies do not provide reliable evidence
about whether CBA would pass its own test, because they do not model the counterfactual
of interest: how does regulation under CBA compare to regulation without it? For that anal-
ysis, one would need to match rules subject to CBA with those not subject to CBA, and
study which did better at achieving net benefits. One method may be to exploit the fact that
"economically significant rules" (ESRs) are subject to more stringent CBA under OMB
Guidance, supra note 20, than other rules, so one could compare outcomes for rules just
above and below the ESR threshold. Any objection that this question is simply too hard to
study should lead to a similar conclusion as the one reached by this Article- in other words,
that CBA/FR itself is unreliable.
35. E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1O9 YALE L.J. 165,
239 (1999) (tentatively recommending CBA over "unidimensional" or "nonaggregative" de-
cision procedure alternatives).
36. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2289-90 (2002) (defend-
ing CBA on the ground that, although the bottom-line quantification of the arsenic rule was
so uncertain that no conclusion could be reached from it, it was successful because it allowed
the government to be "transparent" about why the rule's net benefits were uncertain).
Transparency is often presented as an obviously good thing. Id.; Adler & Posner, supra note
35, at 239 (asserting the "inherent transparency of CBA itself" and noting that oversight
bodies such as OMB can prevent agencies from misusing CBA or applying it in a way that
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democratic process, potentially combating pernicious rent seeking by special
interests.3 7 By specifying how a rule will produce benefits, by acknowledging
the costs involved, and by encouraging the consideration of alternatives, CBA
is expected to improve the allocation of governmental resources and reduce the
drag of regulation on beneficial activities.3s Some but not all CBA optimists
even assert that CBA can mitigate cognitive biases of regulators or the public.
39
Despite having potential virtues, however, CBA can have a different, dark-
er, or more complex mix of effects. It can provide camouflage, reducing the
transparency of a rulemaking process.4° More disclosure does not always im-
prove transparency, a point that (ironically) some CBA advocates have made
strenuously when resisting disclosure rules for private actors. 41 Beyond the in-
decreases transparency). But see Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q 417, 444-45 (2003) (arguing
that information overload can lead to disclosures that are not meaningful or effective).
37. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1662, 1709
(2OO) (stating that "the case for cost-benefit analysis is strengthened by the fact that inter-
est groups are often able to use.. . cognitive problems strategically, thus fending off regula-
tion that is desirable or pressing for regulation when the argument on its behalf is fragile";
and noting the risk that, if permitted to adopt rules that do not pass a CBA test, agencies
"will conceal an effort to placate powerful private groups not having a strong claim to gov-
ernmental assistance"); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000) (agencies
sometimes adopt rules that benefit private interests).
38. Adler & Posner, supra note 35, at 245 ("CBA is a useful decision procedure and it should be
routinely used by agencies. CBA is superior to rival method[s] . . . [and] allows agencies to
take into account all relevant influences on overall well-being ... and ... to weigh the ad-
vantages and disadvantages in a clear and systematic way .... ").
39. Compare Sunstein, supra note 37, at 1662 (arguing that unless people "are asked to seek a full
accounting, they are likely to focus on small parts of problems" and explaining that CBA "is
a way of producing [a] full accounting" and is a "natural corrective" for "systematic errors"
and "misperceptions of facts" caused by the use of "rules of thumbs, or heuristics"), with
Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference
Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1161-62 (2000) (critiquing the justification of CBA as a cor-
rective for cognitive biases), and Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 1O6 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033
(2012) (critiquing Sunstein's research and attempts to account for cognitive biases in poli-
cymaking).
40. Despite being generally in favor of CBA, Adler and Posner acknowledge this point, but they
do not develop it as a theoretical reason to resist legalizing CBA. Adler & Posner, supra note
35, at 172 ("Agencies sometimes appear to use CBA to rationalize decisions made on other
grounds.").
41. Paredes, supra note 36, at 420 ("[T]he specter of information overload casts doubt on the
long-held belief and policy choice that more disclosure is better than less."). Paredes was a
Republican Commissioner of the SEC until 2013, and as Commissioner, Paredes was a
strong proponent of CBA. See Troy A. Paredes, Remarks at AICPA Council Spring
Meeting (May 17, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speecb/Detail/Speech/136517149o5oo#
.VEMV6ecdVEA [http://perma.cc/4JMC-JLK9] ("[The SEC] must engage in rigorous
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determinate effects of CBA soft law on the ability of the public to monitor
regulatory agencies, CBA can also be a tool of political struggle over the distri-
bution of rents, and it can serve as a means to increase the power of unelected
expert agents as a tactic in that struggle.'
The origins of CBA in the United States illustrate this set of possibilities. It
is commonly asserted that Congress "initiated the use of CBA in 1936, when
[it] ordered agencies to weigh the costs and benefits of projects designed for
flood control," 43 permitting authorization of such projects only if "the benefits
to whomsoever they accrue are in excess of the estimated costs."' This origin
story fits the optimistic view of CBA outlined above, making it a mechanism
used by elected and accountable representatives to control costs at a wayward
agency. In fact, however, the use of CBA by the Army Corps of Engineers
emerged earlier, on the initiative of the Corps itself, as described in Theodore
M. Porter's Trust in Numbers.4' In Porter's telling, the first efforts at CBA oc-
[CBA] when fashioning... securities law .... I have expressed these views several times
before in advocating for rigorous [CBA] at the SEC."); see also Alex Edmans et al., The Real
Costs of Disclosure 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19420, 2013) (ar-
guing that "even if the actual act of disclosure is costless, high-disclosure policy can still be
costly due to differential verifiability of some kinds of information").
42. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.
387, 443 (1981) ("[CBA] is arbitrary. It provides yet another medium for the introduction of
political preferences through what seem merely necessary 'practical' assumptions of any
analysis.... The focus on particular problems legitimates arbitrary assumptions and masks
their political content."); Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liber-
als, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2011) (book review) ("The danger of CBA... lies in its
false promise of determinacy, its pretense of objectivity and scientific accuracy .... [T]his
false promise ... renders CBA... vulnerable to manipulation and... destructive to demo-
cratic decision-making, as... Sunstein's analysis of the arsenic CBA amply demonstrates.").
43. E.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 35, at 169 & n.5 (citing Ajrr K. DASGUPTA & D.W. PEARCE,
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORYAND PRACTICE 12-13 (1972)).
44. Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. S 701a (2o12); see also Sherwin, supra note 15, at 6 (cit-
ing JAMES T. CAMIEN, BENEFIT, COST, AND BEYOND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BENEFIT-
COST ANALYSIS 16 (1986)). Sherwin correctly notes but does not discuss an earlier statute,
the River and Harbor Act of 1902, ch. 1079, § 3, 32 Stat. 331, 372. That statute directed the
organization and authorized the funding of a board of engineers reporting to the Chief of
Engineers of the United States Army. The board was directed "so far as in the opinion of the
Chief of Engineers may be necessary" to review reports for proposed river and harbor im-
provements and submit recommendations and "have in view the amount and character of
commerce existing or reasonably prospective which will be benefited by the improvement,
and the relation of the ultimate cost of such work.., to the public commercial interests in-
volved, and the public necessity for the work." 33 U.S.C. § 541 (2012). The board was in-
structed to do the same for past projects upon request by relevant congressional committees.
Id.
45. THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND
PuBLic LIFE 148-9o (1995).
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curred in 1902, with the creation of a board within the Corps; opponents of
public works spending hoped that the board's performance of cost-benefit
analysis and its issuance of recommendations would "reduce opportunities for
purely political choices." 46 Rather than ranking all projects based on CBA,
which would have systematized project choice, the Corps chose to maintain
flexibility, "recognizing, it seems, that congressional choice was the key to con-
gressional favor."'47 Far from being a tool for the management of the Corps,
CBA became a tool by some politicians and by the Corps to manipulate Con-
gress.
The Corps had developed a "huge civilian labor force" prior to the 1936
Flood Control Act, which mandated strict CBA for new projects. That Act, too,
Porter concludes, was not aimed at disciplining the Corps, but was "one of the
heroic efforts of the United States Congress to control its own bad habits."4s
The Act's requirements, and particularly the delay requirement, were viewed as
a benefit, and not a necessary cost, of conducting CBA: "A preliminary exami-
nation and then a full survey, each running through several levels of Corps bu-
reaucracy, required months or years, and could not be completed to satisfy the
sudden whim of a legislator."49 Far from reducing the power of the Corps, the
regularization of the project approval process (and the implementation of
CBA) enhanced it, because neither Congress nor the public exerted the effort
needed to evaluate and assess the Corps's numerically impressive but some-
times ad hoc analyses: "The numbers were almost never questioned. 0
If some members of Congress favored a particular outcome, they could at-
tempt to "manage" the Corps by finding unorthodox benefits to "quantify" (or
include in a guesstimated CBA). One local district's engineer, faced with an un-
favorable CBA report based solely on flood control benefits, "developed other
benefits that he did not find ... necessary to develop when he wrote his main
report," including benefits from downstream power, pollution abatement, and
improved water supply."' Over time, more benefits were guesstimated, and
previously rejected projects were accepted. 2 The result, in Porter's view, was
that "Corps economic methods [that is, its CBA] could not, by themselves, de-
termine the outcome of an investigation."s' This observation was particularly
46. Id. at 153.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 155.
49. Id.
5o. Id. at 157.
s. Id. at 16o.
s2. Id. at 161.
53- Id.
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true when powerful interest groups, such as the utility and railroad industries,
or other regulatory bodies, such as units of the Department of Agriculture or
the Interior Department, opposed the Corps's initial conclusions.5 4
In sum, CBA can in principle provide public-regarding benefits by disci-
plining agencies, increasing transparency, and enhancing the public's engage-
ment with the regulatory process. In theory, CBA can reduce agency costs asso-
ciated with delegation by politically accountable lawmakers to expert but less
accountable agencies. But CBA can have other effects beyond direct costs of the
CBA itself. These effects include use of technically opaque analytics to (1) ob-
scure the issues at play, (2) raise the risks for lawmakers to question regulators,
(3) shift power from Congress to regulators, (4) hide rent seeking, and (5) fa-
vor factions in distributional struggles among lawmakers. One form of camou-
flage that seems likely to recur is the presentation of guesstimated CBA as
quantified CBA -which potentially misleads the public by omitting significant
information about the uncertainty, judgment, and sensitivity of particular nu-
merical results in a CBA.
Depending on one's assumptions about the alignment of agency interests
with public interests, these effects may be costly or beneficial. But they should
be kept in mind when evaluating a given type of CBA in a given context, and
they suggest that CBA itself needs to be subject to CBA before being mandated
through law. In Part IV, I sketch a third set of effects that CBA policy can
have- stimulating innovation and inducing better regulation over time-that
differs from both the disciplinary role touted by advocates of CBA law and the
camouflaging role illustrated by the Corps's history.
D. Alternatives to Quantified CBAiFR
CBA is sometimes promoted on the ground that there is no superior alter-
native."5 Leading proponents of CBA/FR in the United Kingdom, for example,
acknowledge problems with CBA/FR and then argue these problems do "not
... mean that the best course would be to fail altogether to deploy the tech-
niques of economic analysis.", 6 (One would hope not!) Yet viable alternatives
exist.
54. Id. at 149.
55. Adler & Posner, supra note 35, at 194 (noting "an argument [they] believe has currency
among economists although it is rarely defended in print... is that CBA is desirable be-
cause there are no superior alternatives that provide determinate, or relatively determinate,
prescriptions").
56. Isaac Alfon & Peter Andrews, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: How To Do It and
How It Adds Value, FIN. SERVIcEs AUTHORITY, Sept. 1999, at ii http://spi-romania.eu/admin
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In non-financial areas of regulation, agencies use feasibility analysis, which
focuses on the technical capacity of private actors to comply with a proposed
rule; this procedure pays some attention to costs rather than attempting to
quantify the rule's full range of costs and benefits.57 Another alternative is risk-
risk analysis, in which the risk addressed by a rule is compared to risks that can
be expected to arise as private actors respond to the rule.58 Another option
(sometimes included as a component of CBA) is cost-effectiveness analysis, in
which costs of different methods of achieving stipulated or assumed benefits
are estimated and compared. 9 Yet another, reflected in some important stat-
utes relevant to financial regulation, 6, is a flat ban on certain kinds of activi-
ties- that is, requirements that agencies enact and enforce mandatory rules re-
gardless of what an agency's CBA/FR might suggest about those rules' net
benefits.61
1. The "Alternative" of Expert Judgment
But the primary "alternative" to guesstimated CBA/FR is expert judgment,
which typically includes at least some elements of conceptual CBA (whether or
not expressed in writing) and can be elicited and deployed in a variety of ways.
More precisely, however, expert judgment is not an "alternative," but a neces-
sary component of guesstimated or quantified CBA, as the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's guidance on CBA (OMB Guidance) makes clear. 62 When
/filemanager/files/bulgaria/o.4.fsa cba in financial-regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/XY93
-BFA3].
57. Sinden, supra note 42, at 226-27.
58. See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Weiner eds., 1995).
59. HENRY M. LEVIN, COST-EFFECTIVENESS: APRIMER 17-18 (1983).
60. An example is the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which bans banks from being
owned by or affiliating with companies engaged in non-financial activities. Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 S 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2010). The Federal Reserve Board and other
banking agency regulations interpreting this statute do not engage in CBA when they evalu-
ate whether an activity is prohibited by the statute.
61. Despite the repeal in the Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act, Pub. L. No. lO6-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 162, banks and companies that control banks are still banned from most non-financial
activities and investments under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. The Volcker Rule
is similar, as discussed infra Part III.D, in that it bans banks from specified activities.
62. OMB Guidance, supra note 20 (suggesting the use of "judgment" or "professional judg-
ment" fourteen times, including the use of formal Delphi methods for eliciting expert seat-
of-the-pants estimates). On Delphi methods, see M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION,
UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 164-68 (1990). For a trenchant attack on CBA generally, arguing in favor of the
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defenders of CBA argue that expert judgment may be- as it often is - flawed,
they are also necessarily arguing that CBA is flawed. The question is not, then,
"What is the alternative?" Rather, it is, "Is judgment being camouflaged as
something it is not?" An honest acceptance of the central role of judgment in
policymaking, whether or not decorated with guesstimated CBA, should lower
the stakes in the fight over CBA law.
In the context of financial regulation, the judgment of regulatory staff is
expert because the appointees of the financial agencies have generally spent
their careers in and have developed specialized knowledge of finance, financial
institutions, and financial markets .63 They have sharpened their intuitive sense
of what kinds of regulations work and why- particularly relative to non-
experts, such as generalist judges. Such intuitions can be disciplined and in-
formed in ways other than through formal CBA, such as through discussions
with other experts (within or outside an agency); case studies, surveys, and
polls; retrospective evaluations; regulatory experiments that are deliberately
adopted without specific predictions about how they will turn out; and other
forms of assessment that are not part of quantified CBA/FR.64
The experience and expertise of financial regulators does not make them
infallible: the 20o8 financial crisis proves that regulators with expertise can lack
judgment, particularly when the challenges they face are novel, as with shadow
use of "intelligent deliberation" as the alternative, see Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of
the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000).
63. The expertise of the financial agencies includes vastly more firepower than is available to
OIRA, which has a total staff of roughly fifty. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) Q& A's, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET (Nov. 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb
/oira-qsandas [http://perma.cc/AA96-TFKU]. The Federal Reserve Board alone has 220
Ph.D. economists on staff. See Ryan Grim, Priceless: How the Federal Reserve Bought the
Economics Profession, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2oo9/o9/o7/priceless-how-the-federal n_2788o5.html [http://perma.cc/M9AN-FZRL].
The SEC has more than fifty economists. See Economists, SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION (Oct. 7,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/economistbios.shtml [http://perma.cc/NT98
-GHUU]. For a discussion of the careers of SEC Commissioners and staff, see John C.
Coates W, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis,
41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531 (2001).
64. E.g., Cybersecurity Roundtable, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (May 14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov
/spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable.shtnl [http://perma.cc/SXKY-R6KJ] (example of con-
sultation by SEC with experts); Office of Econ. Analysis, Economic Analysis of the Short Sale
Price Restrictions Under the Regulation SHO Pilot, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb.
6, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2oo7/regshopiloto2o6o7.pdf [http://perma.cc
/23G6-S9YC] (example of regulatory experiment); Office of Econ. Analysis, Study of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2 Section 404 Internal Control over Financial Reporting Requirements,
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2009) [hereinafter Office of Econ. Analysis, Study of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2oo9/sox-4o4-study.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5DBB-H45S] (example of study including survey data).
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banking, over-the-counter derivatives, and (ironically) the complex and unan-
ticipated effects of deregulation.6 s More generally, in many domains, experts
are no more capable of predicting certain kinds of complex events than non-
66experts. Nevertheless, in the realm of financial regulation, expert judgment
has always played a central role in the setting of monetary policy. This brings
us to the Taylor Rule.
2. Monetary Policy: A Limiting Example
To set the stage for case studies of rules in Part III, this section recognizes
that even CBA/FR's proponents do not advocate requiring CBA/FR for mone-
tary policy. 67 As will be seen, guesstimated CBA/FR of monetary policy would
result in conceptual, theoretical, and empirical challenges identical to those that
arise in the case studies reviewed in Part Il1. This fact raises the question of
why, precisely, CBA/FR proponents believe a line should be drawn between
rules for monetary policy and other financial regulations.
To think through how CBA/FR might in principle be applied to monetary
policy, consider the Taylor Rule. That "rule" is a principle of monetary policy
that stipulates how much the Federal Reserve (or any central bank) should
change nominal interest rates in response to changes in prices, output, or other
economic quantities. In particular, the Rule stipulates that for a percent in-
crease in inflation, a central bank should raise interest rates by more than a per-
68centage point. First proposed in its specifics by John Taylor in 1993, the Rule
65. See Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in
the United States, FIN. CISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 27-82 (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http ://perma.cc/43W2-7WAU].
66. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLrrICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE
KNow? (2005) (noting that expert political opinion is often wrong); Tom Stark, Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Phila., Realistic Evaluation of Real-Time Forecasts in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters 2 (May 28, 2010) (unpublished paper), http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and
-data/publications/research-rap/2o10/realistic-evaluation-of-real-time-forecasts.pdf [http://
perma.cc/W4GG-J84W] (concluding that expert economic forecasts beat "no change" fore-
casts and simple direct and indirect autoregression models, but performance of forecasts fell
sharply for predictions more than three months in the future).
67. See infra note 73.
68. More specifically, the Rule calls for the Fed to set the federal funds rate (traditionally its
principal instrument for setting monetary policy) at one plus s.5 times the inflation rate plus
0.5 times the "output gap," defined as the percentage deviation of actual GDP from "poten-
tial" GDP. See John B. Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 39 CARNEGIE-
ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 195, 202 (1993). "Potential" GDP is an estimate of
"the trend growth in the productive capacity of the economy ... an estimate of the level of
GDP attainable when the economy is operating at a high rate of resource use ... [that is,
an estimate of] maximum sustainable output-the level of real GDP in a given year
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sought to reduce uncertainty, limit adaptive inefficiency, and increase credibil-
ity by avoiding frequent changes in monetary policy as a result of the exercise
of discretion. 6' The Federal Reserve, it should be emphasized, has never
"promulgated" the Taylor Rule, nor has it adopted the Rule in any formal or
public fashion.7' Nevertheless, the Rule does fairly characterize (as a first ap-
proximation) the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve for some of the years
under Chairman Alan Greenspan.7'
Suppose, counterfactually, a future Federal Reserve (or Congress) wanted
to "adopt" the Taylor Rule -or any other rule for conducting monetary poli-
cy- in a formal fashion. Could the Rule be defended through CBA/FR? Only a
few CBA/FR proponents suggest that it could, or should, be defended through
CBA. The numerous proposed bills in Congress that would extend CBA to
the independent agencies have all exempted monetary policy. 3
that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation." CBO's Method for Estimating Potential
Output: An Update, CONG. BUDGET OFF. I (Aug. 2001), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default
/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/3oxx/doc3o2o/potentialoutput.pdf [http://perma.cc/L68J-SMQV].
Although models of potential GDP vary, the CBO publishes estimates that are widely used,
based on the "Solow growth model," a simple projection of GDP based on two supply-side
factors: "labor input (hours worked) and accumulation of physical capital (additions to the
nation's stock of plant and equipment)." Id. at 3.
69. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 207-08. For prior theoretical work, see Finn E. Kydland & Ed-
ward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL.
ECON. 473 (1977).
70. In fact, Taylor has argued that the Federal Reserve has repeatedly deviated from his rule.
John B. Taylor, Getting Back on Track: Macroeconomic Policy Lessons from the Financial Crisis,
92 FED. RES. BANK oF ST. LouIs REv. 165-76 (May/June 2010) [hereinafter Taylor, Getting
Back on Track]; John B. Taylor, A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules, in MONETARY
POLICY RULES 319 (John B. Taylor ed., 1999) [hereinafter Taylor, A Historical Analysis]. On
the other hand, recently departed Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve
Board members, and staff economists have argued the contrary-and, moreover, have
claimed that Taylor's 1993 formulation of his rule differs from his 1999 formulation. Ben
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, Speech at
the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2oloolo3a.htm [http://perma
.cc/KT3L-6SVD]; Laurence Meyer, Dueling Taylor Rules, MACROECONOMIC ADVISORS:
MONETARY POL'Y INSIGHTS, Aug. 20, 2009; Glenn Rudebusch, The Fed's Monetary Policy Re-
sponse to the Current Crisis, 2009-17 FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. ECON. LETTER (May 22, 2009).
71. Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy & David H. Papell, Taylor's Rule Versus Taylor Rules i (Sept. 15,
2012) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826363 [http://perma.cc/7U7U
-O,5z] (referring to the period under Greenspan from 1987 to 1992).
72. Compare Kydland & Prescott, supra note 69, at 487 (advocating that Congress select a "sim-
ple and easily understood" monetary policy rule and have it take effect prospectively after a
two-year delay-without explaining how such a law could be made binding on a future
Congress), with Ricardo Reis, Central Bank Design, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 17, 18 (2013) (stating
that central banks' objectives have usually been "vague"); id. at 19 (stating that "some dis-
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Why is monetary policy exempt? Politics and political power play a role, of
course: few politicians want to take on the Federal Reserve (even if a few have
done so, particularly during the public outcry over the 2008 crisis).7 4 History
and tradition also play a role: monetary policy in the United States has long
been (by consensus) an exercise in discretionary judgment, and it involves bal-
ancing multiple goals-full employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates.7' Any strict rule to set monetary policy according to a full
quantified CBA would have to reverse this tradition and implicitly choose a
priority scheme for the goals; as a result, the rule would be (to return to poli-
tics) highly unlikely to achieve the supermajority support necessary to enact
major legislation in the United States.
But policy, too, plays a role here. In a context of high empirical and theo-
retical uncertainty, multiple competing macroeconomic models have long coex-
cretion" may better allow a central bank to achieve even clearly stated objectives); id. at 25-
26 (stating that central banks "always have some discretion"), and John B. Taylor, A Steadier
Course for Monetary Policy, Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee on "The Fed at
loo: Can Monetary Policy Close the Growth Gap and Promote a Sound Dollar?" 3-4 (Apr.
18, 2013), http://www.stanford.edu/-johntayl/JEC%2oTestimony%2o-%2oApril%2o18.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8KB2-B5 WA] (calling for a "return to a more rules-based policy" and a
"gradual exit" from what he criticizes as unfortunate policy decisions, and not for a sudden
or strict "rule" to set policy; declaring that, under his proposal, "while discretion would be
constrained, it would not be eliminated").
73. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. Even those who advocate greater Fed trans-
parency- as reflected in the various bills known colloquially as "Audit the Fed" laws- would
not subject the Fed's monetary policy choices to either ex ante CBA requirements or ex post
review by courts or another agency. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, S.
209, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing to repeal exemption from audit by the Comptroller
General of the Federal Reserve, contained in 31 U.S.C. § 714, for various transactions, delib-
erations, and communications relating to, among other things, monetary policy).
74. Sewall Chan, From Tea Party Advocates, Anger at the Federal Reserve, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. o,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1o/o/11/us/politics/lfed.html [http://perma.cc/74TA
-GNYU] (describing Republican politicians' criticisms of the Fed based on Fed policy deci-
sions during the economic crisis).
7S. On the overall goals pursued by the Fed, see What Is the Purpose of the Federal Reserve
System?, BOARD GovERNoRs FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about
12594.htm [http://perma.cc/TW9Z-ANYL] (outlining the Fed's legal responsibilities and
goals, including an effective payment system and a stable financial system). The Fed's statu-
tory mandate relating to monetary policy is narrower, consisting of seeking to maintain the
"long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's
long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
I am informed by close observers of Congress that the Office of Legislative Council -which
provides confidential drafting advice to members of Congress and their staffs -routinely
suggests exemptions for monetary policy from bills imposing procedural or other require-
ments on regulatory action, based on a strong norm of preserving the Fed's independence in
overseeing monetary policy.
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isted to guide the achievement of monetary policy's goals. However, these
models are widely conceded to be contestable, 76 and no one model has ever
achieved anything close to a consensus among "mainstream" economists. For
this reason, presumably, even the most rule-oriented members of the Federal
Reserve have never seriously attempted to persuade the Board to tie its own
hands by articulating publicly a "rule" that would eliminate the Board's discre-
tion to set interest rates.
Absent such hand-tying, there is no need to exempt monetary policy from
the proposed CBA/FR laws. So why have they been exempted? Presumably be-
cause CBA/FR proponents recognize that there may be welfare-enhancing
"rules" (in the sense of regularities in the exercise of discretion that might come
within the legal definition of "rule" used in the APA) 7 that can discipline regu-
lators but cannot be reliably shown to satisfy a cost-benefit test. The idea that a
"rule" in the general legal sense of the A-PA could be valuable without being
first validated by quantified CBA/FR prevails across many domains of discre-
tionary decision making: in an attempt to constrain itself, a corporate board of
directors may decide to adopt rules about the situations in which it wants offic-
ers to present an investment to the board (instead of pursuing the investment
on their own), but such self-imposed rules may not be defensible under any
kind of quantitative framework. Rules, in other words, can be a part of the way
that discretionary judgment is exercised. Rules can have value even if they can-
not be supported by evidence showing that their quantifiable benefits exceed
their quantifiable costs.
Indeed, CBA/FR's strongest proponents concede that expert judgment is
necessary because CBA/FR can only be as good as the expert judgment that in-
forms it. 8 Pro-CBA/FR bills pending in Congress exempt monetary policy,
presumably for this reason, and there is no serious call for hard-wiring mone-
tary decisions into legislation or regulation. While there are economists who
believe that basing monetary policy on simpler rule-like elements may be a
good idea, even they suggest that rule-like monetary policy be adopted as a
76. See ROGERE. BACKHOUSE, THE PUZZLE OF MODERN ECONOMICS: SCIENCE OR IDEOLOGY? 117-
37 (2oo) (describing historical and ongoing debates within economics over whether and
how to construct macroeconomic models, and detailing continuing disputes over the ability
of such models to adequately forecast economic behavior).
77. The APA defines a "rule" as any "statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. 5 551 (2012). If
the pending bills did not exempt monetary policy, then any "statement" by the Federal Re-
serve Board meant to "implement ... policy" would arguably require CBA/FR under the
APA. Id.
78. OMB Guidance, supra note 20, at 2 ("You will find that you cannot conduct a good regulato-
ry analysis according to a formula. Conducting high-quality analysis requires competent
professional judgment.").
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matter of expert discretion by the Federal Reserve Board and be subject to dis-
cretionary exceptions. 9
The question remaining, then, is whether discretionary judgment should
be confined to monetary policy or whether it should remain available for finan-
cial regulation more broadly. Put differently, the question is whether quanti-
fied CBA/FR is itself actually an alternative to judgment, or whether it should
be viewed as judgment camouflaged by numbers ("judgment in drag," one
might say, or less colorfully, "judgment in disguise"). To answer that question,
a detailed analysis of what CBA/FR might look like is needed.
il. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CBA/FR
As noted at the outset, a movement is afoot to impose CBA/FR on financial
regulation. This movement is flowing through a variety of channels. Interest
groups and advocacy organizations have been promoting CBA/FR as both poli-
cy and law, and regulators themselves have been beefing up their quantitatively
trained staffs. But one big force (perhaps the biggest) that is promoting the
role of CBA/FR has been judicial activism- aggressive review of agency deci-
sions by courts focused in large part on CBA. After reviewing statutes relevant
to CBA/FR, this Part critically assesses recent cases in the D.C. Circuit that
have overturned financial regulations in whole or in part because of what some
judges have seen as inadequately quantified CBA/FR. This Part concludes with
a summary of how this judicial activism has led some of the financial agencies
to engage in more CBA/FR, and has amplified legislative efforts to promote
CBA/FR through oversight and proposed legislation.
A. Existing CBAiFR Law
Formally, independent agencies 8 such as the financial regulators are not
subject to explicit CBA/FR law to the same extent as executive agencies, which
have been required (by executive order since 1981 and by statute since 1995) to
conduct CBA for new rules. 8, Vice President George H.W. Bush requested in
7g. See Taylor, Getting Back on Track, supra note 70; Taylor, A Historical Analysis, supra note 70.
go. Independent regulatory agencies are listed in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 198o. 44
U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012). Not all financial regulations are issued by independent agencies;
the Department of Labor, which is an executive agency, promulgates regulations relevant to
pension funds, for example, and is governed by the executive orders listed infra note 81.
81. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (requiring, inter alia, CBA for
new regulations), superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. S1,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(modestly amending prior CBA requirements, imposing heightened requirements for "sig-
nificant regulatory action" and further requirements for actions likely to have an economic
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1981 that the executive agencies comply with the CBA portions of the executive
orders, and some of the financial agencies have at times voluntarily, if incom-
pletely and inconsistently, done so.82 By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the
two main financial regulatory agencies are required by statute to conduct quan-
tified CBA/FR, unless in the opinion of the agencies the costs or benefits "can-
not reasonably be estimated" or "it is not reasonably practicable to produce an
estimate," in which case the agency must publish its opinion and explain it. 83
impact of $1oo million per year (hereinafter, an "economically significant rulemaking")),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (eliminating the role
of the Vice President in the CBA process), supplemented by Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed.
Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). Under these orders, executive agencies are required to conduct
quantified CBA to the extent feasible, to submit significant rules to OIRA in advance, to
provide CBAs to OIRA, to wait until OIRA reviews the CBAs before publishing rules for
public comment, and to publish CBAs with rules. Id. Independent agencies are required on-
ly to provide OMB with an annual agenda of significant regulatory actions for the upcoming
year, including, "to the extent feasible and permitted by law," a summary CBA. Id. Sherwin
reports having reviewed these agendas for the SEC in the period leading up to 2006, and he
found they did not generally include summary CBA. Sherwin, supra note 15, at 12. These ex-
ecutive orders were joined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requirement that execu-
tive agencies, but not independent agencies, include written CBAs for each economically
significant rulemaking. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109
Star. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
82. E.g., Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke that Federal
Open Market Committee purchases of financial assets are conducted "within a [CBA]
framework"); SEC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 38-39 (1999)
(stating that SEC rule proposals should contain CBAs). This handbook reflected OMB's
best practices guidance issued in 1996, see GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-15 1
DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL
ANALYSES AND COORDINATION n.14 (2011); see also Budget Hearing-Securities and Exchange
Commission: Hearing Before the Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov't Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro), Federal News
Service, Inc., transcript at 26-27; SEC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF AU-
DITS, SEC OIG 499, FoLLow-UP REIvEw OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED DODD-
FRANK RULEMAKINGS 6 (2012) ("SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that there was an ex-
pectation that the SEC would perform cost-benefit analyses as part of the rulemaking pro-
cess."). See generally BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA: THE
ERUPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 78 (1995); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-18 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers & the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
591-93 (1984).
83. Financial Services Act, 2012, amending inter alia sections 1381 (Financial Conduct Authority)
and 138J (Prudential Regulation Authority) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
In striking contrast to the recent U.S. experience, the FSA and its successors' rulemakings
and CBA (while subject to judicial review) have not been subjected to numerous court deci-
sions striking down rules for inadequate CBA. The only example of a court decision that
even refers to CBA by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is R (on the application of the
British Bankers Association) v. FSA et al., [2011] EWHC (Admin) 999 (Eng.), which rejected
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Three CBA-related statutes cover the independent agencies. The Paper-
work Reduction Act (PRA) requires agencies to justify collection of infor-
mation from the public, to minimize the burden of any information collection
process, and to maximize the utility of information gathered s4 The Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) requires agencies to assess and consider alternatives to
the burden of regulation on small entities. 8' The Congressional Review Act
(CRA) requires agencies to submit proposed rules-along with any CBA the
agencies have conducted- to Congress and the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO). 8 6 The statute requires the GAO to submit an assessment to Con-
gress of any "major rule," defined as any rule having an expected impact of
$1oo million or more.s 7
As a result of these statutes, independent agencies include some CBA-
relevant information in rulemakings, the GAO has been submitting annual re-
ports on CBA for major rules (including rulemakings by independent agen-
cies), and the OMB has collected and reported on the GAO's reports on an an-
nual basis.88 Analyses under the PRA and the RFA represent only a subset of a
a challenge by a banking trade group to the handling of complaints about "Payment Protec-
tion Insurance" by the FSA and the Financial Ombudsman Service, which handles consumer
financial complaints.
84. Pub. L. No. 104-13, lo9 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520).
85. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (198o) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6Ol-612). The RFA was
one basis for the recent suit against the Volcker Rule by the American Bar Association. See
infra note 341.
86. Technically, the reports are submitted to the head of the GAO, the Comptroller General.
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 11o Stat. 847 (1996)
(codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. §§ 8oi et seq.). This statute exempts monetary policy by
the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee. 5 U.S.C. § 807.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 804. Under the statute, major rules do not go into effect for sixty days, and Con-
gress has the power to veto "major rules" by joint resolution passed within that period, sub-
ject to presidential veto of the joint resolution. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8Ol-802. Courts have interpreted
this statute to preclude judicial review of agency compliance with the statute, including
agency determinations of whether a rule is "major." See, e.g., Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3 d 1259, 1271 n.11 (loth Cir. 2007) ("The Congressional Review Act
specifically precludes judicial review of an agency's compliance with its terms."); Operation
of the Missouri River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1173 (D. Minn. 2004) (agency's de-
termination under CRA that a rule is not a "major rule" is not subject to judicial review); see
also Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Tex. Sav. &
Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., 2ol F.3 d 551 (5th Cir. 2000).
88. E.g., GAO-o3 -933R Report Under 5 U.S.C. 5 8o1(a)(2)(A) on a Major Rule, U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILTY OFF. (June 25, 2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/9o/83472.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CEG8-WVRH] (reviewing the rule proposed by the SEC for the implementation
of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, discussed more infra Part III.A); GAO-14-14 7R,
Report Under 5 U.S.C. 5 8o1(a)(2)(A) on a Major Rule, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.
(Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/66o/65881o.pdf [http://perma.cc/VXV-A35 V ]
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full CBA- even of a full conceptual CBA- and the information in these reports
is thin - generally indicating whether CBA was conducted, without regard to
whether it was conceptual or quantified, extensive or brief, persuasive or per-
functory. Still, the PRA and RFA have generated information used to critique
financial rules on CBA-related grounds, and the GAO's and OMB's reports
have made the complete absence of voluntary CBA in many rulemakings by in-
dependent agencies more salient over time. Together, this information has
fueled legislative, inter- and intra-agency, and interest group pressure on the
financial regulatory agencies to do more on their own to conduct CBA, and has
also led to a sharp increase in industry-funded court challenges to agency
rulemakings on CBA/iFR grounds.
B. A Critical Assessment of Judicial Review of CBA/FR
Despite the fact that CBA/FR is not clearly required of independent agen-
cies, business trade groups have since 2000 invested significant time and re-
sources to persuade courts-primarily the D.C. Circuit-to strike down a series
of rules under the APA and under statutes that authorize financial regulation.
Cited in internal CBA/FR guidance promulgated by the CFTC and the SEC,
these decisions have clouded implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, contrib-
uting significantly to the rulemaking delays under that law. These decisions
have had an impact on the legislative process, as lawmakers, lobbyists, and the
agencies themselves have noticed that rules receive different treatment depend-
ing on whether Congress has required the agencies to enact them or has given
the agencies discretion and authority to act on their own.
The first in the recent string of judicial interventions was Chamber of Com-
merce v. SEC.89 In that decision, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC failed to
comply with the Investment Company Act (ICA). The ICA requires the SEC to
"consider... whether [regulatory] action will promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation,"9" a requirement added to the SEC's statutory mandates
(reviewing the rule proposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
and the Federal Reserve to implement Basel III, discussed more infra Part III.C); Off. Info.
& Regulatory Affairs, 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations
and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, OFF. MGMT. BUDGET
app. C, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2o12-cb/2o12_cost
_benefit repor.pdf [http://perma.cc/2N6B-NKL7] (assessing CBA of "major rules" issued
by independent agencies in the prior fiscal year).
89. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F. 3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
90. 412 F.3d at 142 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-2(c) (2012)).
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in 1996.91 As a result, according to the court, the SEC had also violated the
APA.92 The rules in question-discussed in Part IJI.B-made exemptions under
other rules conditional on mutual funds increasing their boards' independence.
The specific CBA/iFR-related failings to which the court pointed were two
small parts of the SEC's regulatory analysis. The first was that the SEC de-
clined to quantify costs of requiring more independent directors because it did
not know how funds would respond to the rule.9 3 This, the court replied, was
no excuse, saying that the SEC could have determined "the range within which
a fund's cost of compliance [would] fall, depending on how it responds to the
condition."94 Presumably the court had in mind that the SEC could quantify
costs of each possible response and guesstimate a range based on assumptions
about how many funds would choose each option.
The second failing was similar, relating to a requirement that fund boards
have an independent chair. There, the SEC declined to quantify costs of the
newly independent chairs' hiring staff because staffing would be discretionary
and the SEC had no basis for knowing how many chairs would hire staff (or
how many staff each chair would hire). Again, the court held the SEC needed
to guesstimate this subset of costs by estimating the costs for an individual
fund, an exercise that the court asserted (without further explanation) would
be "pertinent" to an "assessment" of the requirement. 9 But the only way that
an individual fund cost estimate would be "pertinent" is if the SEC implicitly
or explicitly made further assumptions about how many funds would incur
those costs -even though the SEC explicitly noted that it had no reliable basis
on which to build the assumptions, and the court offered no reason to doubt
91. National Securities Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § io6, i1o Stat. 3416,
3425 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-2). Identical requirements were added to the other
federal securities laws. Id.
92. 412 F.3d at 144.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 143.
95. Id. at 144. The third failing did not raise CBA issues, and arose under the APA directly: the
SEC had not formally considered a disclosure alternative to its proposals, in which funds
would prominently disclose whether they had independent chairs. Here, the court pointed
to the fact that two dissenting Commissioners had suggested the alternative, along with a
number of commentators, and that the SEC's only stated reasons for not considering it were
that it had no obligation to consider every alternative raised, that it did consider other alter-
natives, and that Congress in the ICA itself had not relied on disclosure to police conflicts of
interest in funds. To this, the court noted, "[T]hat the Congress required more than disclo-
sure with respect to some matters governed by the ICA does not mean it deemed disclosure
insufficient with respect to all such matters." Id. at 144-46.
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the SEC's claim., 6 The court's analysis under the APA was nonexistent: be-
cause the SEC had not followed the ICA, the court reasoned, it had violated the
APA.
97
In sum, the court interpreted the requirement that the SEC "consider" a
rule's effects on "efficiency" to imply a very specific CBA/FR mandate- calling
on the SEC to guesstimate the range of one of a rule's costs, rather than merely
identifying the type of cost imposed. The court's interpretation of the ICA was
based on no prior court decision 98 and no legislative history. Nor is it implicit
in the ICA's words, as "efficiency" is frequently used as a qualitative and not
exclusively quantitative concept.9 9 Nowhere did the court cite (much less dis-
cuss) Supreme Court precedent under the APA that had emphasized that
courts should be highly deferential in reviewing an agency's judgment under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.'00 Nor did it address precedents more
generally admonishing courts to be mindful of the "complex nature of econom-
ic analysis" in deferring to agencies." '
96. Id. at 137 (citing Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,387 n.81) (stating that
"[w] e have no reliable basis for estimating those costs").
97. Id. at 144 ("The Commission did violate the APA by failing adequately to consider the costs
mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the conditions."); accord id. at 136.
98. The only precedent cited by the court in its critique of the SEC's CBA was Public Citizen v.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F. 3d 1209 (D.C. Cit. 2004). In that case, an
executive (not independent) agency that was specifically required by statute to "consider the
costs and benefits" of its regulation was held to have violated a distinct statutory require-
ment to "deal[] with ... fatigue-related issues pertaining to . . . vehicle safety," which the
court there interpreted as requiring the agency to collect and analyze data on the costs and
benefits of a specific possible regulation. Id. at 1211-12 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 31502, 31506,
31136 (2012)); see also id. at 1221 ("This directive, in our view, required the agency, at a min-
imum, to collect and analyze data on the costs and benefits."). No specific directive of that
kind was at issue in Chamber of Commerce, only the open-ended directive for the SEC to con-
sider the effects of its rules on "efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 412 F.3d at
140 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-2(c) (2012)).
99. See, e.g., MAs-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 32, at 127, 152-53 (discussing "efficiency" without
reference to quantitative data).
lao. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). After
Chamber of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit has held that courts should be "particularly deferen-
tial in matters implicating predictive judgments," Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC, 588 F.3d
1095, 11o5 (D.C. Cit. 2009), which led another panel of the D.C. Circuit to hold that the
APA "imposes no general obligation on agencies to produce empirical evidence" when it is
not in the agency's record. Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F. 3d 514, 519 (D.C.
Cit. 2009).
1o1. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F. 3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cit. 2002). This fact has led another
panel of the D.C. Circuit, after Chamber of Commerce, to announce sweepingly that courts
should "review ... cost-benefit analysis deferentially." Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA,
682 F. 3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Finally, the court never explained how a crude guesstimate of one condi-
tional component of possible costs of a rule could meaningfully inform the
public about the "efficiency" of the rule when the SEC had not quantified the
benefits of the rule - and when the court did not suggest that the SEC try to do
so, whether it could, or how it could if it tried. In other words, the court read
general language in the ICA as if it required the SEC to comply with the Execu-
tive Orders requiring CBA/FR "to the extent feasible," °2 and then added an
interpretive gloss on OMB Guidance that has little apparent virtue in improv-
ing public understanding of the rule. Whatever the merits of the SEC's mutual
fund rules- and there are reasons (noted in Part III.B) to suggest that the rules
might not be a good idea on balance -the merits of the court's decision evalu-
ating the SEC's rulemaking under the ICA and the APA are hardly compelling
and do not appear to reflect any meaningful deference to SEC judgment on
how to conduct CBA/FR.
Yet this decision was only the first of a rash of judicial interventions into
the financial regulatory process, each opinion growing steadily less deferential,
culminating in the 2011 case Business Roundtable v. SEC. °3 In the seven years
after Chamber of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit handed down six more similar de-
cisions, striking down a range of SEC actions (representing one in seven of the
SEC's major rules over that period).1"4 The D.C. Circuit has struck down a rule
requiring registration of hedge fund advisors under the Investment Advisors
Act,' a rule exempting broker-dealers from registration under that Act, , 6 an
order affirming expulsion of an NASD-member firm, 10 7 and a rule treating a
new class of securities market-linked annuities as securities.0 8 The court also
struck down the same mutual fund governance rules from Chamber of Com-
merce a second time: the SEC, with perhaps tactless speed, patched the guess-
timated CBA/FR holes in its rulemaking analysis, only to have its rule struck
down on new grounds.'0 9 Since Chamber of Commerce, only one decision, Na-
lo2. OMB Guidance, supra note 20. The OMB does not specify that an agency engaging in quan-
tification "to the extent feasible" must quantify costs on a conditional basis.
103. 647 F.3 d 1144 (D.C. Cit. 2011).
104. For the total number of major rules, see OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, Lo-
CAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES app. c (2012).
105. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F. 3 d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
1o6. Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3 d 481 (D.C. Cit. 2007).
107. PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cit. 2007).
1o8. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cit. 2010).
log. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (2006) (holding that the SEC's re-proposal of
the mutual fund governance rules violated the APA because the SEC relied on materials not
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tional Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC, has upheld an SEC regulation.11 Another
upheld a CFTC regulation,"' and another upheld a decision of the Office of
Thrift Supervision against CBA/FR-related challenges."1
2
Three facts are worth noting about these decisions. First, a business or
trade group initiated and funded each of the cases; so far, consumer and inves-
tor lobbies have been sitting out these court battles.1 3 One-sided use of litiga-
tion as a lobbying tactic is not typically a stable feature of enduring battles be-
tween interest groups over important regulations. Second, not all of the deci-
decisions strike down new regulations - one struck down a new exemption from
a regulation, and one overturned an enforcement action. Together, these two
facts should give pause to political entrepreneurs who seek to use CBA/FR as a
way to attack regulation generally; these observations suggest that CBA/FR
law can slow or stop deregulation as easily as it can slow or stop new regula-
tion, particularly if consumer or investor advocates develop and fund their own
CBA/FR litigation agendas. Third, each regulatory action (except the action in-
volved in National Ass'n of Manufacturers) was taken pursuant to the SEC's
general statutory authority to use discretion to adopt regulations in support of
the securities laws-and not pursuant to a mandate from Congress to do so.
That the District Court in National Ass'n of Manufacturers"4 distinguished the
in the public record and had not reopened the rule for public comment). Some commenta-
tors have suggested that the SEC's rapid re-adoption of its rule with the cost estimates called
for by the D.C. Circuit in Chamber of Commerce I shows that it was less than diligent in fail-
ing to provide the cost estimates in the first release. E.g., CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at
30; Sherwin, supra note 15, at 164. This criticism is unfair, because it fails to explain why the
SEC should have understood that it had an obligation to provide that cost information in its
first release; at the time of that release, neither the APA nor NSMIA nor court precedents
would have made it apparent that the cost considerations-referred to by the Chamber of
Commerce's own report as "relatively minor," CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30-would
be an independently important component of the SEC's regulatory analysis, or were other-
wise required to be set forth in the release. It is even more deceptive to imply that the SEC
was able in its second release to do something it had said it could not do in its first release,
as the CCMC report suggests, id. (noting that "the court's incredulity about the SEC's posi-
tion that the agency could not determine these costs proved true"), because the SEC's posi-
tion was not that it could not estimate conditional cost estimates, but only that these condi-
tional cost estimates could not be translated into an actual aggregate compliance estimate-
which it never provided, even in its second release.
11o. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
iii. Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 215 (D.D.C. 2012) ("While the CFTC did not
calculate the costs of the Final Rule down to the dollar-and-cent, it reasonably considered
the costs and benefits of the Final Rule, and decided that the benefits outweigh the costs.").
112. Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
113. See cases cited supra notes 103-112.
114. 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) ("All of those cases involved rules or regulations that
were proposed and adopted by the SEC of its own accord, with the Commission having in-
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string of anti-SEC precedents on the ground that the Dodd-Frank Act mandat-
ed the rule in question reinforces this take-away. Under the current CBA/FR
legal regime, regulatory agencies are well advised to seek statutory language
that requires them to adopt rules or to enforce rule-like legal requirements via
enforcement proceedings that are generally exempt from judicial review under
the APA;1 it is inadvisable to seek language that promotes SEC discretion and
authority in rulemaking based on the agency's expertise. Judicial efforts to
promote CBA/FR, in other words, have given expert agencies an incentive to
ask an inexpert Congress to tie their hands with inflexible statutory commands.
The most notorious 16 decision in this line of cases was Business Roundtable,
which struck down an SEC rule requiring public companies to include in their
dependently perceived a problem within its purview and having exercised its own judgment
to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that problem.").
115. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts, 47
AM. J. POL. SCI. 205, 205 (2003) (using a dataset of Army Corps of Engineers decisions from
1988 to 1996 to conclude that "judicial ideology significantly affects bureaucratic decision
making," consistent with the idea that agencies may seek to shelter decisions from court re-
view by obtaining Congressional mandates); Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpreta-
tion by Administrative Agencies, 12AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95 (2010) (finding that, in a theoreti-
cal model, stricter judicial review of agency action can result in "safer" statutory
interpretations by the agency, due to the relative shift in utility of safe and aggressive inter-
pretations); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1437-42 (2004) (noting that agencies can and do choose among rulemaking, enforcement,
and informal guidance for various reasons and that judicial review is affected by and affects
these choices); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 12o HARV. L. REv.
528 (2006) (concluding that procedural formality substitutes for textual interpretation of
statutes that authorize agency actions); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling
Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatoy Decision Making, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998)
(presenting a model of judicial review of agency decision making, in which "process review"
under the APA for arbitrariness forces agencies to expend resources to reduce the risk of ju-
dicial reversal); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure
and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1999) (finding that
agencies choose among "instruments of decision making" so as to increase costs of court re-
view). For an account of executive agency efforts to avoid CBA review by OIRA, see Jennifer
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1755 (2013).
116. The decision provoked unusual agreement among legal commentators -all negative. See
Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1983 (2013); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emper-
or Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90
TEX. L. REv. 1811 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Fu-
ture of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 695 (2013); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T.
Bodie, The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CoRP. L. 1O
(2012); Kraus & Raso, supra note 12; Michael E. Murphy, The SEC and the District of Colum-
bia Circuit: The Emergency of a Distinct Standard of Judicial Review, 7 VA. L. & BuS. REv. 125
(2012); Comment, D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inad-
equate Economic Analysis, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1o88 (2012); Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Busi-
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annual proxy statements, under limited circumstances,'1 7 information about
(and the power to vote for) board nominees nominated by large shareholders
rather than solely those nominated by the incumbent board."8 Despite the
SEC's having debated the issue for over a decade, having developed an exten-
sive public record before adopting the rule, and having adopted the rule under
the explicit authority and implicit direction of Congress in section 971 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, a panel of the D.C. Circuit struck the rule down as "arbitrary
and capricious."" 9 According to the court, the twenty-five single-spaced pages
devoted to cost-benefit and related analyses in the adopting release was inade-
quate under the APA and "failed . . adequately to assess the economic effects
of a new rule." 2' The D.C. Circuit presented no evidence that there is any
ness Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank
World, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 746; Stephanie Lyn Parker, Note, The Folly of Rule i4a-11:
Business Roundtable v. SEC and the Commission's Next Step, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 715 (2012); J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder Access and Uneconomic Economic Analysis: Business
Roundtable v. SEC (Univ. of Denver Sturm College of Law Legal Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 11-14, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2011/9
/3o/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysis-business.html [http://perma.cc
/PD72-8K83]; Dennis Kelleher, Stephen Hall & Katelynn Bradley, Setting the Record Straight
on Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financial Reform at the SEC, BETTER MARKETS, INC.
59-68 (2012), http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/defaul/files/Setting%2oThe%2oRecord
%2oStraight.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4L8-SUKS]. The only substantial defense of the deci-
sion is in the CCMC report, CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, which, as noted above, was fund-
ed by a party to the case, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id. at ii.
117. Indeed, the circumstances were so limited that prominent corporate law scholars labeled the
rule "insignificant." Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA.
L. REv. 1347 (2011). The CCMR report's characterization of the proxy access rule as "more
substantive," CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 7, than the CFTC registration and reporting
requirements upheld in Investment Company Institute v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162 (2012), is
mysterious. Proxy access would not have changed "substantive" corporate governance but
only added disclosure and process requirements for proxy solicitation; it would have been,
in effect, a cross-subsidy of large, long-term shareholders' disclosure obligations, but would
not have altered voting rights or the relative authority of boards or shareholders to make de-
cisions for corporations.
1S. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F. 3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2o11).
119. Id. at 1148.
12o. Id. The court also asserted the SEC had been arbitrary by using "inconsistent" estimates of
the frequency with which the rule would be used. Id. at 1153. To support this, the court
claimed that the SEC had "predicted nominating shareholders would realize 'direct cost sav-
ings' from not having to print or mail their own proxy materials," that the SEC had cited
comment letters in support of this fact, and that one letter reported the rule would be fre-
quently used, suggesting that the SEC believed that the cost savings would be large. Id. at
1153-54 (noting that the SEC "then cited comment letters predicting the number of elections
contested under [the rule] would be quite high" and that "[o]ne of the comments report-
ed... that... 'hundreds' of... companies... expected a shareholder.., to nominate a di-
rector using the rule" (citing Letter from Kenneth L. Altman, President, The Altman
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available scientific technique for the SEC to "assess the economic effects" of the
rule along the lines that the court seemed to think legally required-as when
the court held that the SEC "relied upon insufficient empirical data when it
concluded that Rule 14a-1l [would] improve board performance and increase
shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nomi-
nees,"'' or when it held that the SEC had "arbitrarily ignored the effect of the
final rule" because the SEC "does not address whether and to what extent Rule
14a-ii will take the place of traditional proxy contests. " "
Instead, as in Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. court with "[s]tatus [s]econd
[o]nly to [the] Supreme Court"'23 ignored precedents establishing a "deferen-
tial" standard of review under the APA and substituted its own judgment for
that of the SEC in evaluating the existing research relevant to proxy contests.
In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to characterize (without
explanation) a peer-reviewed article published in the Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics as "relatively unpersuasive."'" Even the Chamber of Commerce decision
had not gone so far, for while that decision invented an obligation for the SEC
to use guesstimated CBA/FR on the cost side of its rulemaking, it also held that
the SEC need only "determine as best it can the economic implications" of a
rule; 2 ' moreover, Chamber of Commerce nowhere suggested the SEC had to
remain inert whenever quantified CBA/FR was simply unavailable. Hypocriti-
cally, it was Judge Ginsburg who penned the Business Roundtable decision, just
two years after he joined the decision in Stilwell, where the same court held that
Grp., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 19,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1o-09/s71o9-605.pdf [http://perma.cc/QTJ4
-TADN])). The court's opinion on this point is egregiously misleading: it falsely claims the
SEC relied on the Altman comment as a basis for the SEC's views on costs, and it then false-
ly claims that the SEC's supposed view on costs contradicted other statements in the SEC's
release. In fact, the SEC did not cite any public comments to support its beliefs about direct
cost savings, which were qualitative, a matter of common sense, and did not need such sup-
port. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9136,
7S Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). To the contrary, the SEC specifically rejected the claim
that the rule would be frequently used, as claimed in the Altman letter cited by the court. Id.
at 270. Nowhere does the SEC cite the Altman letter to support its conclusions. Id.
121. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149-5o.
12. Id. at 1153.
123. Jess Bravin, Why D.C. Circuit, at Center of Nominee Fight, Is So Important, WALL ST. J., Nov.
20, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBIooo1424o527o23o46o71o457921o383151449
004 [http ://perma.cc/CSV-CUH].
124. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
1a. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3 d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
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the APA "imposes no general obligation on agencies to produce empirical evi-
dence. )12
6
In sum, the D.C. Circuit's new interpretations of the APA and statutes au-
thorizing financial regulation have permitted panels to overturn regulatory
changes on the ground that a court would conduct its guesstimated CBA dif-
ferently than an agency would. Since guesstimated CBA/FR is unreliable and
imprecise, no matter who conducts it, courts have no legitimate role to second-
guess the agencies -even if the agencies are arbitrary in how they go about the
guesstimated CBA/FR. Indeed, the state of CBA/FR is such that one can rea-
sonably argue that all guesstimated CBA/FR of major financial regulations in-
evitably contains multiple arbitrary assumptions and judgments simply to al-
low for rough guesstimates to be made. Worse, the judges reviewing these
guesstimates are political appointees tenured for life, and so-while often se-
lected for political reasons -are immune from conventional forces of political
accountability; nonetheless, they have been frequently partisan in their ap-
proach to CBA. Because the D.C. Circuit is roughly evenly split between Re-
publican and Democratic appointees," the partisan-driven outcomes in
CBA/FR cases are unpredictable and depend on a factor (which judges are cho-
sen for a given case) that has nothing to do with the APA or any other law. The
normative implications of this state of affairs are taken up in Part IV.
C. Congressional Oversight, Regulatory Initiatives, and Proposed Legislation
Elements of the legislative branch, as well as the financial agencies' own
initiatives, have reinforced the effect of judicial review of existing CBA-related
1z6. Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis add-
ed). Nothing in the text of the securities laws would change this; the word "efficiency" does
not by any reasonable reading imply a burden to generate evidence that does not exist, and
the court in Business Roundtable did not examine the legislative history of the requirement
that the SEC consider "efficiency." See Murphy, supra note 116, at 128-30; Mongone, supra
note 116, at 746-56.
127. On the partisan nature of the Court's decisions on CBA, see the discussion in the text ac-
companying notes 7 and 8; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Admin-
istrative Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 56) (on file with author)
(noting the libertarian ideology of judges on the D.C. Circuit who have been most active in
striking down agency decisions on CBA grounds, and that while this ideology does not per-
fectly track party affiliation, it "correlates powerfully" with it). 'While the D.C. Circuit now
has seven active judges who were nominated by Democratic presidents and four active judg-
es who were nominated by Republican presidents, it also has five senior judges who were
nominated by Republican presidents and one senior judge who was nominated by a Demo-
cratic president. These senior judges are entitled to (and do) carry up to a full caseload. Be-
cause panels are composed of three judges, there remains a strong possibility of partisan or
ideological panels reviewing independent agency decisions.
124:882 2015
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
mandates on the financial agencies' organic statutes. While Congress has not
mandated CBA for independent agencies, members of Congress, in coordina-
tion with minority commissioners of the CFTC and the SEC, have pressured
the agencies to engage in CBA, both by attempting to pass legislation (dis-
cussed below) and with soft power, through hearings, information requests,
and public criticism. In 1998, the GAO released a critique of current law for
failing to improve CBA in agency rulemakings28 As discussed in Part III.B,
Fidelity Management in 2004 persuaded Congress to require the SEC to justify
proposed rules by preparing a report on their potential benefits. 2 9 In 2007, the
House held hearings on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in which one witness (inaccu-
rately) critiqued the SEC's CBA/FR,"'3 a criticism echoed by members of Con-
gress 3' and, more recently, by Republican SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gal-
lagher.'32
These pressures, along with the court decisions discussed above, have led
financial agencies to conduct and publish more CBA/FR in recent years. OMB
reports show that this increase in the use of CBA/FR began in the early 2000S.
In September 2010, the CFTC's General Counsel and Acting Chief Economist
distributed a memo to the CFTC's rulemaking teams noting that, while the
CFTC's authorizing statute does not require quantified CBA/FR, it does re-
quire the CFTC to consider costs and benefits, and that recent court decisions
128. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-3o, UN-
FUNDED MANDATES: REFORM ACT HAS HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON AGENCIES' RULEMAKING AC-
TIONS 30 (1998), http://www.gao.gov/assets/23o/225165.pdf[http://perma.cc/5QFV-58641.
i29. Sherwin, supra note 15, at 27-28 (citing H.R. 4818, lo8th Cong. (2004); H.R. REP. No. 1o8-
472, at 841 (2004); S. 29o8, io8th Cong. (2004) (introduced by Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH));
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1o8-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004)).
130. Full Committee Hearing on Sarbanes-Oxley 404: Will the SEC's and PCAOB's New Standards
Lower Compliance Costs for Small Companies?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus.,
11oth Cong. 97 (2007) (statement of Hal Scott, Professor, Harvard Law Sch.) ("That esti-
mate was, we now know, off by a factor of over 48."); accord CCMR REPORT, supra note 4.
As noted in Part ILA, infra, this criticism was mistaken, but has been repeated by the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation in its 2013 report promoting CBA. Id. at 9.
131. A Balancing Act: Cost, Compliance, and Competitiveness After Sarbanes-Oxley: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, logth Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of Rep. Patrick T. McHenry, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Af-
fairs) (repeating criticism).
132. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Corporate
Directors Forum, (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/DetaiVSpeech
/1365171492142#.VADgc7xdXkZ [http://perma.cc/TVS-8QWs] ("One example relates to
compliance with Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley, which the Commission estimated would
cost on average roughly $91,ooo a year to implement.").
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had been expanding the demands of CBA/FR law under the APA.'33 As a result,
the memo directed staff to provide summary CBA/FR in proposed rulemakings
and to address conceptual CBA/FR in adopting releases.'
3 4
Despite these efforts, congressional pressures have only increased, poten-
tially stimulated by the financial industry lobbies seeking to influence rulemak-
ing under the Dodd-Frank Act. In 2013, Senator Mike Crapo (Republican of
Idaho) pressed the heads of the major financial agencies to commit to "act on
GAO's recommendation to incorporate OMB's guidance on [CBA] into your
proposed and final rules [and] interpretive guidance."' Shortly thereafter, ten
Senate Banking Committee members requested financial agency inspector gen-
erals to report on CBA under the Dodd-Frank Act, "in response to concerns
raised by Commissioners at both the CFTC and the SEC" regarding economic
analysis at the agencies.,, 6 Also in 2011, Congress amended the Dodd-Frank Act
to require the GAO to analyze the impact of regulations on the marketplace, 3 7
and in November 2011, the GAO released a report on the financial agencies'
133. Memorandum from Dan M. Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n, & Jim Moser, Acting Chief Economist, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n, to Rulemaking Teams (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public
/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_investigationo4151.pdf [http://perma.cc/M235-EUT2].
134. Id. at Exhibit 1, 2-3 ("[S]ection 15 does not require the [CFTC] to quantify the costs and
benefits of an action. However, the [CFTC] cannot consider the costs and benefits ... un-
less they are presented either quantitatively or qualitatively."). A follow-up memo, in May
2011, required rulemaking teams to "incorporate the principles of Executive Order 13563 ...
to the extent . . . reasonably feasible" in final rulemakings. Memorandum from Dan M.
Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, & Andrei Kirilenko,
Chief Economist, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, to Rulemaking Teams 1
(May 13, 2011) http://www.cftc.gov/ucnm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig
_investigation-o61311.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3SR-VYNW]. In May 2012, the CFTC and
OIRA entered into a memorandum of understanding permitting OIRA staff to provide
"technical assistance" to CFTC staff during implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, "partic-
ularly with respect" to CBA/FR. Memorandum of Understanding between Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (2012), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/oira cftc mou_2o12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7AJK-3WE8].
135. Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and Investor Protections:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, ll 3th Cong. 21 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Crapo).
136. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT No. 499, FOLLOW-UP RE-
VIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS 1
(2012); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, A
REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE DODD-
FRANKACT, ati (2011).
137. Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1573(a), 125 Stat. 38, 138-39 (2011) (codified at 12 U.S.C. S 5496(b)).
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Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings, finding that "[a]lthough most of the federal fi-
nancial regulators told us that they tried to follow [OMB guidance] in principle
or spirit, their policies and procedures did not fully reflect OMB guidance on
regulatory analysis." 38 While noting that "for 7 of... lo regulations we re-
viewed, the agencies generally assessed benefits and costs of the alternative
chosen,"' 39 the GAO was particularly critical of the financial agencies for not
conducting quantified CBA/FR: "[O] ne of the seven benefit-cost analyses mon-
etized the costs of the regulation, but the analysis did not monetize the bene-
fits. None of the other analyses monetized either the benefits or costs, identi-
fied the type and timing of them, or expressed them in constant dollars." 4
Trade groups and political entrepreneurs have picked up these criticisms, " as
have members of Congress. 2
In March 2012, SEC staff distributed its own internal CBA/FR guidance.
The guidance cited "[r]ecent court decisions, reports of the [GAO] and the
SEC's .. . [OIG], and Congressional inquiries" that had "raised questions
about ... the [SEC's] economic analysis in its rulemaking."'43 The SEC guid-
ance noted "[n]o statute expressly requires" the SEC to "conduct a formal"
CBA but that "SEC chairmen ha[d] informed Congress since at least the early
138. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-i2-i 5 i, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLE-
MENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 14 (2011).
139. Id. at 16-17. In 2012, the GAO released another report advocating CBA/FR, reiterating its
view that financial regulators should "more fully incorporate OMB's guidance into their
rulemaking policies." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-lol, DODD-FRANK ACT:
AGENCIES' EFFORTS To ANALYZE AND COORDINATE THEIR RULES (2012) (text on "highlights"
page).
140. U.S. GOV'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 17.
141. See CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-io; CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-1o. Neither the
GAO nor other CBA proponents have set out examples of how the SEC should conduct
CBA/FR, limiting themselves to simply counting what share of rulemakings contained
CBA/FR of any kind, and what share contained at least some quantification, without regard
to whether the quantification is precise, reliable, or comprehensive as to either costs or bene-
fits. The CCMR report holds up one SEC rulemaking as the "gold-standard" of CBA/FR,
CCMRREPORT, supra note 4, at 13-15, as discussed infra at text accompanying notes 344-361.
142. E.g., Who Is Too Big To Fail? GAO's Assessment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and
the Office of Financial Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Fin. SerF., n13th Cong. 26 (2013) (question from Rep. Wagner to witness
from Financial Stability Oversight Council about a "GAO report that talked about [needing]
a [CBA]").
143. Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy and Fin. Innovation and the Office of the
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to the Staff of the Rulemaking Div. and Offices,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in
SEC Rulemakings 1 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-guidance-econ analy
_secrulemaking.pdf [http://perma.cc/RDN3-NU64].
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198os-and as rulemaking releases since that time reflect-the [SEC] considers
potential costs and benefits as a matter of good regulatory practice whenever it
adopts rules." The SEC guidance went on to set out "[s]ubstantive require-
ments" for CBA/FR, drawing on the CBA Executive Orders and the OMB
Guidance. 4 Rulemaking staff were directed to work with economists on the
SEC's staff to analyze which costs and benefits a rule might create, to quantify
those that could be quantified, and to explain why others could not feasibly be
quantified.
The bluntest form of congressional pressure has taken the form of bills that
would mandate CBA/FR across the board. In June 2013, three Senators rein-
troduced the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act. 46 That bill would
permit the President to order all independent agencies, including all of the fi-
nancial regulatory agencies, to (among other things) conduct a CBA of any
new "rule and, recognizing some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify,
propose or adopt a rule only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of
the rule justify its costs." 47 The bill incorporates the definition of "rule" from
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. at 4-15. See sources cited supra notes 2o and 81 (citing CBA Executives Orders and OMB
Guidance).
146. S. 1173, ll 3th Cong. (2013). The Senators were Senators Collins (R-ME), Portman (R-OH),
and Warner (D-VA). A similar bill was introduced in 2012. S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012).
Other bills promoting CBA have been introduced in this and prior years. E.g., Unfunded
Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2014, H.R. 899, 113th Cong. (2014); Regu-
latory Sunset and Review Act of 2013, H.R. 309, 113 th Cong. (2013); Startup Act 3.0, S. 310,
113th Cong. (2013); SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013);
Startup Act 3.0, H.R. 714, 113 th Cong. (2013); Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis
Creation and Sunset and Review Act of 2011, H.R. 214, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Im-
provement Act of 1999, S. 746, lo6th Cong. (1999); Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998,
S. 981, io5th Cong. (1997); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 1o4th
Cong. (1995); Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, H.R. 926, 1o4th Cong. (1995). To date, a
small number of former commissioners of independent agencies have backed the bill. E.g.,
Letter to the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs
Comm., June 18, 2013, http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File
_id=6f 3f466c-e744- 4d99-892a-91f6e6348ebf [http ://perma.cc/9V34-WsX9].
147. S. 1173, § 3(a)(6). The independent financial regulatory agencies include, among others, the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve System, Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Financial Research (OFR), and Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC). S. 1173, § 2(4) (incorporating 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012)). The
newly created CFPB and OFR were added to the list in the Dodd-Frank Act, § i1ooD, and
the OCC was added to the list in § 315 of that Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Star. 1524 (codified in scattered sections).
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the APA and excepts only rules of the Federal Reserve "relating to monetary
policy."48
In addition, for any "economically significant rule" (ESR), an independent
agency could be required to give OIRA and to publicly disclose (i) "an assess-
ment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits... [and] costs... antici-
pated ...with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of those benefits ...
[and] costs," (2) a similar assessment of all "potentially effective and reasona-
bly feasible alternatives to the rule, identified by the agencies or the public,"
and (3) a statement of why the rule is superior to alternatives. 49 For this pur-
pose, the bill defines an ESR as a rule with an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more. Independent agencies could be required to submit any
ESR for a ninety-day OIRA review of whether the rule "has complied" with
these requirements, with the OIRA review also to be part of the published rec-
ord for the rule. Independent agencies would also be required to publish a
finding that the rule did comply with the bill, with an explanation of that find-
ing, or "if applicable, an explanation why the independent regulatory agency
did not comply."'
The bill states that "compliance" by an independent agency with the bill is
not subject to judicial review. However, it also states that in any court chal-
lenge to an independent agency's rule under other laws, such as the APA, all
material produced by the independent agency and OIRA under this bill would
be "part of the whole record" for the court to review.' 1 As discussed more in
Part IV, mandating an open interagency process formally not subject to judicial
review might seem innocuous: how could it impede rulemaking for an inde-
pendent agency to simply get the input of another agency? But this naive read-
ing misses the fact that any public interagency process will create a larger rec-
ord that will be used by litigators to attack particular agency judgments as
arbitrary and capricious under the APA: any disagreement between the agen-
cies, for example, will provide grist for the litigation mill. The cases reviewed in
this Part show how aggressive some D.C. Circuit panels have been in overturn-
ing agency actions on CBA grounds, particularly when an agency's commis-
sioners have been divided over judgments needed for any regulatory change.
Trebling the number of pages or components of a CBA available for judicial se-
cond-guessing, and adding the possibility of interagency disagreement to the
148. S. 1173, § 2(5) (incorporating the definition of "rule" under 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012), which de-
fines a "rule" as any "statement of general or particular applicability and future effect de-
signed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy").
149. Id. § 3 (b).
150. Id. § 3(c)(3)(B).
Is'. Id. § 4 (b).
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mix, will almost certainly incite more judicial interventions . 2 Before we can
assess whether such interventions might be net beneficial, however, we need to
consider CBA/FR itself. Could it offer precise, reliable estimates of the costs
and benefits of financial regulation?
III. HOW MIGHT CBA OF FINANCIAL REGULATION WORK?
In this Part, I outline how the kind of quantified CBA/FR envisioned by its
proponents might work in practice. The goals of this Part are to illuminate
what we might expect of CBA/FR policy, to advance the substantive research
project of developing CBA/FR, and to provide a better empirical basis for eval-
uating CBA/iFR law in Part IV.
To accomplish these goals, I outline the CBA/FR that was performed for
four specific rules: (1) SEC regulations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404
(SOX 404); (2) the SEC's 2002 mutual fund governance proposals; (3) Basel
III's enhanced capital requirements for banks; and (4) the Volcker Rule. These
analyses are followed by a review of two rules that have been subject to
CBA/FR and have been held up as the "gold standard" by CBA advocates: (5)
the SEC's cross-border swap rules and (6) the UK/FSA's mortgage market
rules.
The first, third, and fourth case studies represent the kind of significant
rulemakings that CBA/FR proponents agree should be the focus of CBA/FR,' s3
and because they are clearly "economically significant rules," they would trig-
ger the highest degree of interagency review under the CBA Executive Orders
and OMB Guidance if the independent agencies were brought under those
process requirements. The second case study focuses on rules that led to the
D.C. Circuit decisions reviewed above and stimulated the SEC's Chief Econo-
mist to publish two extensive CBA/FR-related memos that provide one of the
better (if imperfect) examples of what CBA/FR as conducted by a financial
agency could look like.
In each case the analysis draws on the best research by economists, finance
scholars, and legal scholars, all using the kinds of methods that are closest to
the idealized vision of quantified CBA/FR that its proponents are asking finan-
152. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA.
L. REv. 253, 256 (1986) ("[R]ulemakings are often more controversial than adjudications
[under the APA], whose very processes are hidden from outsiders.").
153. See CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that CBA/FR should "[fJlocus on economically
significant rules").
124:882 2015
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
cial agencies to pursue."4 This review illustrates that guesstimated CBA/FR of
each of the rules reviewed would (or did) require the same kinds of macroeco-
nomic or political models used to set monetary policy, or entailed causal infer-
ences that are unreliable under standard regulatory conditions, or both.
These case studies were also chosen to reflect representative types of major
financial regulations. They focus on regulations promulgated by a variety of
financial regulators: the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the CFTC, and the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA). The regulations
employ a range of the kinds of regulatory instruments that are commonly ana-
lyzed or proposed for the financial markets: disclosure, governance regulations,
capital requirements, activity restrictions, and transactional restrictions and
process requirements. The regulations address a variety of market failures:
fraud, asymmetric information more broadly, conflicts of interest, externalities
(systemic crises arising from the effects of transactions on third parties), and
the absence of competition. But they also give rise to a typical array of regulato-
ry costs: compliance costs, constraints on potentially optimal private govern-
ance arrangements, smaller or less complete markets, and prohibition of poten-
tially optimal transactions, possibly reducing economic activity and surplus.
And, finally, most of the regulations were adopted following at least some con-
ceptual CBA by the relevant agencies, and two were adopted after at least some
efforts at quantification of the relevant costs and benefits.
A. Case Study #1: Control Disclosures for Public Companies"'
The first case study is of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX was Con-
gress's response to the widespread fraud at Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, and other
corporations. The core of SOX consisted of two parts"S6 : (i) the creation of a
quasi-public regulatory body to oversee public company audit firms -the Pub-
154. It is worth noting that no similar efforts can be found in the more prominent publications
advocating CBA/FR of financial regulation. E.g., CCMC REPORT, supra note 6; CCMR RE-
PORT, supra note 4. The closest proponents come is to point to selected CBA/FR as "gold
standard" CBA/FR, but CBA/FR advocates do not review that CBA in any detail, and as dis-
cussed in Part III.E below, these "gold standards" are no more compelling in their guessti-
mated CBA/FR components than the examples reviewed here. This gap between what the
CBA/FR proponents promise can be done and what they can demonstrate has been done is
troubling.
1s. This section draws extensively on John C. Coates IV & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX After Ten
Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 29 AcCT. HORIZONS (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2379731 [http://perma.cc/6SVZ-ELZW].
156. For a review and evaluation of the core elements of SOX, see John C. Coates V, The Goals
and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007).
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lic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) - and (2) the requirement
of new disclosures by public companies about "control systems."1 7 Among
other things, the case study illustrates the way that a common goal of financial
regulation - the reduction of fraud - implicates important externalities, as well
as non-market goods (such as psychological effects of fraud), which cannot be
reliably reduced to precise monetary estimates, given current research technol-
ogies.
1. The SEC's CBA of Rules Implementing SOX 4o4
SOX required the SEC to enact regulations to carry out the goals of SOX
404.,8 The SEC did this in August 2003, a year after SOX's passage. s 9 In its
adopting release, the SEC included a 140o-word CBA, which, as noted above,
was not a legal requirement for the SEC. 6 ° The release contained a separate
Soo-word analysis of the rule's effects on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation, 16' and a longer analysis under the PRA and RFA. 62 In its CBA, the
SEC provided a qualitative listing but no quantification of the rule's benefits.
The benefits identified were: (i) generally to (a) enhance the quality of public
company reporting and (b) increase investor confidence, and (2) specifically to
(a) improve disclosure about management's responsibility for financial state-
157. Such systems consist of methods by companies that monitor use of the company's assets
and produce accurate financial reports, including (for example) computer programs de-
signed to detect inconsistencies between customer orders and accounting records, rules for
which corporate agents can authorize certain expenditures and transactions, internal audits,
and verification procedures. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Report on
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8810, 34-55929, 72
Fed. Reg. 35,324 (June 27, 2007).
158. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(a), 107 Pub. L. No. 204, ni6 Stat. 745, 749 (codified at 15
U.S.C. 7202 (2012)).
159. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274). For brevity, I refer to the SEC's "rule" in
this section, although in fact the release modified a number of separate SEC rules. The effect
of the SEC's rules in practice would turn out to be heavily influenced by rules separately
adopted by the PCAOB.
16o. See supra notes 77-78, 87-88, 95-98 and accompanying text.
161. This was required by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 11o Stat. 3416, 3424-25 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which
amended three of the SEC's governing statutes - the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act
of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940 - to require the SEC to consider whether
any rulemaking done "pursuant to" those statutes would "promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(b), 78c(f), 8oa-2(c) (2012).
162. See supra notes 81-82.
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ments and controls and how management discharges that responsibility,
(b) encourage companies to devote adequate resources and attention to con-
trols, (c) help companies detect fraud earlier, and (d) deter fraud or minimize
its effects. The bottom-line benefit, then, was to reduce fraud. 
6
,
The SEC also provided a qualitative listing of the rule's direct costs (ad-
ministrative burdens and fees to attorneys and auditors). The SEC noted that
companies were already required to have a control system under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and that many issuers were already voluntarily
providing the required disclosures, raising conceptual issues (discussed below)
for what baseline and set of effects to assume in any CBA/FR of the rule-
issues that the SEC did not explicitly address. The SEC provided a partial
quantification of the costs of its rules under SOX 404. That estimate focused
exclusively on the requirements of subsection (a) of SOX 404, disclosures by
management, which the SEC estimated would cost covered companies an aver-
age of $91,ooo per year. 6' The SEC explicitly noted it had no information that
would allow it to quantify the costs created by subsection (b) of SOX 404, the
auditor attestation requirements, which it acknowledged could be large. 
6
,
Of note for assessing CBA/FR's effects on public understanding, the SEC
has been strongly criticized for the CBA/FR in its release - but only for the part
of its CBA/FR that provided a quantitative estimate of costs, which one com-
mentator has claimed is "off by a factor of over 48. ",66 However, this critique of
the SEC's CBA/FR is demonstrably mistaken. The SEC's estimate was solely
163. 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,656-57 (June 18, 2003).
164. Id. at 36,657.
165. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47986,
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26o68 at pt. V(B) & n.174 (Aug. 14, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm [http://perma.cc/XZN4-GMZ5] ("The esti-
mate does not include the costs of the auditor's attestation report, which many commenters
have suggested might be substantial.").
166. Full Committee Hearing on Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Will the SEC's and PCAOB's New
Standards Lower Compliance Costs for Small Companies?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Small Bus., loth Cong. 97 (2007) (statement of Hal S. Scott, Dir., Comm. on Capital Mkts.
Regulation) ("[The SEC's] estimate was, we now know, off by a factor of over 48."). Pre-
sumably, this claim is based on comparing the SEC's cost estimate with the results of a sur-
vey (n=274) conducted by the Financial Executives International (FEI) and Financial Execu-
tives Research Foundation (FERF). That survey found the average cost of SOX 404
reported in 2004 was $4.4 million (4,400,000 / 91,000 = 48.4). FEI is a trade group, and the
FERF is a related organization that performs research on topics of interest to chief finance
officers of large companies and other members. The FEI/FERF study is formally titled Fi-
NANCIAL EXECUTIVES INTERNATIONAL AND FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
SPECIAL SURVEY ON SAsANEs-OxLEY SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION (2005) [hereinafter
FEI/FERF SURVEY].
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for SOX 404(a), while the FEI/FERF estimate was for both SOX 404(a) and
4o4(b)., 6' For several reasons, auditor attestation costs can be expected to ex-
ceed internal costs by a multiple (as in fact has been the case). 68 The SEC ex-
plicitly acknowledged this gap in its cost estimate, 6' but the criticisms of the
SEC ever since-including by SEC Commissioner Gallagher himself-have
mistakenly claimed the estimate was for SOX 404 as an entirety. 7 CBA/FR
advocates, in other words, have publicly and repeatedly criticized the SEC for
underestimating the cost of apples and oranges when the SEC's estimate was
for the cost of apples alone. The spectacle may undermine an observer's faith in
the value of public discourse stimulated by CBA/FR.
A better critique of the SEC's CBA/FR of SOX 404 is that it failed as con-
ceptual CBA/FR for not identifying indirect costs of the rule. Indirect costs in-
clude potential reductions in risk-taking, dilution in strategic focus, and the
opportunity costs of devoting excessive management time to compliance and
working through the initial control attestation process with outside auditors,
internal audit staff, and members of companies' audit committees (which SOX
required to be wholly independent for the first time) .171 While quantifying the-
se costs would have been nearly impossible for the SEC at the time (as dis-
cussed below), the SEC could have pointed to the possibility of these costs in
its rulemaking.
Conversely, the SEC in 2006 did not identify (much less quantify) in-
creased fraud as a possible cost of the deferral of SOX 404 requirements for
small and newly public companies, nor did it identify (much less quantify) in-
167-. Criticisms of the SEC's cost estimate are misplaced for two other reasons. The FEI/FERF
survey, see supra note 166, was of large firms (average revenues of $6 billion, as compared to
overall average revenues for all public firms in Compustat in 2004 of $2 billion, and median
revenues for such firms of $96 million). Since compliance costs generally, and control sys-
tem costs in particular, increase at a decreasing rate in relation to firm size, $4.4 million
would have been too high as an average for all covered firms even in 2004. In addition, the
FEI/FERF estimate was based on data that was gathered from companies during their first
year under the rule. The costs of any new rule will fall over time, with learning, as has been
the case with SOX 404. Further, the agency ultimately charged with supervising section
404 (b) work by audit firms, the PCAOB, modified the requirements applicable under that
section in 2007, further dramatically reducing the costs of the rule. The upshot is that the
best current estimate of section 404 costs is closer to $400,000 than to $4.4 million-still
higher than the SEC's estimate of section 404(a) costs, but reasonably close, once one
acknowledges that the $91,ooo estimate was for a part and not all of section 404's costs.
168. See Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 25.
169. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, supra note 165, at pt. V(B).
170. See supra note 166.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 182-203.
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creased fraud as a possible side effect (cost) of the relaxation of the SOX 404
requirements in 2007.1 While these efforts were deregulatory in nature, they
would be just as subject to CBA under Executive Order 12,866 for an executive
agency as would the imposition of new regulations."7 The fact that the more
prominent CBA/FR proponents'74 do not mention these gaps in the SEC's de-
regulatory rulemaking process under SOX tends to undermine their general de-
pictions of CBA/FR as a politically neutral procedure for improving regulation
generally.
2. An Overview of CBA/FR of SOX 404
Now that ten years have passed since its adoption, how might SOX 404
fare under a CBA/R? Quantifying the costs and benefits of the rule would re-
quire multiple research tasks. These include (1) establishing better estimates of
the incidence and direct costs of fraud, 7 (2) securing consensus on how to
treat "transfers" for purposes of analyzing fraud, (3) generating new models
and data on fraud's externalities, (4) creating better instruments for estimating
the rule's causal effects, (5) developing better models and data on the chilling
effects that the rule could have on legitimate activity, and (6) promoting better
understanding of how compliance costs vary across firms and over time. Each
task will be difficult and likely require a separate stream of research before any
plausible quantified estimate of the costs and benefits of a rule under SOX 404
could be developed.
172. See Amendments to Rules Regarding Management's Report on Internal Control Over Fi-
nancial Reporting, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,310 (June 27, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. ptS. 210, 228,
229, 240); Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of
Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580 (Dec. 21, 20o6)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249).
173. Section 3(e) of Executive Order 12,866, supra note 81, defines the "regulatory action" cov-
ered by the order to include "any substantive action by an agency... that promulgates or is
expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation," without regard to wheth-
er the final rule adds new restrictions on private activity or exempts private activity covered
by a prior regulation. Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
174. See CCMC REPORT, supra note 6; CCMR REPORT, supra note 4.
175. Throughout this section, I use "fraud" in a loose sense, and mean it to encompass deceptive,
manipulative, or misleading accounting and other financial disclosures that could be pre-
vented or corrected in a cost-effective manner, regardless of whether proof of specific intent
to deceive, reasonable reliance, or other elements of the tort or crime of fraud exists, and re-
gardless of whether the accounting technically complies with generally accepted accounting
principles.
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3. Estimating the Incidence of Fraud and Its Direct Costs
The first task is to develop better methods of measuring the incidence of
corporate fraud and its direct costs. This task is a prerequisite even to a rough
estimate of the effects of regulations aimed at reducing fraud, such as SOX 404.
Yet, with few exceptions, research on fraud to date has only attempted to es-
tablish relationships between fraud and its correlates, and it does not present
evidence of how strong these relationships are, or what the overall incidence of
corporate fraud is., 76
One difficulty confronting such studies is that all concerned have incentives
to hide fraud."7 Partial observability presents challenges to empirical model-
ing, ,8 but until recently, few researchers used models adapted to those chal-
lenges. Such models study both fraud incidence and detection together, ex-
ploiting partial overlap in indicators of fraud incidence and detection to draw
better inferences about correlates of fraud overall from detected frauds.179
Building on this work, one study exploits the collapse of Arthur Andersen
to estimate an incidence of fraud among public companies at approximately fif-
176. See Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155.
177. Id. at 46. Interestingly, the U.S. crime victimization survey does not ask questions that
would be likely to elicit data on fraud incidence, instead focusing on violent crime, sexual as-
saults, and stalking. See Census Bureau, OMB No. 1121-o111, National Crime Victimization
Survey: NCVS-1 Basic Screen Questionnaire, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, http://www.bjs
.gov/contentpub/pdf/ncvsl_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8BM-N3WU]; Census Bureau,
OMB No. 1121-0302, Supplemental Victimization Survey, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE (20o6),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsl-o6.pdf [http://perma.cc/RJ8H-XYUN]. Identi-
ty theft and cyber crimes are types of fraud surveyed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
see ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2012, (Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf [http://perma.cc/DDX4-HWPU]; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Cyber-
crime, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=41 [http://perma.cc
/9LWR-VJTY], but no general survey of fraud is conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics.
178. See Jonathan S. Feinstein, Detection Controlled Estimation, 33 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233-34 (1990).
179. E.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna et al., CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds, J. FIN. (forth-
coming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323251 [http://perma.cc/S3YL-ZKBM]; Si Li, Cor-
porate Financial Fraud: An Application of Detection Controlled Estimation (Sch. of
Bus. and Econ., Wilfrid Laurier Univ., Working Paper, July 2013), http://ssrn.comabstract
=1698038 [http://perma.cc/WB8G-ZRNZ]; Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Securities
Fraud: An Economic Analysis (Carlson Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Minn., Working
Paper, Apr. 20o6), http:/Ahome.business.utah.edu/finea/paperi-theory.pdf [http://perma.cc
/AW9P-33SF]. Such models have their weaknesses, as they rely in an ad hoc fashion on dif-
ferent instruments that are assumed to be exogenous, when none truly are exogenous; they
are, however, the best that researchers have yet devised.
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teen percent. ' The study also estimates that fraud generates direct losses of
between twenty-two percent and forty percent of enterprise value, implying a
lower bound on hidden fraud of three percent of enterprise value (o.15 x 0.22 =
0.03), or losses of over $5oo billion. This study is a promising start to estimat-
ing how much fraud exists and how costly it is. But it is, as yet, unpublished
and relatively isolated, 8' and it needs more scrutiny before it can provide a reli-
able rulemaking foundation. Future research could use more comprehensive
measures of fraud, including fraud outside the scope of audits that nevertheless
might be revealed by a stronger control system, such as insider trading and
self-dealing (as at Enron), fraudulendy obtained compensation (as at Tyco),
frauds involving third parties (as at Worldcom), or technically GAAP-
compliant but deceptive accounting choices (as at Lehman).
4. How Should Transfers Be Treated?
An open conceptual issue in estimating the costs of fraud is how to treat
transfers accomplished through fraud -in other words, whether to count the
utility of a fraudster in estimating welfare effects of fraud.82 Data on crime
generally suggests the issue could have a significant effect on a CBA/FR of
SOX 404.83 Canonical economic theory would count the loss as zero, as would
iso. I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive Is Corporate Fraud? 4 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt.
Working Paper No. 222608, Feb. 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=22226o8 [http://perma
.cc/D7H6-G47F]. They validate this measure with a survey of fraud observed by business
school students at former employers. Id. at 21-23.
181. For related research, using different and less theoretically grounded empirical methods, see
Anastasia K. Zakolyukina, Measuring Intentional GAAP Violations: A Structural Approach
(Univ. of Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 13-45, Apr. 25, 2014), http://ssrn
.coni/abstract=242251 [http://perma.cc/X4QR-4JSC] which estimates undetected intended
earnings manipulation from a sample of 1400 CEOs after SOX. She finds the probability of
detection is six percent and that intended earnings manipulation generates a loss of twenty-
four percent to a firm's CEO wealth when detected. The inference she draws is that seventy-
three percent of her sample has incentives to manipulate earnings, and that the value-
weighted bias in stock prices is 2.82%. Id. at 3. A survey-based study is provided in Ilia
Dichev et al., Earnings Quality: Evidence from the Field, 56 J. AcCT. & EcoN. 1, 30 (2013), in
which respondents suggest around twenty percent of firms exploit GAAP to misrepresent
reported performance in their financial statements.
182. Assume, for example, a fraudster obtains $1 from a victim and spends it on food. Is the so-
cial loss $o or $1? If the criminal's utility is ignored and the fraud has no effect besides the
transfer of $1, the social loss is $1. If the criminal's utility is counted equally with the vic-
tim's, and neither attaches unusual utility to the dollar, the social loss is $o.
183. For example, David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON. 611, 629
tbl.7 (1999), estimates that such gains, if counted, roughly double the costs of crime.
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the OMB Guidance on CBA, 8' but it seems implausible as a political, policy, or
legal matter for the SEC to ignore for purposes of CBA/FR of SOX 404 the
losses of Enron's defrauded investors on the ground that they were mere trans-
fers to Ken Lay and Andrew Fastow. OMB Guidance suggests including trans-
fers in an analysis of "distributional effects" distinct from quantified costs and
benefits, 8S but that does not answer the question of how an agency should
weigh the transfers in its overall CBA.
86
5. Measuring the Externalities and Psychological Costs of Fraud
If more work is needed to model the incidence of and transfers caused by
fraud, no researchers have systematically attempted to study and measure the
social costs of corporate fraud. Without estimates of such costs, an assessment
of rules that reduce fraud, such as SOX 404, would have to remain qualitative.
Research is needed both on externalitiess7 and psychological costs. On externali-
ties, consider these categories' 8 : (a) fraud increases the cost of capital for all
firms ;189 (b) fraud results in the misallocation of resources;'9 ° (c) fraud destroys
184. OMB Guidance, supra note 20.
185. Id.
186. In the context of crime, compare Philip J. Cook, Crime Statistics: Costs of Crime, in 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 373 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1983) (criminals' utility
should count) with MARK A. COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (2005) (criminals'
utility should not count), and The Cost of Crime: Understanding the Financial and Human Im-
pact of Criminal Activity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 7 (2006)
(statement of Jens Ludwig, Professor, Georgetown Public Policy Institute) (same).
187. Fraud is criminalized in part because it causes large externalities: direct remediable civil
damages are not thought to be large enough to provide sufficient incentive for private actors
to enforce optimally. S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45
(1986) (tort-feasors may be "judgment proof" against large civil sanctions). But criminal
sanctions are reserved for a small subset of frauds -those in which clear evidence is available
ex post for frauds caused by individuals with specific intent- and the nature of fraud is such
that this type of evidence is often unavailable. Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933 impos-
es criminal liability for "willful" violations. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 24, 48 Stat. 74
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2012)); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(2012).
188. Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 42-44 (2003). Ander-
son, supra note 183, at 616-17, 629, presents a similar list of indirect effects of crime general-
ly. He estimates the indirect costs -what he categorizes as "crime-induced production," op-
portunity costs, and risks to life and health -as roughly double the value of victim-to-
criminal property transfers, and when he counts the costs incurred by criminals, the total
costs of crime are more than double the value of those transfers. Id. at 629 tbl.7. In other
words, the external effects of crime generally greatly exceed their direct effects.
189. Reduced quality of financial information provided by one firm will in the first instance low-
er expectations of the quality of information provided by other firms, heighten expected
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value through (costly) acquisitions and bankruptcy;19 ' (d) fraud induces precau-
tionary costs;'9' and (e)fraud imposes costs on non-investor third parties.9 3
fraud-related losses generally, and reduce confidence in public securities markets and in
markets more generally. Market-wide liquidity deteriorated following Enron and related
scandals, and improved after SOX's adoption. Pankaj K. Jain et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and Market Liquidity, 43 FIN. REV. 361 (2008). Mariassunta Giannetti and Tracy Yue
Wang show that revelation of corporate frauds in a state caused equity holdings of house-
holds in that state to fall, increasing the cost of capital for non-fraudulent firms. Mariassun-
ta Giannetti & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Scandals and Household Stock Market Participation
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 405/2014, 2014), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2331588 [http://perma.cc/73LY-VSWS]. For a more general study of the effect of
trust on finance, see Luigi Guiso et al., Trusting the Stock Market, 63 J. FIN. 2557 (2008). See
also Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti, Weak Institutions and Credit Availability: The Impact of
Crime on Bank Loans (Bank of It., Occasional Paper No. 52, 2009), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=16o6242 [http://perma.cc/84L3-UVWXL] (demonstrating that crime, including
fraud, increases borrowing costs and increases capital constraints by the public generally).
19o. Misallocation is caused by fraudulent signals of the value of firms or whole industries, as in
the telecom and Internet bubbles. For a review of studies showing that corporate finance de-
cisions are driven by capital market prices, including prices that deviate from fundamental
values (that is, mispricing), see Malcolm Baker, Capital Market-Driven Corporate Finance, 1
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 181 (2009). See also Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Mat-
ter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, Q.J. ECON. 969 (2003) (model-
ing and presenting evidence that bubbles affect corporate investment). Simi Kedia and
Thomas Philippon model investment decisions of firms during periods of fraud and find
empirical support for their prediction that fraud and earnings management distort hiring
and investment decisions of firms, leading to over-investment and excessive hiring during
periods of suspicious accounting; this over-investment and excessive hiring, in turn, lead to
misallocation of resources in the economy. Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics
ofFraudulent Accounting, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 2169 (2009).
191. One can view costly acquisitions by fraudulent companies of other companies as an example
of the prior category (misallocated resources), but it is important enough to warrant esti-
mating separately. Such acquisitions are often followed by mismanagement or outright
theft, contributing to otherwise avoidable bankruptcies. While bankruptcy can reorganize
firms, resulting in transfers among investors, they also use up real resources. For a model of
merger and acquisition activity driven by mispricing, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vish-
ny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003). For estimates of the costs of
bankruptcy, see, for example, Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquida-
tion Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61J. FIN. 1253 (20o6), which estimates that the range of
firm assets resulting from formal bankruptcy is between two and twenty percent.
192. Such costs include bonding and monitoring by investors to avoid fraud, such as for audit
firms, independent directors, appraisers, analysts, regulatory and enforcement agencies, and
prisons. Audit fees were rising prior to SOX, due to market-driven demand for increased
scrutiny of financial statements following the scandals that led to SOX. Sharad Asthana et
al., The Effect of Enron, Andersen, and Sarbanes-Oxley on the US Market for Audit Services, 22
ACCT. RES. J. 4 (2009). Likewise, separate from SOX, the New York Stock Exchange and the
Nasdaq adopted tighter corporate governance requirements in response to Enron et al.,
which tightened the criteria for and likely increased the costs of recruiting independent di-
rectors. See Coates, supra note 156, at 111.
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Consider the Madoff scandal, which imposed significant direct losses on over
15,000 individual investors, each of whom presumably had an average of two
dependents or heirs, and many of whom were co-investors and borrowers with
yet others, or makers of charitable donations to non-profits. 94 To date, the liq-
uidation of the Madoff entities has generated over $700 million in expenses-
all a pure loss to investors, over and above the amounts stolen by Madoff him-
self.'9s
As a broader example, consider how fraudulent home loans (whether due
to borrower fraud, lender fraud, or both) had ripple effects in the last financial
bubble, partly generated through leverage and intermediation, so the one
fraudulent loan would affect not only the immediate parties to the loan but also
securitization lenders, sponsors, and related parties; collateralized debt obliga-
tion investors, sponsors, and related parties; structured investment vehicle in-
vestors, sponsors, and related parties; investors in the banks that sponsored
those vehicles; borrower-customers of those banks, whose capital constraints
and heightened risk-aversion following the crisis caused a withdrawal or in-
crease in the cost of credit; employees and customers of businesses that failed
as a result of the capital constraints generated by the banks' losses; family
members of those employees; and so on.
Psychological effects (fear, distrust, stress) can result in tangible conse-
quences, including drug addiction, job loss, reduced income, health effects, and
even suicide. In the context of securities fraud, elevated levels of post-traumatic
stress disorder and related behavioral effects have been found among Madoffs
victims. 196
193. These third parties include those dependent on the victims of the initial fraud (e.g., family,
business partners, creditors, and communities). For studies showing spillover effects of re-
statements, see Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 51 n.21.
194. While SOX 404 would have had no effect on Madoff s scheme, since he kept his brokerage
private and outside the scope of SOX, the findings are suggestive of what might be discov-
ered if the prospect of quantifying such harms to fraud victims more generally were under-
taken. For the number of investors affected, see Trustee's Ninth Interim Report for the
Period Ending March 31, 2013, exhibit A at 4-5, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L.
MadoffInv. Sec. (In re Bernard L. MadofO, No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013).
For charities harmed by the Madoff scandal, see Anthony Weiss & Gabrielle Birkner,
Charities, Day Schools Hard Hit by Madoff Scandal, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Dec. 17,
2oo8), http ://forward.com/articles/14 729/charities-day-schools-hard-hit-by-madoff-scandal
[http://perma.cc/AZ7D-CPRA].
195. See Trustee's Ninth Interim Report, supra note 194, exhibit A at 2.
196. Audrey Freshman, Financial Disaster as a Risk Factor for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Internet
Survey of Trauma in Victims of the Madoff Ponzi Scheme, 37 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 39, 44-47
(2012).
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The take-away from these thought experiments-and they remain just
that - is that the external costs of fraud are likely to exceed, perhaps by a large
amount, direct transfers from victim to fraudster. As a result, the quantified
benefit of SOX 404 is likely to be found not in estimating direct losses prevent-
ed, but in increasing those losses by a multiple to reflect its externalities. How
do we translate anecdotal examples into more general methods for estimating
the full effects of fraud on society as a whole?
In the context of SOX, only one unpublished paper attempts to estimate
fraud's social COStS. 197 The authors treat widespread revelations of fraud as a
"shock" to the equity premium and estimate its social effects with a macroeco-
nomic model. For this purpose -and this is worth stressing in light of the dis-
cussion of the Taylor Rule in Part I.D above -they adapt a model used by the
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to set monetary policy9 8 They
first guesstimate that 25% to ioo% of the market decline from March to July
2002 was caused by the scandals of Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, and other com-
panies.199 They then rely on the U.S./Fed. model to estimate that investment
would fall o.8% per year in response to a 20% decline in the stock market,
guesstimating first-year impacts ranging from nineteen to fifty-seven billion
dollars.00 These projections underestimate costs if the impact of the frauds
lasts longer, and could over- or underestimate costs if the economy's response
to fraud-driven equity shocks differs from responses to other kinds of shocks,
or if the assumptions of the U.S./Fed. model are varied."1
197. Carol Graham et al., The Bigger They Are, the Harder They Fall: An Estimate of the Costs
of the Crisis in Corporate Governance (The Brookings Inst., Working Paper, 2002), http://
www.brookings.edu/views/papers/graham/2o02o722Graham.pdf [http://perma.cc/MK3C
-MWDY]. Another attempt to assess the size of externalities (without quantifying them for
society overall) uses brokerage data of a sample of retail investors across the United States
and shows that, upon the revelation of fraud in a company in a particular state, all house-
holds in the state, not just the ones owning stocks of fraud firms, reduce their equity hold-
ings. Giannetti & Wang, supra note 189.
198. This is the model described in David Reifschneider et al., Aggregate Disturbances, Monetary
Policy, and the Macroeconomy: The FRB/US Perspective, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1999), some-
times referred to as the "FRB/US" (pronounced "ferbus") model. See DIV. OF RESEARCH &
STATISTICS, FED. RESERVE BD., A GUIDE TO FRB/US: A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE
UNITED STATES (Flint Brayton & Peter Tinsley eds., Oct. 1996), http://www.federalreserve
.gov/pubs/feds/1996/199642/199642pap.pdf [http://perma.cc/H6LF-TC2Q.
199. Graham et al., supra note 197, at 5.
zoo. Id. at 6.
2ol. The sensitivity of estimates of social harms to assumptions in similar macroeconomic mod-
els is discussed more in connection with the Basel III rules in Part III.C, infra.
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Finally, research on fraud's social costs could draw on research on crime
generally, which uses several families of methods2"2 : (1) estimating hedonic
models in which variation in prices affected by crime is used to infer social
costs; 203 (2) surveying willingness-to-pay for a reduction in crime;
0 4
(3) aggregating estimates of each direct and indirect effect;"5 and (4) relating
responses to surveys of crime victims to respondent wealth or income and in-
ferring a "shadow price" for the effects of crime ., 6 Each method has limita-
tions 17: guesstimates based on willingness-to-pay surveys have been strin-
gently criticized as too subjective and internally inconsistent to be reliable for
CBA purposes,2°8 and to date these methods have not been undertaken in the
context of fraud.
6. Estimating Causal Effects of SOX 4o4
With a better framework for estimating the incidence and costs of fraud in
hand, researchers could then better estimate the benefits of regulatory changes
2o2. For overviews, see John J. Donohue III, Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: Overall
Changes and the Benefits on the Margin, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 269, 270-341 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009);
and Jens Ludwig, The Costs of Crime, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 307, 307-11 (2010).
203. See John P. Hoehn et al., A Hedonic Model of Interregional Wages, Rents and Amenity Values, 27
J. REGIONAL Sci. 605 (1987); Richard Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime Control: Evidence
from the Property Market, 5 J. URB. ECON. 137 (1978).
204. See Mark A. Cohen et al., Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control Programs, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 89
(2004); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Public Preferences for Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration ofjuve-
nile Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 627
(2006).
205. See Anderson, supra note 183, at 616-29.
2o6. See Simon Moore & Jonathan P. Shepherd, The Cost of Fear: Shadow Pricing the Intangible
Costs of Crime, 38 APPLIED ECON. 293 (2006).
207. These methods are probably best used in combination, as described in Donohue, supra note
202, at 321 ("Instead of trying to resolve these normative questions, this chapter illustrates
their importance by presenting various estimates of the cost of crime based on different as-
sumptions. The effort to highlight the underlying assumptions and methodologies will ena-
ble readers to implement their own normative choices in conducting cost-benefit analyses of
incarceration.").
208. Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No
Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 63 (1994) (concluding that "survey responses [in contingent
valuation surveys] are not satisfactory bases for policy" because they are internally incon-
sistent, unreliable and biased by such factors as the "warm glow" from answering questions
in particular ways); see also John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) (advocating use of hedonic surveys as more reliable than will-
ingness-to-pay surveys, which are conventionally used in CBA in the non-financial regulato-
ry context).
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such as SOX 404. Where a regulation is an innovation, regulators are not in a
position to "study" its causal effects at all, but must forecast those effects. For
SOX 404, this type of prediction would have been impossible; indeed, few ob-
servers (even hostile commentators, who had incentives to exaggerate) antici-
pated the full extent of the direct costs that SOX 404 would initially generate.
Ex post or retrospective studies, coupled with regulations that sunset ab-
sent re-adoption based on the result of the ex post studies, are more promising,
and would be better able to enlist academic research in the service of better fi-
nancial regulation. To date, however, most retrospective studies of SOX have
not used research designs allowing reliable causal inferences about its effects.
Instead, most researchers have used before-and-after comparisons that fail to
control for contemporaneous changes in the objects of study. 9 Better are a
handful of difference-in-difference studies, such as those used to study some of
the effects of SOX." In such studies, researchers match, as best they can, the
companies affected by a regulation with unaffected companies and compare the
before-and-after effects. But even those studies are commonly misleading in
the kinds of rich, interdependent environments that characterize the financial
markets. Long-term trends may manifest differently in the treated and nominal
control group, and common factors omitted from the matching criteria that af-
fect events in the nominal control sample may differentially affect the nominal-
ly "treated" sample, creating a spurious impression that the regulation had ef-
fects it did not actually have.2"
Better for identifying causal effects ex post are discontinuity designs, which
look at the before-and-after effects of a regulation on firms just above a thresh-
old triggering compliance and compare them with changes at firms just below
the threshold. 2 However, the findings of such studies rarely generalize be-
yond firms "near" the discontinuity, making them of limited use in CBA/FR. 3
aog. See Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 17.
alo. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107 (2009) (studying whether SOX drove firms
out of the public capital market); see also Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 55 (touting
difference-in-difference studies).
a11. This seems to have been true in some of the earliest studies of the effects of SOX, which
found differences in U.S. firms after SOX compared to Canadian or U.K. firms. For a selec-
tion of these studies, see Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 29-31. Those differences,
however, either started well before SOX, or affected U.S. firms not subject to SOX as much
as they did U.S. firms subject to SOX, such that no consensus has emerged as to whether
SOX had the studied effects. Id.
aa. See the studies reviewed in Coates and Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 27, 30, 56.
213. One could imagine a law like SOX 404 applying to all firms with a past (and so not easily
manipulated) market capitalization of between $75 million and $ioo million, or between
$1oo million and $125 million, or between $15o million and $175 million, and so on all the
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This point is illustrated by Figure 1, which depicts how one of the best studies
of SOX 404, by Peter Iliev, used such a discontinuity design.4 While that
study provided convincing evidence on causality, it provides very limited in-
formation about SOX's overall effects, because of how different the firms near
the discontinuity are from the firms most likely to generate significant costs
and benefits.
Figure i.
LIMITS ON EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF SINGLE BEST SOX STUDY TO DATE
215
Share of Public Firm Market Capitalization by Deciles of Market Capitalization,
2002
Over 1612 87.66%
538 to 1612 71o%
241 to 538 0 2.76%
112 to 241 1.26% Iliev's discontinuity is in this bin: less
than to% of public firms by number;
o
8 
to 112. .f less than 5% by value.
30 to8 I1 0.3 xtra
30 to 58 I033% External validity questionable
Sto 30 o.i6% because SOX costs fall as % of size, as
benefits are also likely to do.
6 to 15 o.o8%
2 to 6 0.03% I /
Under 2 0.01% I
0% 1o% 20% 30% 40% 50% 6o% 70% 8o% 90% oo%
Perhaps the best of feasible ex post studies are time-series designs studying
multiple events, which were used by a small number of studies to analyze SOX
404. Leuz and coauthors studied differences-in-differences among covered and
exempt groups of companies over several events in the phase-in of the rule, in-
cluding extensions by the SEC of exemptions for small firms, and Arping and
Sautner studied the staged phase-in for foreign firms cross-listed in the United
way through the full distribution of market capitalizations. Needless to say, even though it
may be the only way to derive reliable estimates of the aggregate social costs and benefits of
the rule, such a novel regulatory design would likely generate protest from covered compa-
nies, who would rightly complain that they compete with the exempt companies in the
product, labor, and capital markets and that they were being potentially disadvantaged by
any regulatory costs the rule might impose.
214. Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices, 65 J. FiN.
1163 (2010).
215. Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155.
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States. ' 6 Neither study attempted comprehensive measurement of changes in
fraud or direct and indirect costs at covered firms, but in principle these types
of studies provide the best path towards a possible retrospective CBA/FR of
SOX 404.
7. What Baseline and Set of Counterfactuals Should Be Used?
Even if a research design could produce reliable inferences about the effects
of financial regulation, it is unclear how (if at all) to modify the results of such
a study to reflect the context in which the rule was adopted. As mentioned
abovc, the SEC's CBA/FR of SOX 404 noted two facts about the rule's context:
(i) covered companies were already subject to the FCPA, which requires com-
panies to have effective control systems, and (2) many companies already vol-
untarily made disclosures similar to ones required by the rule. These facts raise
several open questions about the baselines and counterfactuals to be used in as-
sessing the rule.
First, what baseline should be used to assess the effects of SOX? One pos-
sibility is to assume a baseline of full compliance with prior law. Another is to
use a realistic baseline of average actual compliance, in which case both costs
and benefits would likely be higher (reflecting the gap between full and average
compliance, on the reasonable assumption that effects of new enforcement
pressures from SOX would have a diminishing effect as compliance increases).
A third possibility is to try to estimate levels of baseline compliance that vary
with observable firm characteristics. Nothing in the SEC's governing statutes
or other relevant law resolves which baseline to use, but the answer would like-
ly have a significant effect on any quantified CBA/FR of the rule'
7
216. Stefan Arping & Zacharias Sautner, Did SOX Section 404 Make Firms Less Opaque? Evidence
from Cross-Listed Firms, 30 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1133 (2013); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do
Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J.
ACCT. &ECON. 181 (2008).
217. At first pass, it might seem that the dual effects of this choice on both costs and benefits
would cancel out as long as the choices were consistent, but in fact that would require a fur-
ther debatable assumption-that is, that the functional relationship between actual legal
compliance on the rule's effects is the same for both costs and benefits. That assumption
seems at least possibly mistaken, because (for example) the extra costs from assuming a re-
alistic baseline should be larger for larger companies, but they should increase at a decreas-
ing rate in relation to firm size. On the other hand, the extra benefits might not follow that
pattern, and in fact might increase at an increasing rate, if (for example) large firm frauds
(as at Enron) have externalities that are not only larger than externalities of smaller firms,
but also larger by a multiple greater than one due to informational cascades and threshold
effects in how the media report on frauds.
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Second, how should analysts treat indirect behavioral effects of eliciting in-
formation for purposes of CBA/FR? Suppose, for example, that disclosure re-
duces risk-taking (as SOX 404 may have done) not because it distracts man-
agement but simply because it prevents managers from hiding behind
information asymmetries to deflect blame from losses caused by risks they
caused the firm to take. Assume that in a world of symmetric information,
those risks would not have been taken, but might have generated expected net
gains for a firm (perhaps due to differences in risk aversion between managers
and diversified shareholders). Should the lost gains due to this reduction in
risk-taking be counted? Asymmetric information is treated as a market failure
in conventional economics and in the OMB Guidance on CBA. Does that imply
that "costs" (such as reduced risk-taking) causally attributed to elimination of
some (but not all) information asymmetries should not be counted in
CBA/FR? Such a question arises for all disclosure regulations, which anticipate
and rely on private responses to the disclosure. 
8
8. How Do Compliance Costs Vary Across Firms and over Time?
Better methods are also needed for estimating costs, even direct costs. Af-
fected companies and their agents (who know the most about the likely direct
costs of a rule) have incentives to exaggerate costs in public comments.219 The-
se exaggerations are evident from the strong contrasts between the FEI/FERF
21s. Another open issue for CBA/FR is whether to use a national or supranational unit of analy-
sis for purposes of estimating welfare effects. If, for example, SOX 404 prevented fraud by
U.S.-listed but foreign-based companies that harms foreign investors, should that count as a
social gain? What if, as some studies suggest, e.g., Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, SOX
404 reduced cross-listings in the U.S. of foreign firms but with an effect that was concen-
trated among the most fraud-prone firms? If the result was to shift sales of stock by fraud-
prone companies from the U.S. to other countries but not to reduce the total amount of
fraud, should that count as a "benefit" for CBA/FR purposes under U.S. law? A similar un-
resolved issue concerns the costs of the rule: if the shift of firms from the U.S. to foreign
stock markets harmed the New York economy but benefited the London or Hong Kong
economies, should the losses count in a CBA/FR of the rule? The authors of the CCMR re-
port seem to think such losses to the U.S. economy should count as "costs" under CBA.
CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at io (criticizing the SEC for not attempting to measure
whether new rules "would... deter foreign companies from tapping U.S. capital markets").
But that report does not defend the position and does not take the correlative position that
an increase in larger company cross-listings (for example, by lowering the cost of capital rel-
ative to foreign jurisdictions by reducing information asymmetries) should count as a bene-
fit (and if a benefit, whether it should be a gross benefit to the United States or net of lower
benefits to the issuers' home countries). Neither the CFTC's nor the SEC's governing stat-
utes specify the United States as the governing unit when commanding those agencies to
consider "costs and benefits" or "efficiency," respectively. See sources cited supra note 6.
219. See Harrington et al., supra note 34, for evidence of this outside the financial context.
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survey results on SOX 404"20 and the findings on direct costs from surveys by
the SEC, the GAO, and CAQ, a firm catering to the audit industry."2 Compli-
ance costs also vary across firms.' The SEC's own studies of the effects of
SOX 404' contain information on some relevant differences, but future
CBA/FR could usefully build such differences into better models of direct
compliance costs, rather than relying on rationally biased inputs from private
actors.
9. Modeling and Measuring Chilling Effects of Financial Regulation
Although direct costs of SOX 404 were most salient to firms, because these
costs were borne directly by firms and paid out of their treasuries, indirect
costs of SOX 404 may have been larger. They are likely to remain high and may
increase rather than diminish over time, as direct costs typically do. Indirect
costs include those flowing from changes in risk-taking and investment, which
can plausibly dwarf direct costs in magnitude. SOX 404 is said to have caused
changes in the risk of personal liability facing managers and directors and in
the risk of reputational harms and opportunity costs created by litigation.' If
true, difficult-to-explain and legitimate business risks may be foregone, and
firms may decline to go public or otherwise avoid the burdens of the law, with
resulting social costs. However, the challenges of estimating indirect costs are
also larger than for direct costs. Causal inference for indirect costs is just as dif-
ficult as for a regulation's benefits, requiring quasi-experimental research de-
n2o. See FEI/FERF SURVEY, supra note 166.
221. See Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 155, at 25-29.
222. SOX 404, for example, generates higher costs for larger firms, as well as for firms with less
centralized decision making and more dispersed or fragmented assets. Id. To some extent,
the RFA and analyses thereunder have produced useful methods of breaking down costs by
firm size, but some of the more important differences may have less to do with size and
more to do with industry, complexity, or geographic dispersion.
223. Office of Chief Accountant, Study and Recommendations on Sections 4o4 (b) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 for Issuers with Public Float Between $75 and $25o Million, SEC. & EXCH.
COMMISSION (2011) [hereinafter SEC, Study and Recommendations], http://www.sec.gov
/news/studies/2oll/4o4bfloat-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5P7-PSHX]; Office of Econ.
Analysis, Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 64.
224. See Leonce L. Bargeron et al., Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking, 49 J. ACCT. &ECON.
34 (2oo) (finding reduced risk-taking by U.S. companies subject to SOX compared to non-
U.S. companies not subject to SOX). But see Ana M. Albuquerque & Julie L. Zhu, Has Sec-
tion 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Discouraged Corporate Risk-Taking? New Evidence from a
Natural Experiment (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
2013-6, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1997228 [http://perma.cc/J88G-TTN9] (finding a
trend towards reduced risk-taking by U.S. companies prior to SOX).
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signs that will only be imperfect, even after the fact. Powerful empirical proxies
for risk-taking, investment, and capital costs remain elusive and contested.
1o. Summary and Illustrative Integrated Assessment Model
The previous sections have described the kind of CBA/FR of SOX 404 that
could (in theory) be done today, from the distinctly advantaged after-the-fact
perspective of ten years after the rule was adopted. The bottom line is that no
one could hope to conduct a precise and compelling quantified CBA/FR of
such a rule now or in the near future. The one component of CBA/FR that
could be quantified - direct costs - has generated estimates that vary by an or-
der of magnitude.' Other, larger components, including benefits from re-
duced fraud and indirect costs from effects on risk-taking, investment, and
management, all remain unquantifiable.
To produce quantified CBA/FR, the SEC would need an "integrative as-
sessment model" (LAM) similar to those used in estimating the social cost of
carbon in climate change analysis.1 6 An AM would have to combine a sub-
model of fraud incidence, a sub-model of the costs of fraud, including transfers
and externalities (possibly consisting of a macroeconomic model), and a pre-
dictive empirical sub-model for how SOX 404 would affect the incidence of
fraud. Indirect costs would have to be estimated in yet another sub-model.
To illustrate what an LAM might look like, consider the following: begin-
ning with the formula for the present value of a perpetuity,2 7 an annual per-
firm direct cost stream for SOX 404 ranging from $300,000 to $2 million per
year' 8 would range from $io to $67 million (at a three percent discount rate)
225. The cost estimates range from more than $4.4 million per year on average (firms with an
average of $6 billion in revenues in 2004, based on a FEI/FERF survey) to $350,000 (firms
with market capitalizations under $io billion in 2012, based on a GAO survey). See
FEI/FERF Survey, supra note 166; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-582, IN-
TERNAL CONTROLS: SEC SHOULD CONSIDER REQUIRING COMPANIES To DISCLOSE WHIETHER
THEY OBTAINED AN AUDITOR ATTESTATION 23 (2013).
26. For one economist's highly skeptical assessment of IAMs in the environmental context, see
Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?, 51 J. ECON. LIT. 860
(2013). Pindyck calls for environmental policymaking to be informed by research, including
empirical research, but ultimately based not on IAMs or guesstimated CBA but on "simpler"
policy approaches that use a "plausible" range of outcomes and probabilities, where "plausi-
ble" is what is acceptable to a range of economists and subject matter experts (in his analy-
sis, climate scientists). Id. at 869-70.
227. PV=C/R, where PVis the present value, C is the annual cost, and R is the discount rate.
228. This is a rough range of per-year, per-firm direct cost estimates reflected in the SEC's com-
prehensive survey of such costs in 2007 and 2008. See Office of Econ. Analysis, Study of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 64, at 46 tbl.9 (2009). The estimates were reduced by an ar-
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or from $4 to $29 million (at a seven percent discount rate).' 9 As of 2003,
there were roughly 4,400 U.S. public companies covered by SOX 404,230 pro-
ducing a present value of direct costs ranging from $19 to $293 billion.
How would this compare to a possible range of benefits for SOX 404?
Suppose fraud incidence was -as estimated by Dyck et al.23'- three percent of
market capitalization, on average, but could range from 5o% to 200% of that
estimate. These assumptions produce direct fraud costs ranging from $140 to
$70o billion. Suppose SOX 404 permanently reduced annual fraud risk by an
amount ranging from 1% to lo%.232 When applied to our direct fraud cost es-
timates, the range of fraud reduction implies benefits from SOX 404 ranging
from $2 to $84 billion. Finally, assume fraud externalities range from one to
three times direct costs.23 3 This implies benefits ranging from $4 to $336 bil-
lion.
bitrary thirty percent to reflect increases that would have occurred without SOX, due to
market pressures reacting to Enron and related scandals.
229. The Office of Management and Budget suggests these discount rates. OMB Guidance, supra
note 20, at 18. Whether they are appropriate at all, or for assessing financial regulation, is
unclear. See Martin L. Weitzman, Tail-Hedge Discounting and the Social Cost of Carbon, 51 J.
ECON. LIT. 873 (2013) (critiquing the current discount rate of three percent recommended by
OMB and suggesting one percent instead, based on current yields on U.S. Treasuries). If a
discount rate of one percent were used instead of three percent, the sensitivity to the net
costs and benefits reported in Table 3 below for discount rates would increase by another
852%. One can also argue for discount rates higher than seven percent, depending on what
time period one uses to average returns on equity investments. As discussed in Part III.C,
two further discount rates (2.5% and 5%) are used by the Bank for International Settlements
in its CBA/FR of the Basel III capital rules discussed below, and yet another (3.5%) is used
by the FSA in its CBA/FR of the mortgage reforms discussed in Part III.E below. That six
different discount rates (1%, 2.5%, 3%, 3.5%, 5%, 7%) are plausible is itself a source of con-
cern about CBA/FR.
230. See Office of Econ. Analysis, Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 64, at 27 tbl.i (show-
ing 2205 companies subject to 4 o4 (b) that did not answer the survey and 2o81 companies
subject to 4 o4 (b) that did answer the survey, totaling 4286, grossed up to 44oo to reflect
growth in the number of listed companies since 2009).
231. See supra text accompanying note 18o.
232. This range is roughly equivalent at the high end to reductions in the shares of U.S. public
companies that were meeting or just beating analyst estimates in the post-SOX period, with
the low end being motivated by the likelihood that SOX's effects on fraud are diminishing
over time and/or caused by changes other than SOX 404. Eli Bartov & Daniel A. Cohen, The
"Numbers Game" in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Eras, 24 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 505,
517 fig.2 (2009).
233. This range extends from 5o% to 200% of the point estimate of the relationship between
transfers and externalities of crime from Anderson, supra note 183, at 629 tbl. 7.
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Table 2.
ILLUSTRATIVE QUANTITATIVE CBA/FR OF SOX 404
Present value of aggregate benefits,Present value ofiaggregate Present value of direct benefitsn
direct costs (transfers) includingexternalities
Direct % of current Fraud Ratio of
costs per Discount rate equity market Low end High endcap f pulic reduction rate externalities of direct gof direct
costs per cap of public to transfersofdrcofietfirm per firms due to 1% 1o% from fraud transfers transfers
year 3% 7% fraud
$0.3 $44 $19 bn 1.5% $2bn $21bn Lox $4 $168
mm bn bn bn$20 29 $26$8 $336
$2.0 $293 $126 6.o% $8 bn $84 bn 3.ox bn bn
mmn bn bn n b
Table 2 summarizes. The high end of costs is far higher than the low end of
benefits, producing a net cost of $289 billion, but the low end of costs is far
lower than the high end of benefits, producing a net benefit of $317 billion.
Depending on assumptions, guesstimated CBA suggests that SOX 404 could
be a very good idea, a very bad idea, or anything in between. If one arbitrarily
chose the range's midpoint, SOX 404 created a net benefit of $9 billion. But
this bottom line is highly sensitive, as reflected in Table 3, with net benefits
changing by between 2x and 13x as one moves from low to high values for each
of five major inputs into the illustrative IAM.
Table 3.
SENSITIVITY OF OUTPUT OF ILLUSTRATIVE IAM TO INPUTS
Absolute value ofdifference between net benefits from low to high
Low to high of various inputs, relative to mean net benefit of $9 billion, hold-ing other
inputs constant at mean
Discount rates +243%
Direct costs +440%
Ratio of externalities to direct costs +511%
Fraud rates + 1033%
Fraud reduction rates +1267%
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This illustrative LAM is crude: it implicitly resolves all of the open issues
reviewed above and uses many assumptions. The JAM could be challenged on
numerous fronts: (a) indirect costs are omitted; (b) open issues on baselines
and counterfactuals are resolved in favor of higher cost estimates, but discount-
ed by an arbitrary thirty percent; (c) the current run-rate for direct costs is as-
sumed to last indefinitely, contrary to the SEC's survey of SOX 404 costs that
suggests that costs can be expected to fall; 34 (d) transfers from U.S. to non-
U.S. persons are ignored; (e) transfers from fraud victims to other sharehold-
ers are counted; (f) the ratio of externalities to transfers is borrowed from re-
search on crime, not fraud; (g) discount rates are from OMB Guidance; (h) the
fraud reduction effect is assumed to be a one-time permanent reduction; (i) the
rate of fraud reduction is derived from a before-and-after study that may
wrongly misattribute changes to SOX; (j) the rate of fraud reduction is derived
from studies of earnings, and not the full range of fraud that SOX might re-
duce; and so on. A change in any of these assumptions would change the bot-
tom line. This list of serious debatable limits could be extended for many pag-
es. Any serious contest between opposed analysts would add to the upper ends
of ranges of both costs and benefits."
234. SEC, Study and Recommendations, supra note 223, at 53-55; Office of Econ. Analysis, Study of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 64.
235. Another method for estimating the net costs and benefits of a financial regulation is the
"event study," which examines market reactions to events leading up to a regulation's en-
actment. One estimate of the negative effects of SOX overall, based on stock market reac-
tions to events leading to its passage, was roughly -o.o7/o of the U.S. equity market capitali-
zation. Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2, 44J. AccT.
& ECON. 74, 92 tbl.2 (2007). That represented a net effect of more than negative $98o bil-
lion, based on U.S. equity market capitalization in 2003 (when SOX § 404 was adopted) of
roughly $14 trillion. Market Capitalization of Listed Companies, WORLD BANK, http://
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD [http://perma.cc/8FYT-9CNM ] .
By contrast, other studies of the stock market reaction to SOX produced results ranging
from positive $420 billion to $1.7 trillion. Aigbe Akhigbe & Anna D. Martin, Valuation Im-
pact of Sarbanes-Oxley: Evidence from Disclosure and Governance Within the Financial Services
Industry, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 989 (2006); Pankaj K. Jain & Zabihollah Rezaee, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2oo2 and Capital-Market Behavior: Early Evidence, 23 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
629 (2006); Haidan Li et al., Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2oo2 and Earnings Management, S1 J.L. & ECON. 11 (2008). The studies were published in
peer-reviewed journals, and they included plausible cross-sectional tests of the validity of
the estimates. For example, each contrasted differing market reactions to firms that theory
would predict to be more or less benefited or harmed by SOX and found results consistent
with at least some of those theories.
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B. Case Study #2: Independent Boards for Mutual Funds
The second case study is of the mutual fund governance rules proposed by
the SEC in the wake of the market-timing scandals of the early 2000s. Togeth-
er with the review of the Chamber of Commerce case in Part II.B, this case study
illustrates, among other things, how judicial review of CBA can penalize an
agency for transparency about the limits of its ability to quantify the costs and
benefits of a rule.
The ill-fated mutual fund governance rules had their origins in 2003, when
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer ended his prepared remarks at a Har-
vard Law School reunion event with a dramatic J'accuse! Pointing a finger at a
fellow panelist-a lawyer from Fidelity Management 36 - Spitzer announced
that his office was about to reveal widespread fraud in the mutual fund indus-
try. Over the next year, twenty-six advisory companies settled cases alleging
violations of the securities laws in which select investors were permitted to
harm funds and other investors by engaging in late or frequent trading that
was either contrary to SEC rules or contrary to disclosed fund policies.237
Scandals at this scale had not hit the fund industry in decades, and while
the wrongdoing alleged varied from fund complex to fund complex, the most
troubling charges involved conflicts of interest between the fund advisors and
the funds they advised s8 Conflict-of-interest transactions had been banned in
1940, but because many conflict-of-interest transactions could benefit funds,
the SEC had adopted a series of exemptions, subject to a fund's meeting set
236. Fidelity turned out not to be a target of the investigations, but Spitzer did not let that get in
the way of a dramatic moment.
237. 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N 23 (2OO6),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2oo6.pdf [http://perma.cc/A474-TGZ4] (noting
that "fair funds" were established pursuant to SEC enforcement actions concerning market
timing and late trading); John C. Coates TV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual
Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 592-93 & n.3
(2009). I served as an independent distribution consultant in connection with one of the
Fair Funds created as a result of the SEC's investigations of the fund industry that came in
the wake of Spitzer's announcement. See Order Approving Modified Distribution Plan,
Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., S.E.C. 56122 (2007), http://www.sec.govlitigation/admin/2o07/34
-56122.pdf [http://perma.cc/G36G-JK3F].
238. See, e.g., Complaint at 9, 20, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, No. 2003-
402830, 2003 WL 2569166o (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003), http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites
/default/files/press-releases/archived/canary-complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/9GLR-VXG8]
(alleging that Bank ofAmerica agreed to let a hedge fund place illegal late trades in return
for keeping investments in funds sponsored by Bank of America). For a good analysis of the
market reaction to the revelation of the scandals, see Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The
Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REv. 1021 (2007).
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conditions.239 In 2001, the SEC had tightened the conditions, increasing the
share of independent directors from forty percent to a majority for funds want-
ing to use the exemptions (as most funds wanted).
1. The Rules
In response to the scandals highlighted by Attorney General Spitzer, the
SEC proposed further tightening of the conditions for exemption, (1) requiring
a fund's board to contain seventy-five percent independent directors and (2)
adding a requirement that a fund board chair be independent of the advisor. 4
The latter requirement was anathema to Fidelity Management-one of the
largest fund complexes, privately held, and dominated by its founder, Ned
Johnson, who chaired boards of all 292 funds advised by Fidelity.24' Fidelity
paid for a study that found a negative correlation between independent board
chairs and fund performance but which acknowledged that the correlation
could be due to "other important differences that may have impacted perfor-
mance results," such as the prevalence of split chairs in bank-sponsored fund
groups.' 42
The SEC adopted the more stringent conditions by a three-to-two partisan
vote in August 2004. In its rule release, the SEC included a 1,68o-word
CBA/FR and a lengthier discussion of the conditions' benefits in its general as-
239. Various sections of the ICA govern conflict of interest transactions. See, e.g., Investment
Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 17, 54 Stat. 815 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 8oa-17 (2012)) (banning purchases, sales, borrowing, and loans to or from a fund
by "any affiliated person"). The exemptions adopted by the SEC under the ICA are numer-
ous and collected at Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,379 n.9
(Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
240. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,582-82. The SEC also added require-
ments for fund boards to perform self-assessments at least annually, hold executive sessions
for independent directors at least quarterly, and give independent directors authority to hire
their own staff. Id. at 46,381. None of these requirements were the focus of subsequent liti-
gation, although each plausibly contributes to both the overall benefits and overall costs of
the combined package of conditions, by enhancing the power of independent directors, for
both good and ill.
241. Amy Borrus & Paula Dwyer, Who's Right, the SEC or Ned Johnson?, BLOOMBERG Busi-
NESSWEEK, June 27, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-o6-27/whos-right
-the-sec-or-ned-johnson [http://perma.cc/9YVJ-76ED].
42. See Letter from Eric D. Router, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity Mgmt. &
Research Co. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 18,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7o3o4/fidelityo318o 4 .htm [http://perma.cc
/UF86-8JGK].
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sessment of the conditions. 4 3 The CBA/FR was qualitative, and the rule was
justified because, in the SEC's view, independent directors and chairs were
"more likely to be primarily loyal to the fund shareholders rather than the fund
adviser"; 2 " in addition, the independent directors and chairs were more likely
to effectively manage conflicts of interest such as those involved in the 2003
scandals." s The SEC explicitly noted it had not conducted a quantified
CBA/FR, as it could not quantify either costs or benefits. The agency also stat-
ed that it was "not aware of any conclusive research that demonstrates that the
hiring of an independent chairman will improve fund performance or reduce
expenses, or the reverse. ' ' , 46 Within weeks, Fidelity persuaded Senator Judd
Gregg (a Republican from New Hampshire) to include a rider to an omnibus
bill;247 the rider required the SEC to study the need for tightened conditions,
resulting in an SEC study that was released in April 2005. That study contained
seventy-seven pages of conceptual CBA/FR, showing that the Fidelity-
commissioned study was sensitive to assumptions and could not reliably estab-
lish what it purported to show. After the SEC conducted the study, the Cham-
ber of Commerce sued to overturn the rule under the APA and the ICA, a suit
that ended in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC as described in Part II.,8
2. The Aftermath of Chamber of Commerce II
After the second Chamber of Commerce decision, 9 the SEC requested that
the SEC's Chief Economist 2s ° reevaluate the governance rules yet again. That
243. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,386-87 (applying cost-benefit analy-
sis); id. at 46,381-86 (discussing conditions, including qualitative assessment of benefits).
244. Id. at 46,386.
245. Id. at 46,380.
246. The SEC noted that "[e]ven accepted at face value, Fidelity's data constitute muddy and un-
persuasive evidence for continuing to allow senior management company officials to sit in
the fund chairman's chair." Id. at 46,383 n.52 (citing John C. Bogle, Founder and Former
CEO, Vanguard Group, Remarks Before the Institutional Investor Magazine Mutual Fund
Regulation and Compliance Conference (May 5, 2004)).
247. As noted by Sherwin, this rider was first introduced in S. 2908, io8th Cong. (2004), by
Senator Gregg on September 15, 2004, and was later incorporated into H.R. 4818, to8th
Cong. (2004), the version of the spending bill passed into law, during the House-Senate
conference. Sherwin, supra note 15, at 27 n.159. For Fidelity's role, see Carrie Johnson, Trade
Groups, Firms Push to Ease Tough Federal Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2005,
http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43168-2oo5Jan2.html [http://perma.cc
/ 7 6AJ-K8CB].
248. 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cit. 2005).
249. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F. 3 d 890 (D.C. Cir. 20o6).
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request led to two memos -publicly released with a request for public com-
ment.
In those memos, the Chief Economist concluded that (1) more independent
boards were more likely to better protect investors, but (2) little evidence exist-
ed to establish that board composition would create higher returns.2"' These
two conclusions, seemingly in tension, could be reconciled by one or more of
three further conclusions: (a) "no sound structural model [exists] ... to isolate
the effect of a ... board decision on performance"; (b) "inherent limitations to
data and statistical tools ... may render it difficult for research to identify rela-
tions that ...may be economically significant"; or (c) "there may not be a
unique relation between governance and performance. ' 2s2 In other words, the
state of finance research was such that no CBA/FR of the mutual fund govern-
ance rules was feasible. At the same time, economic theory (particularly agency
cost theory) and the Chief Economist's judgment, based on the research re-
viewed in the memos, supported a qualitative judgment that the rules would
better protect investors.
3. What Would CBA of the Mutual Fund Governance Rules Require?
Implicit in the Chief Economist's memos is a sketch of what quantified
CBA/FR of the governance rules would look like. As the memos noted, the best
board structure (in terms of independence) depends
25o. The SEC's Chief Economist was Chester S. Spatt, who had been a Professor of Finance at
Carnegie-Mellon.
251. See OEA Memorandum re: Literature Review on Indep. Mutual Funds and Dir. from Ches-
ter Spatt, Chief Economist, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to the Inv. Co. File S7-o3-o4 (Dec. 29,
20o6), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s703o4/oeamemol229o6-litreview.pdf [http://
perma.cc/XF8H-FXYE]; OEA Memorandum re: Power Study as Related to Indep. Mut.
Fund Chairs from Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to the Inv. Co.
Governance File S7-o3-o4 (Dec. 29, 20o6), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7o3o4
/oeamemo1229o6-powerstudy.pdf [http://perma.cc/4PXD-F42K].
252. OEA Memorandum re: Literature Review on Indep. Mutual Funds and Dir., supra note 251,
at 1. While the Chief Economist did not spell out the point, "structural model" here presum-
ably refers to a model in which potential causal relationships among exogenous and endog-
enous variables needed to measure fund value or fund performance are specified-in other
words, a theoretical model of fund value or performance. See, e.g., Peter C. Reiss & Frank A.
Wolak, Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization,
in 6A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS 4277, 4363 (James J. Heckman & Edward E. Leamer
eds., 2007) (contrasting structural models with non-structural "descriptive" empirical mod-
els). Most empirical corporate governance research, including research relevant to mutual
funds, remains closer to the "descriptive" than to the "structural."
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on the ... consequences of increasing the influence of outsiders ....
[O]utsiders may bring expertise and independence [and] improve the
quality of management decisions and manage conflicts of interest that
insiders have, thereby increasing the value of the firm [but] may lack
information about the "inner-workings" of the firm and other firm-
specific knowledge [which if] difficult to extract... may diminish the
quality of management decisions and reduce the value of the firm.23
Because this tradeoff may vary by fund, a fixed minimum share of inde-
pendent directors may benefit investors in one fund by preventing an advisor
from influencing the board to nominate too few independent directors. The
same minimum may harm investors in another fund by raising the level of in-
dependence beyond the optimum for that fund.
Because optimal boards likely vary, however, and because board structure
is only one of many factors that influence firm value, an empirical comparison
of value at funds with more independent directors in the pre-rule context
would not generate reliable information about the effect of the rules. Govern-
ance scholars have known this fact-that cross-sectional observational studies
produce only weak information about the merits of endogenously chosen gov-
ernance structures- for some time.254 A source of governance variation that is
exogenous with respect to fund value is a necessary but insufficient condition
for identifying the average effect of a proposed rule about the feature. Few ex-
ogenous sources of variation for fund governance exist, other than as a result of
SEC rule changes - and even for those changes, the effects they have caused are
likely to be sufficiently small as to be difficult to discover, even with the best
cross-sectional modeling.
This identification challenge is fundamental and greatly undermines the re-
liability of any guesstimated CBA/FR of rules on fund (or corporate) govern-
ance."'5 The difficulty is even more severe than it was in the SOX case study be-
253. OEA Memorandum re: Literature Review on Indep. Mutual Funds and Dir., supra note 251,
at 2.
254. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 2o FIN.
MGMT. 101 (1991); Eugene Kang & Asghar Zardkoohi, Board Leadership Structure and Firm
Performance, 13 CORP. Gov.: INT'L REv. 785 (2005); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board
Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation
Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1995); M. Babajide Winto-
ki et al., Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal Corporate Governance, 1O5 J. FIN. ECON. 581
(2012).
255. E.g., SANJAI BHAGAT & RIcHARD H. JEFFERIS, JR., THE ECONOMETICS OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE STUDIES (2002); Michael R. Roberts & Toni M. Whited, Endogeneiry in Empirical
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cause the plausible importance of any detail of governance is lower for SOX,
which combined multiple institutional and enforcement changes. Anything
that changes fund values-for example, anything that changes the value of a
fund's investments -can confound the ability of researchers to identify the ef-
fects of governance changes. Fund investment values undergo changes that are
continuous and large (money funds aside) relative to the effect of governance
details. A shift from fifty percent to seventy-five percent independent directors
will not have an effect on value approaching a small fraction of common mar-
ket-affecting events.2s6 In the language of econometrics, the "power" of statisti-
cal tests given available data is too weak to detect, much less reliably and pre-
cisely quantify, the effects of most governance changes-even if we had
examples of changes that were plausibly exogenous. All of these points are
made plain in the Chief Economist's memos, even if they were not explained in
the SEC's releases or subsequent D.C. Circuit opinions. 7
Corporate Finance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 493 (George M. Constan-
tinides et al. eds., 2013); Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corpo-
rate Governance, io AM. L. & ECON. REv. 90 (20o8). This does not mean empirical studies of
governance are useless. Such studies are essential sources of descriptive information about
important organizations, without which neither social scientists nor practitioners can hope
to understand them at all. For example, the fact of the extent and generality of variation in
governance's fine details emerged only from such studies. Such studies can provide partial,
weak, and provisional evidence about the effects of governance arrangements, and when
replicated with sufficient frequency in a variety of settings by a variety of researchers, they
may allow tentative inferences to augment raw experience-based judgment in tentative eval-
uations. They can reject certain theories about governance, prompt refinements in theory,
and provide a basis for more serious experimentation. At least over short time frames, they
can allow for useful out-of-sample predictions even without reliable proof of causal mecha-
nisms.
256. Compare, for example, the effect of financial collapse (as in 20o8), accounting scandals (as
in 2002), a market crash (as in 1987 and 1989), or war (shooting or trade), pandemic, or
drought.
257. Thus, as with SOX, a valid criticism of the SEC's CBAiFR is that the SEC failed to ade-
quately explain why quantitative analysis was not feasible, and that it failed to present an
adequate conceptual CBA/FR-not, as argued by others, that it failed to conduct adequate
quantitative analysis. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir.
2005); CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 9; Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation: What the SEC Ignores in the Rulemaking Process, Why It
Matters, and What To Do About It 53, 65 (Working Paper, 2005), http://www.law
.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/CBA.article.doc.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWL-8GNR].
For example, the SEC never noted in its rule release that heightened independence require-
ments could result in less informed and more cumbersome boards or divisiveness and con-
flict on boards, undermine board culture, and dilute the effectiveness of board decision
making. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,386-87. These costs seem
likely to swamp the short-term compliance costs on which the SEC, the D.C. Circuit, and
commentators have focused. See Letter from John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law and Econ.,
to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules
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To be sure, any change in governance mandates will generate adjustment
costs -the focus of both the SEC in the "cost" section of its rule release and of
the Chamber of Commerce in its lawsuit -that could be quantified (or at least
bounded) based on survey evidence. But if benefits of a rule cannot be quanti-
fied, and larger potential costs of the rule due to fund performance cannot be
quantified, it remains unclear why the failure to quantify adjustment costs is a
significant failing or how (if provided) such information would materially im-
prove public understanding of the effects of the rule. This point is even more
compelling when, as here, even the quantifications would vary depending on
private responses that could not be forecast with any precision, as the D.C. Cir-
cuit acknowledged in Chamber of Commerce. Put differently, litigation challeng-
ing the SEC's rule focused on an immaterial subset of the likely costs and bene-
fits of the rule, and had the SEC done exactly what the D.C. Circuit ultimately
said it had to do, the result would likely have had no material effect on any as-
sessment of the rule. Yet one would not know this from reading the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinions or much of the commentary on the case.2S8 The litigation is a
perfect example of how CBA law-here, judicial review of CBA/FR- can ob-
scure more than illuminate.
4. The Aftermath of the Aftermath
Because it was unclear if the Chief Economist's memos represented the end
or the beginning of another stage in the SEC's efforts to revise governance
rules, Fidelity filed a 141-page comment in response, including a twenty-two-
page analysis of the Chief Economist's memos by me (for which I was paid a
fee, giving me a financial interest in this topic). 9 In my analysis, I critiqued
the memos on the ground that the research used to support the qualitative con-
clusion that the rules would better protect investors was weak, inconsistent,
and at times at odds with the summary in the memos. I also outlined a number
of potential costs to the proposed rules that had not been noted in the Chief
260Economist's memos.
/proposed/s703o4/s7o3o4-554.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RX-F38D] (discussing the costs of an
independent board chair).
258. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (nowhere discussing these
costs); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); CCMR RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 4; CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at 29-30; Sherwin, supra note 15, at
32-33.
25g. See Letter from John C. Coates IV, supra note 257.
26o. I also argued that "[i]f [CBA/FR] is to assist the regulatory process, the minimum one
would expect before adding regulations is at least some economic evidence that the regula-
tions will provide some benefit." Id. at 2. I continue to hold that view. But a desire for "evi-
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Subsequently, the SEC has taken no more action to re-propose its govern-
ance reforms. What is unclear, however, is whether its decision was based on a
genuine change of policy. Two less optimistic possibilities exist: (1) between
Chamber of Commerce II and the SEC's giving up on the rules, the SEC Chair
changed identity (William Donaldson was replaced by Christopher Cox); and
(2) the ongoing litigation threat, coupled with the fact that reliable quantified
CBA/FR for the rules remains unfeasible, led the SEC not to want to risk an-
other morale-draining, resource-depleting court loss,261 even if it continued to
believe that the governance rules would benefit investors at a low cost. In favor
of the last possibility is the fact that the Chief Economist's memos were re-
leased after Christopher Cox became Chairman, but they supported re-
adoption, and nothing in the public commentary (including my comment)
provided any compelling quantitative reason for the SEC to change its mind.
While the qualitative reasoning in the public comments may be part of the ex-
planation, a dysfunctional system of judicial review seems likely to be a bigger
part of the explanation.
C. Case Study #3: Heightened Capital Requirements for Banks
The third case study is of bank capital rule reforms adopted in the wake of
the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis. Among other things, the case study illustrates
how difficult it is to quantify one of the core benefits of a great number-
perhaps the majority-of financial regulations: reductions in systemic risk. The
difficulty is in part due to the relatively small number of comparable crises
from which to draw reliable inferences about the effects of crises or the effects
of regulations on them.
"[Y]ou only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out." "
Warren Buffett's perhaps self-congratulatory moral was occasioned by losses
facing casualty insurers after 9/11, but it captures a central fact of the 20o8 cri-
sis: banks were revealed to be grossly undercapitalized for risks they had been
dence" is not the same as a mandate to conduct quantified CBA/FR. One can believe finan-
cial regulations aimed at improving or constraining governance are not susceptible to quan-
tified CBA/FR without giving up on the goal of obtaining "evidence" that can inform con-
sideration of the rules and their alternatives. Evidence is commonly adduced in court and in
other contexts that do not admit of quantification, reliable causal inference, or anything ap-
proaching "science."
261. Cf. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, in THE NEw PoLiTIcs
OF PUBLIC POLICY 88 (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995) (litigation drains agency
resources, causing agencies to alter their behavior in an effort to avoid it).
262. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders (Feb. 28,
2002), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2oo1ar/2oo1letter.html [http://perma.cc/S7WA
-BH85].
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running. Undercapitalization was evident in the failures of both commercial
banks -Washington Mutual, Wachovia-and investment banks-Lehman,
Bear Stearns. But it was also true of the more than 700 banks bailed out by the
United States.263 Even the "best" performing U.S. banks during the crisis lost
significant amounts of money, needed to raise capital on terms suggesting pre-
crisis undercapitalization,264 and would have failed without massive infusions
of liquidity by the Federal Reserve, through near-zero interest rates and three
rounds of "quantitative easing," six years after the crisis began.26'
Capital shortfalls were global but not universal. Banks in the United King-
dom, France, Germany, and Belgium failed or needed government support to
stay open, while banks in Canada and Australia did not, in part due to tight
capital regulation.266 In a cross-section of banks, those with more capital and
263. See Capital Purchase Program: Program Purpose and Overview, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Jan.
15, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs
/bank-investment-programs/cap/pages/default.aspx [http ://perma.cc/YY5Y-MsRN].
264. Wells Fargo's then-CEO has criticized what he viewed as U.S. government efforts to pres-
sure his company to accept a bailout under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (also
known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program), and Wells Fargo repaid the investment as
soon as it was permitted under the terms of the investment. Mark Calvey, Former Wells Far-
go CEO Dick Kovacevich Blasts TARP: An 'Unmitigated Disaster,' S.F. Bus. TIMEs, June 13,
2012, http://www.bizournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2o i2/o6/wells-fargo-dick-kovacevich-
occupy-tarp.html [http://perma.cc/86D4-sNW4]; Wells' TARP Plan Brings End to Bailout
Era, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 14, 2009, 6:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/20o 9/i2/14/wells-fargo-to-repay-25-billion-to-us [http://perma.cc/ZMA2-N7VD]. Howev-
er, Wells Fargo was found to need more capital in the course of the "stress tests" conducted
during the crisis, in circumstances in which not all banks were required to raise capital.
Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report (Form lo-K) 8 (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/72971/oooo95o12310017877/f54129elovk.htm [http://perma.cc/YW49
-8TJE] ("[I]n 2009, the [Federal Reserve] conducted a test under the [Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program, i.e., the stress test program] to forecast capital levels . . . in an adverse
economic scenario. Following .. .that stress test, the [Federal Reserve] required [Wells
Fargo] to generate a $13.7 billion regulatory capital buffer .... [Wells Fargo] exceeded this
requirement through an $8.6 billion ... common stock offering .... ").
265. See Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, 95 FED. RE-
SERVE BANK ST. Louis REv. 51 (2013), http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review
/13/ol/Fawley.pdf [http ://perma.cc/EV39-BRNT].
266. See Jennifer G. Hill, Why Did Australia Fare So Well in the Global Financial Crisis?, in Ti-E
REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 203, 287 (Eilis Ferran et at. eds.,
2012) (reporting that no bailouts occurred in Australia or Canada, and noting that
"[b]etween 2003 and 2005, [Australia's financial services regulator] created a new regulatory
framework, which was focused on close supervision, effective risk management, governance,
and strong, well-enforced, capital adequacy rules"); Michael D. Bordo et al., Why Didn't
Canada Have A Banking Crisis in 2008 (or in 193o, or 19o7, or... )? 25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17312, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w'7312.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZYUs-CMTD] ("Canadian regulation under OSFI proved tougher than in
the United States, mandating higher capital requirements, lower leverage, less securitiza-
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those based in countries with more stringent capital regulation did better than
banks elsewhere, controlling for other factors. 6
1. Regulatory Response
It was thus inevitable that regulators around the world would impose new,
higher capital requirements. Capital regulation is coordinated for global banks
(on a voluntary multilateral basis) by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) based in Basel. More precisely, BIS hosts the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (Basel Committee), composed of members from twenty-seven
countries, which from time to time reaches consensus on a unified set of capital
regulations for banks.768 Bank regulators in the member countries then trans-
pose the consensus to national regulation.
Each U.S. banking agency (the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC))2 6' participates in the Basel Committee."7 Following the crisis, the
Committee hosted talks on new capital guidelines (called Basel III to distin-
guish them from two prior guidelines). This new round focused on tougher
capital guidelines for large banks engaged in cross-border transactions or activ-
ities with a lack of substitutes,"1 and on liquidity requirements -with the aim
of addressing liquidity risks that played a greater role in 2008 than in prior cri-
ses. 72 The new capital guidelines included leverage ratios so banks will need to
tion, the curtailment of off balance sheet vehicles, and restricting the assets that banks could
purchase.").
267. See Andrea Beltratti & Ren6 M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some
Banks Perform Better?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 8-1o (2012).
268. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://
www.bis.org/bcbs [http ://perma.cc/7YUX-FQPA].
269. The Federal Reserve supervises systemically important financial institutions and other bank
and financial holding companies, as well as state banks that are members of the Federal Re-
serve System (FRS). The OCC supervises national banks and federal thrifts. The FDIC su-
pervises state FDIC-insured banks that are not members of the FRS and has back-up au-
thority over other insured banks. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43o87,
WHO REGULATES WHOM AND How? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY PoLIcY
FOR BANKINGAND SECURITIES MARKETS 13, 16 (2013).
270. See Basel Committee Membership, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs
/membership.htm [http://perma.cc/69B3-76LZ].
271. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Re-
silient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS 1 (June 2o11), http://
wwwv.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [http://perma.cc/7D9U-YM8F].
272. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidi-
ty Risk Monitoring Tools, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS paras. 1-3, at 1 (Jan. 2013), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [http://perma.cc/DU8G-YDLM]. The new requirements in-
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hold a minimum ratio of capital to assets, even if those assets nominally have a
low level of risk, such as highly rated mortgage-backed securities.273 Other re-
quirements in the guidelines included more common equity; tougher treat-
ment for credit default swaps and counterparty risk; securitizations; and risk
management; and a surcharge for the very largest, most complex, and inter-
connected banks, known as "systemically important financial institutions," or
SIFIs.274 The Committee circulated capital guidelines in December 2010 (re-
vised in June 2011) and liquidity guidelines in January 2013. The U.S. agencies
proposed capital requirements for U.S. banks in August 2012, eliciting over
2,500 comments before being finalized in October 2013, and proposed new li-
quidity requirements in November 2013.7 s
clude a liquidity coverage ratio, which requires banks to have enough high quality liquid re-
sources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month, and a net stable funding
ratio, designed to address liquidity risk by creating incentives for banks to rely on funding
with maturities of a year or longer. Id. paras. 14-17, at 4. In general terms, liquidity is the
amount of cash or other assets readily convertible to cash on a timely basis, to meet with-
drawal demands or other cash requirements. The Basel Committee also circulated an earlier
discussion paper related to liquidity. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: In-
ternational Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 20o), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6J2Y-64BE].
273. Under prior capital rules, securitized assets with high credit ratings were given a low risk
weighting and so required less capital than other kinds of assets. See Basel Comm. on Bank-
ing Supervision, Revisions to the Basel Securitisation Framework, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLE-
MENTS 4 (Dec. 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs236.pdf [http://perma.cc/QF6Z-RBCL]
("The recent financial crisis revealed that external credit ratings often did not adequately re-
flect the risk of certain structured finance asset classes, such as mortgage backed securities,
including but not limited to resecuritisation exposures.").
274. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III Counterparty Credit Risk and Exposures to
Central Counterparties - Frequently Asked Questions, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Dec.
2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs237.pdf [http://perma.cc/9329-V35D]; Basel Comm.
on Banking Supervision, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms - Basel III, BANK
FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf [http://
perma.cc/D6KL-V4A7]; Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement, BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS (July 2011), http://www.bis.org/pubVbcbs20i.pdf [http://perma.cc
/rQH2-UCXP].
27S. See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Ad-
equacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-
Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches
Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018, 62,023 (Oct.
11, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 217, 225) (final rule, consolidating three pro-
posed rules, and noting that there were over 2,500 comments for these proposed rules); Li-
quidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, 78 Fed.
Reg. 71,818 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249); Regulatory Capi-
tal Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule, 77
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2. CBA/FR ofBasel III
Although U.S. banking agencies briefly discussed costs in reviewing com-
ments on their rules,276 none of the U.S. banking regulators included formal
CBA in transposing Basel III to U.S. law. However, the Basel Committee itself,
in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, published its own
CBA/FR.m The Committee elicited CBA/FR that focused on costs to its mem-
bers (central banks and bank regulatory agencies), twenty-three of which ob-
tained data and analyses from 263 large banks worldwide.~ Subsequently, the
Fed's counterpart in the United Kingdom (then the FSA)279 extended the Basel
Committee's CBA/FR in published white papers.so
Fed. Reg. 52,978 (proposed Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 217, 324); Reg-
ulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regula-
tory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Ac-
tion, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792 (proposed Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 2o8, 217,
225); Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets; Market
Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,888 (proposed Aug. 30, 2012) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217).
276. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequa-
cy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-
Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches
Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 62,o24.
277. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS (Aug. 2oo) [here-
inafter BCBS 173], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf [http://perma.cc/JLsH-4PU6] (es-
timating both costs and benefits of higher capital requirements); Macroeconomic Assess-
ment Grp., Final Report: Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, BANK FOR INT'L SETLEMENTS (Dec. 2010), http://
www.bis.org/publ/othpl2.pdf [http://perma.cc/FZ45-39XB] (estimating the effects of high-
er capital requirements).
278. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Results of the Comprehensive Quantitative Impact Study,
BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTs 1, 4 (Dec. 20o), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl86.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BY4F-QSE8]. The Basel Committee compiled those inputs and analyzed
the results in a "quantitative impact study," id., and the results are reflected in the Commit-
tee's final CBA/FR, Macroeconomic Assessment Grp., supra note 277. This consultation was
confidential, at both agency and bank levels, and individual bank or national regulator in-
puts to the Basel Committee process are not available to the public. Id.
279. The FSA was required to conduct CBA/FR. See supra text accompanying note 83.
28o. Ray Barrell et al., Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity: How To Calibrate New
International Standards, FIN. SERVICEs AUTHORiTY (Occasional Paper Series No. 38, July
2009) [hereinafter FSA 38], [http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op38.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G7JM-2ZTH]; Sebastian de-Ramon et al., Measuring the Impact of Prudential Policy
on the Macroeconomy: A Practical Application to Basel III and Other Responses to the Financial
Crisis, FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (Occasional Paper Series No. 42, May 2012) [hereinafter FSA 42],
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op42.pdf [http ://perma.cc/5TWP-WT65].
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Collectively, the work of the Basel Committee and the FSA on Basel III's
higher capital rules provides another detailed illustration of what CBA/FR
looks like for a financial regulation with large if narrow significance. A review
of these publications does not leave a reader with much confidence in using
guesstimated CBA/FR to guide regulation. CBA/FR of the new rules required
complex social and economic predictions. First, the analysis had to estimate
benefits of heightened capital and liquidity requirements; those benefits were
identified as less frequent and/or severe financial crises. Two sub-models were
needed, one to estimate the cost of a crisis and one to predict the frequency of
crises. The CBA/FR then faced the challenge of forecasting the causal effect of
the requirements on each modeled relationship (incidence and effects). Finally,
the CBA/FR had to estimate the costs of the requirements-posited to be lower
lending by the banks subject to the rules. Each of these models is discussed be-
low.
3. Costs of a Financial Crisis
Focus first on the costs of a crisis. One pair of commentators has suggested
that this element of CBA/FR should be "easy": "Agreement on a figure in the
range 15o billion to 3 trillion dollars (viz. a crisis cost between 1 percent and 20
percent of US GDP .. .) would seem relatively easy to reach given the widely
respected estimates of Reinhart and Rogoff."8' Unfortunately, this view is too
sanguine by more than half. Other estimates of the costs of financial crises
range from 90% to 350% of world GDP (Bank of England); 18% to 48% of UK
GDP (FSA 42); and io% to 21o% of UK GDP.2
To state the obvious: these ranges do not even overlap. The high end of
Posner and Weyl's range (20% of U.S. GDP) is less than one-fourth of the low
end of the Bank of England's range and is barely above the low end of the
FSA's range. The high end of the Bank of England's estimate is seventeen times
that of Posner and Weyl's, and Yan et al.'s estimate is eleven-and-a-half times
larger than Posner and Weyl's. In absolute, comparable, present value dollars,
these differences are enormous: trillions, not billions.
281. Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 AM. ECON.
REv., May 2013, at 393, 394 (citing CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TiME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009)).
282. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Address at the Institute
of Regulation & Risk in Hong Kong: The $1oo Billion Question (Mar. 30, 2010),
http ://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2o1o/speech 43
3.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SEQ-9KYK]; FSA 42, supra note 28o, at 63 tbl.7; Meilan Yan et al.,
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Basel III: Some Evidence from the UK 26 tbl.io (Working Paper,
Aug. 20, 2011), http://ssm.com/abstract=1913433 [http://perma.cc/UAD5 -64BB].
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One may object, fairly, that Posner and Weyl's estimate is for all future cri-
ses, whereas the other ranges are for the recent crisis. But there are two re-
sponses. First, with respect to the recent crisis, the ranges still vary substantial-
ly. Second, as discussed more below, no consensus approach exists to resolve
which historical data one should use in estimating the cost of future crises. Da-
ta from 1929, included in Reinhart and Rogoff, on which Posner and Weyl re-
ly, 23 are not obviously more or equally relevant to future crises than data from
2008. A longer set of historical data has the advantage of allowing costs to vary
with factors that fluctuate or cycle over decades, and dampens the effect of dif-
ferences of estimated costs of any particular crisis. A shorter set of data from
more recent periods has several advantages as well. First, a shorter dataset
promotes better modeling of current economic, legal, and political conditions,
including the centrality of finance to the economy, 8 which has arguably in-
creased over time; it also allows one to account for the presence of laws and in-
stitutions that socialize some of the risks of crises, such as FDIC deposit insur-
ance, and that did not exist in 1929. Second, a shorter dataset enables one to
reduce the number of disputes that can be expected over which crises to include
in the dataset. Given the tradeoffs between a shorter and a longer dataset, nei-
ther choice clearly dominates.
An examination of CBA/FR conducted for the Basel Committee reveals
methodologies and estimates of the costs of crises more disparate than in the
studies just summarized. The Committee reviewed twenty-one studies. Two
provided estimates of peak-to-trough losses during the crises studied, while
thirteen provided cumulative loss estimates. The present value of the average
cost in the latter studies ranged from 16% to 302% of pre-crisis GDP (some-
times measured against domestic GDP, sometimes global). Several include a
lower bound of zero(!),8s while the highest upper bound was 1041% of pre-
283. This date is from REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 281, at 230 fig.14.4. Posner and Weyl do
not provide details on which of Reinhart and Rogoffs estimates they used; in some of the
latter's datasets, for example, id. at 295 app.A.i, they list datasets on crises dating back to
18oo or even 1258. I assume few would use data from the thirteenth century in modern
CBA/FR.
284. See infra Part IV.A.i.
285. That a crisis could have zero social cost disconcerted the authors of BCBS 173, supra note
277, who found the result driven by "definitions of what constitutes a systemic banking cri-
sis. For example, some studies assume that Canada had a banking crisis in 1983. While two
small banks failed, experts at the Bank of Canada do not consider this event a systemic
banking crisis. Unsurprisingly, most studies find zero output costs for this crisis." Id. at 36
(citation omitted).
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crisis GDP. One study presented results from two methods that varied at the
mean by a factor of five and at the high end by a factor of ten." 6
The Basel Committee's qualitative summary is "that results in the literature
are surprisingly consistent." ' But this conclusion is inconsistent with the
committee's statement elsewhere in its report that one can find "a significant
range of crisis outcomes across studies and individual episodes."8 8 Presuma-
bly, the "significant range" of outcomes is "surprisingly consistent" when
measured against prior expectations that the results would lack coherence alto-
gether.
The table summarizing the committee's findings,28s converted into Figure 2
here, shows the sensitivity of the results to assumptions and methodological
choices. The primary drivers of the sensitivity of results are: (i) selection of
historical data points; (2) assumptions about whether economic losses will be
permanent or temporary, and if temporary, how long crises will last; and
(3) what policy response will be triggered by the crisis. For each driver, a num-
ber of choices must be made, and each choice has large effects on the bottom
line of the CBA/FR.
286. John H. Boyd et al., The Real Output Losses Associated with Modern Banking Crises, 37 J. MON-
EY, CREDIT&BANKING 977, 978, 994 tbl.7 (2005).
287. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 34.
288. Id. at 11.
289. Id. at 35 & tbl.Ai.i.
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Figure 2.
RANGE OF ESTIMATES OF COSTS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
290
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Cumulative reduction in GDP, relative to pre-crisis GDP
Boyd et al. 2005 M2 max (1041%) omitted to make figure readable
For the simplest driver - choice of data - at least three contestable choices
are required. First, a "financial crisis" must be defined: crises can be subjective-
ly and judgmentally chosen ("I know it when I see it" approach)29' or objec-
tively chosen, and either way can be based on a variety of data, including data
regarding market volatility,292 bank runs,29 3 bank closures or nationaliza-
tions,294 bank bailouts,29 stock market declines,29 6 and ratios of non-
290. Id.
291. One prominent study asserts that the definitions used in it and in other cross-country stud-
ies are "qualitative." Glenn Hoggarth et al., Costs of Banking System Instability: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence, z6 J. BANKING & FIN. 825, 829 (2002).
292. See, e.g., Michael Bordo et al., Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?, 16 ECON. POL'Y S3,
55 (zoo).
293. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 281, at 8-11; FSA 38, supra note 280, at 12.
294. See, e.g., REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 281, at 8-11; Bordo et al., supra note 292, at SS; FSA
38, supra note 280, at 12.
295. See, e.g., Bordo et al., supra note 292, at 55; FSA 38, supra note 280, at 12.
z96. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 286, at 98o-81.
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performing loans to bank assets.297 Some distinguish banking from market cri-
ses; others include banking crises as a subset of financial crises.29s Second, time
periods must be chosen-both for the overall dataset (how far back to go in
history?) and for each crisis (because the duration of a crisis affects the count
and size of effects)99 Third, one must decide what geographic scope to con-
sider: should one consider only crises in the United States, in developed coun-
tries (and if so, how to define "developed"?), or all countries?
These choices have large effects on outputs. One study of the costs of fi-
nancial crises presents two historical samples, with its bottom line estimate
doubling depending on which sample is used.3"' Even over the same historical
period, one study counts 16o banking crises, including many that caused rela-
tively small losses, reducing the average loss caused by the crises counted,
while another study counts twenty-three, which caused large average losses.3"1
The differences are attributable to (a) basic definitional choices; (b) whether to
count poor, developing nations or nations with poorly developed financial
markets; and (c) how (and whether) to count countries that experienced mul-
tiple crises close in time: if all crises are counted separately, the average cost
falls, because some of the crises are brief episodes paving the way to a larger
crisis." 2
Further illustrating the fragility of cost-of-crisis models is the recent kerfuf-
fle involving Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R), on whose "widely respected esti-
mates" Posner and Weyl rely. R&R's publications on the effects of crises
297. See, e.g., FSA 38, supra note 280, at 12.
298. See, e.g., Bordo et al., supra note 292, at 55.
299. As the FSA noted, the use of binary crisis dummies (as is typical in the studies reviewed
here) "inevitably mean[s] that the start and end dates are ambiguous." FSA 38, supra note
280, at 12. The use of annual dummies allows for up to twenty-two months of variance in
actual duration without affecting the data used (eleven months for the start date, eleven
months for the end date), and, "[s]ince the end-dates are to some extent subjectively cho-
sen[,] there are potential endogeneity problems with estimation: the explanatory variables
will be affected by ongoing crises." Id.
300. E.g., Bordo et al., supra note 292, at 68 tbl.3.
301. Boyd et al., supra note 286, at 980 (comparing their choice of twenty-three crises with 16o
"or so" identified by Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Daniela Klingebiel, Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad
Policy, or Bad Banking?, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOM-
ICS (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997)); see also BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 9
("Different authors classify crises differently. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) find 34 crises over
the 25 year period, while Laeven and Valencia (20o8) report only 24.").
302. If a stable or smooth relationship existed between the number of crises and the average loss-
es caused by crises, then choices affecting size might be balanced by effects in the second
component of the CBA/FR of capital rules, namely, the probability of a crisis, but no such
relationship is evident from the studies.
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turned out to be indisputably 0 3 flawed because of a spreadsheet error that
went undetected for over three years304 (in spite of the fact that the study was
cited prominently in policy debates).30 s While the spreadsheet error caused
R&R's analysis to drop data for five countries they intended to include, the er-
ror had no effect on their estimates of the direct costs of financial crises-that is,
the fiscal costs incurred by governments attempting to resolve crises. However,
the error did affect estimates of the indirect costs of financial crises-that is, the
depressive effects on growth caused by higher levels of debt incurred as part of
a policy response. As discussed below, whether and how to count indirect ef-
fects of policy responses are further sources of sensitivity in modeling the cost
of crises. The same researchers who discovered the spreadsheet error also chal-
lenged separate choices by R&R in their analyses -what the critics termed a
"selective exclusion of... data" (for Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) and
an "unconventional weighting of summary statistics" that amplified the effects
of exclusion of New Zealand.3, 6 While R&R disagree on these points, they do
303. R&R concede the spreadsheet error, see Full Response from Reinhart and Rogoff, N.Y.
TIMES: ECONOMiX, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2o13/o4/7/business
/17economix-response.html [http://perma.cc/WVJ-2GFA], but not other critiques of their
estimates, see id.; Paul Krugman, Reinhart-Rogoff Continued, N.Y. TIMES: CONSCIENCE OF
A LIBERAL (Apr. 16, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://www.krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2ol3/O4
/16/reinhart-rogoff-continued [http://perma.cc/S6AW-476F]. Krugman takes R&R to task
for their response to their critics; R&R take Krugman to task for his taking them to task.
Carmen M. Reinhart, Letter to PK, CARMEN M. REINHART AUTHOR WEBSITE (May 25, 2013),
http://www.carmenreinhart.cornletter-to-pk [http://perma.cc/BLQ3-BM75].
304. The original R&R publication was a working paper released in early 2010. See Carmen M.
Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15639, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9QR3-2NGL]. The data flaw did not get noticed until 2013. See Thomas Herndon et al.,
Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff
(Political Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 322, 2013), http://www.peri.umass
.edu/2 36/hash/ 31e2ff374 b6377b2ddeco 4deaa6 388bs/publication/ 566 [http://perma.cc/W3TL
-NX6B].
3os. As noted in Hemdon et al., supra note 304, at 4, R&R's 2010 paper "is the only evidence cit-
ed in the 'Paul Ryan Budget' on the consequences of high public debt for economic growth."
British politician George Osborne (later Chancellor of the Exchequer) relied on R&R to ar-
gue most financial crises are caused by excessive public debt in a speech quoted in an April
2013 New Yorker article on the R&R kerfuffle. John Cassidy, The Reinhart and Rogoff
Controversy: A Summing Up, NEW YORKER: JOHN CASSIDY, Apr. 26, 2013, http://www
.newyorker.com/rational-irrationality/the-rogoff-and-reinhart-controversy-a-summing-up
.html [http ://perma.cc/K33X-YCR].
3o6. Herndon et al., supra note 304, at 5.
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so in part on the ground that their work is historical, consisting of "archival re-
search, involving constant judgments at every step."3 7
Even if observers agreed on historical crises to estimate the cost of future
crises, two additional output-sensitive inputs - temporary versus permanent
effects and policy responses - intensify the unreliability of CBA/FR of Basel III.
Some studies assume the effects of a crisis on the economy are transient -that
is, a crisis causes a temporary drop in activity, followed eventually by higher-
than-normal "catch-up" growth, bringing long-term output trends back to
where they would have been without the crisis. Other studies assume that the
effects are permanent -that is, economic activity never catches up to where it
would have been without the crisis. If one takes the median of the average of
estimated losses across studies, as the authors of the BCBS 173 did, the differ-
ence caused by this one assumption triples the losses. If harms are large (for
example, 158% of pre-crisis GDP in BCBS 173), then differences between per-
manent-harm and temporary-harm models are even larger -up to a hundred
times larger.3 9 A related force increasing the sensitivity of results in perma-
nent-harm models - which by definition extend into the indefinite future - is
the choice of discount rate. 1 °
A third source of sensitivity of social costs to modeling assumptions is per-
haps the most troubling for anyone hoping CBA/FR can produce reliable in-
formation: the political and policy response to the crisis. As the last crisis re-
minded us, a major financial crisis can provoke a range of policy responses.
Politicians may bail out banks; tighten, loosen, or repeal regulations; increase
liquidity through conventional monetary policy (cutting interest rates) and less
conventional instruments ("quantitative easing"); stimulate activity directly
with government spending or tax cuts; other responses; or some combination.
307. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Op-Ed, Reinhart and Rogoff: Responding to Our
Critics, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o4/26/opinion/reinhart
-and-rogoff-responding-to-our-critics.html [http://perma.cc/46UB-RH8V].
3os. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 3 ("Using the median estimate ... across all comparable studies
.. each i percentage point reduction in the annual probability of a crisis yields an expected
benefit per year equal to o.6% of output when banking crises are allowed to have a perma-
nent effect on real activity. Using the median estimate ... when crises are seen to have only
a temporary effect ... each 1 percentage point reduction ... yields an expected benefit per
year equal to 0.2% of output.").
309. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 29 tbl.8 (subtracting amounts in the column labeled "Net bene-
fits (large permanent effect)" from amounts in the column labeled "Net benefits (no perma-
nent effect)," adding back the amount in column labeled "Expected costs," and comparing
the difference).
310. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 36 (noting that "median losses are sensitive to the choice of dis-
count rate," and that "the median loss ... is 82% if a discount rate of 2.5% is used" but is
63% if 5% is assumed). On discount rates in CBA/FR, see generally Pindyck, supra note 26.
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Each response can have benefits and costs, ranging from lending constraints,
moral hazard, and the future frequency of crises; inflation; deficits; debt; and
reduced medium- to long-term growth. These policy responses can vary in in-
tensity as well. Depending on the policy response, the effect of a crisis can vary
significantly, and the models reviewed in the Basel Committee CBA/FR make
assumptions about the policy responses and their effects.
To predict policy responses, CBA/FR must include what amounts to politi-
cal speculation. For if economic inputs to CBA/FR models are uncertain, politi-
cal inputs are even more so.3"' To see this, simply note the varying policy re-
sponses across developed economies to the recent crisis. The United States cre-
created a very large (relative to the economy or the tax base) fiscal stimulus
through deficit spending, while the United Kingdom "committed itself to early
fiscal retrenchment."3 '2 The United States implemented the most aggressive
monetary program in history, through the novel technique of buying massive
amounts of mortgage-backed and other fixed income securities, while the Eu-
ropean Central Bank remained more focused on preventing inflation, and the
Bank of Japan's balance sheet increased only slightly over the crisis period.313
Policy responses also change in response to learning (or claims to learning)
from past crises -compare recent U.S. monetary and fiscal policy to responses
to the Great Depression 14 and to that of Japan during the 199OS 3'1 - but that
implies that predicting future policy requires predicting the future path of eco-
nomic theory and the results of retrospective analyses of past policy interven-
tions. This is not to mention financial rescue programs, such as TARP.
These are not second-order considerations. Informed observers have at-
tributed much of the difference in the duration of the current U.S. recession,
on the one hand, and the contemporaneous U.K. recession and the historical
311. See generally TETLOCK, supra note 66.
312. Edward Ashbee, Fiscal Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis in the United Kingdom and
the United States: A Comparative Assessment 1 (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Annual Meeting
Paper, 2011), http ://ssrn.com/abstract= 1899700 [http://perma.cc/Y8BN-8RNV].
313. See Michael Joyce, Quantitative Easing and Other Unconventional Monetary Policies: Bank
of England Conference Summary, 52 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 48, 49 (2012), http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qbl2o l.pdf [http://perma
.cc/NU62-CQ 3V] (contrasting the U.S., U.K., and European Central Bank responses to the
crisis); Leonardo Gambacorta et al., The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy at the
Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country Analysis 5-6 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 384, 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/work384.pdf [http://perma.cc/FU6G-LEVM].
314. E.g., James R. Lothian, U.S. Monetary Policy and the Financial Crisis, 6 J. ECON. ASYMME-
TRIES 25, 27-28 (2009).
315. E.g., Mariko Fujii & Masahiro Kawai, Lessons from Japan's Banking Crisis, 1991-2oo5, at 4-8
(Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 222, 2010), http://www.adbi.org/files/2oio
.o6.29.wp222.lessons.japan.banking.crisis. 1991.2005.pdf [http ://perma.cc/RT9B-S2UM].
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U.S. Great Depression, on the other hand, to policy responses.' 6 Should the
current legitimacy of otherwise desirable regulation turn, to any significant de-
gree, on debates or assumptions about predictions of future politics? That is
what CBA/FR advocates effectively, if tacitly, presume." 7
4. Frequency of Financial Crises
Even if the costs of financial crises could be estimated with precision and
reliability, these costs would have to be paired with estimates of the frequency
of crises to arrive at an estimate of the benefit from regulations that reduce cri-
ses' frequency. This modeling faces similar challenges as estimating effects:
subjectivity in selection among relatively small numbers of historical data
points and sensitivity of results to choice of data points. The Basel Committee
simply took average frequencies from two studies3' over an arbitrarily chosen
316. E.g., Lothian, supra note 314; Adam S. Posen, External Member of the Monetary Policy
Comm., Bank of Eng. and Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Why Is Their Re-
covery Better Than Ours? (Even Though Neither Is Good Enough), Speech at the National
Institute of Economic and Social Research, London 2 (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2o12/speech56o.pdf (http://perma
.cc/iWK2L-U3LE] ("[T]he US has had significantly more GDP growth with somewhat
lower inflation over the last thirty-two months than in the UK ... [because, among other
factors] there was significantly less net withdrawal of fiscal stimulus in the US than
the UK."); Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve,
Evaluating Large-Scale Asset Purchases, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Oct.
11, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein201l1oia.htm [http://
perma.cc/P8FH-K6W4] (noting that large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve
"played a significant role in supporting economic activity and in preventing a worrisome
undershoot of the Committee's inflation objective"); Martin Feldstein, Quantitative Easing
and America's Economic Rebound, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.project
-syndicate.org/commentary/quantitative-easing-and-america-s-economic-rebound [http://
perma.cc/N8WQJJ8S] (suggesting that the 2011 economic rebound in the United States
was due to increases in stock prices and consumer spending driven by quantitative easing,
which would not be sustainable beyond 2011).
317. It is tempting to suggest that CBA/FR could be made tractable by just ignoring future policy
responses in modeling the costs of future crises. But that is to make an implicit assumption,
too, and one that is more likely to be counterfactual than an assumption based on past (or at
least recent) policy responses. The assumption would tend to inflate the cost of future crises
beyond reasonable levels because every crisis would tend, absent a policy response, to gener-
ate large and sustained reductions in GDP, as in the Great Depression. The result would be
to expand greatly the range of defensible regulations and to eliminate any disciplining effect
of CBA/FR while adding a great deal of camouflage to the regulatory process.
318. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 9 (citing Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Banking
Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14587, 2oo8), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14587 [http://perma.cc/BX8V-CDsF]); Luc
Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database (Int'l Monetary
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period and set of countries (1985 to 2009 for Gio and BCBS countries, except
Russia and China, which were included from 1992 on) and made the heroic as-
sumption that this average was a good estimate of the probability of a crisis for
any given year and country.319
The FSA, by contrast, used a longer time period (1970 to 2007), a narrower
set of countries (OECD countries), and relied on a multivariable logit approach
relating the likelihood of a crisis in a given year "to a vector of explanatory vari-
ables," with observed crises in the past coded one and non-crisis years coded
zero.32° This approach relies on the logistic cumulative distribution to predict
future crises and is an improvement over BCBS 173 if interdependencies among
time-varying observables affect crisis frequency, as seems likely. For example,
housing prices have varied over time, and crises often coincide with (partly
causing, partly being caused by) bubbles in housing prices, so crisis odds
would not be uniform over time but would vary in cycles and across countries.
However, the small number of crises that can be modeled this way (FSA 38's
data included fourteen) limits the value of this approach, in statistical degrees
of freedom and in robustness, and the functional form imposes assumptions on
the shape of the distribution of crisis probabilities that is nowhere defended in
the FSA's publications.
Because of differences in approach, the FSA's results differ markedly from
the Committee's results. BCBS 173 reports an estimated baseline probability of
a crisis per year for all countries of 4.5%.321 FSA 38 reports a baseline probabil-
ity ranging from 0.7% (for Germany) to 21.7% (for the United Kingdom) -
that is, from one-sixth to five times the estimate used by BCBS 173. 3' Again,
the sensitivity of outputs to assumptions illustrates how fragile CBA/FR of
capital regulation remains. 3
Fund, Working Paper No. 08-224, 20o8, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/20o8
/wpo822 4 .pdf [http://perma.cc/FVC8-7XHY].
319. See BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 39 tbl.Al.4.
320. FSA 38, supra note 28o, at 12.
321. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 9.
322. FSA 38, supra note 280, at 15 tbl.2.
323. FSA 42, supra note 280, at 38 & tbl.5.A, adds current account balances to the logit model used
in FSA 38, and adjusts the data for comparability across countries. The modest change "re-
sults in a significant improvement in" the model's classification performance. Id. FSA 42 also
examines a larger family of different crisis prediction models. Id. at 38-45. The authors later
present information on the overall uncertainty associated with their bottom-line estimates of
the net benefits of higher capital requirements, id. at 60-64, but they do not break out the
specific potential impact of different models of crisis frequency.
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5. Effects of Higher Capital Requirements on Financial Crises
A third task necessary to estimate the benefits of higher capital require-
ments is to estimate how higher capital will affect the frequency and effects of
future crises. The challenges are similar to those outlined in the case studies of
SOX and mutual fund governance above, if slightly less difficult. The challeng-
es are less difficult because capital levels have a more mechanical relationship to
bank failure than disclosure and governance regulations have to fraud and fund
performance, respectively. If a bank's capital falls below zero, it is by definition
insolvent and will be either closed, nationalized, or bailed out (and/or suffer a
bank run) - all of which (at least by most definitions) feed directly into the oc-
currence of a financial crisis.
Nevertheless, the modeling exercise remains difficult here, too, and in-
cludes a long list of challenges. Three are reviewed here: (i) baselines;
(2) packages; and (3) international externalities. 3 4 The first question in any
CBA is what baseline to use. Similar to the effect of fraud revelation on disclo-
sure practices in the SOX case study, financial crises stimulate banks to raise
their capital levels even without regulatory reform, as private actors increase
the price of lending or investing in now apparently riskier banks. So how
should one measure the effect of a regulatory mandate for new capital - against
the baseline of pre-crisis capital levels, or against levels that could be expected
in the wake of the crisis without the regulation? The argument for the for-
mer-advanced in FSA 42-is that "banks will tend to relax their post-crisis
holdings of capital as the economic cycle strengthens."32 This seems sensible as
a rough prediction, but it is not anchored in an equilibrium model of bank be-
havior. After all, banks observe the same indicia of the probability of a crisis as
used in the FSA's CBA/FR of Basel III. Bank investors can observe those indi-
cia and bank capital levels, so why should we assume that bank capital levels
only subside, rather than rise and fall as the risk of a systemic crisis rises and
falls? It may be that private actors lack sufficient incentives to demand that an
optimal level of capital be retained by banks, but for CBA/FR of capital re-
quirements, the baseline itself- the capital that private actors would demand -
is likely to change over time in unpredictable ways.
324. A fourth, equally difficult challenge is to anticipate and model the private market responses
to the rule, particularly responses that include moving assets or activities outside of regulat-
ed banks into unregulated entities -that is, Basel III may shift risk into "shadow banks." If
those assets or activities nevertheless create risks for the financial system as a whole, or oth-
erwise generate external risks, such a response would represent an offset to the benefits of
higher capital requirements, to be included on the cost side of the CBA/FR ledger.
325. FSA 42, supra note 280, at 47.
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Part of the reason that private actors may lack incentives to demand that
banks retain optimal capital is that they face moral hazard due to the likelihood
of bailouts and other policy interventions. But that fact calls into question the
validity of using pre-crisis capital levels as appropriate baselines altogether.
Has moral hazard increased, decreased, or remained the same after the bailouts
of 2008 ? Lehman failed, and Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were forced to sell
at fire-sale prices-so perhaps investors are now less certain about future
bailouts. But, of course, more than 700 U.S. banks were bailed out,, 6 not to
mention the indirect bailouts through the various liquidity facilities established
by the Federal Reserve Board -so perhaps investors face even more moral haz-
ard than before. FSA 42 asserts that the pre-crisis period was one in which
"banks' decisions ... were not distorted by the immediate influence of the cri-
sis or regulators' response to the crisis."327 But it presents no evidence to sup-
port that assertion. Any rational actor who anticipates a crisis should, given
policy responses to past crises, also anticipate that a bailout may occur with
some probability, and the capital levels it will demand will be affected by that
anticipation. The better point, then, is that a model of the effect of future capi-
tal regulation should start with a baseline that explicitly takes into account
moral hazard as a permanent condition of financial markets without adequate
regulation. However, establishing such a baseline would require estimating the
subsidy provided by the moral hazard to bank investors- a task not yet con-
vincingly tackled by researchers.
Another challenge is that Basel III consists of a package of reforms, not one
reform. As FSA 42 notes, if the probability of a crisis is non-linear in the level of
bank capital, as assumed in a logit model (and as seems likely), then the effect
on that probability of each piece of the reform package will depend on the se-
quence in which the pieces are adopted.328 As with SOX, the best one may be
able to do in estimating the causal impact of a package of reforms is to evaluate
the package as a whole. For the CBA/FR of any given package of reforms, this
is not a critical problem, but it does undermine the value of CBA/FR because it
allows regulators to determine (to an extent) what is being evaluated- and
may allow a package to include some reforms that are net positive (if evaluated
on their own) with other reforms that are net negative (if evaluated on their
own), as long as the former outweigh the latter.
326. The Financial Crisis Response in Charts, U.S. DEP'T TREASuRY 12 (Apr. 2012), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Documents/2o12o413_FinancialCrisis
Response.pdf [http ://perma.cc/5HUD-ZBGN].
327. FSA 42, supra note 28o, at 47.
328. Id. at 48.
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A third challenge to estimating the causal impact of Basel III, also noted in
FSA 42,329 is that it is a voluntary multilateral initiative, which means that it
will be implemented in different ways at different times in different countries.
Implementation in one country will affect how banks in other countries act, in-
dependent of the effect of implementation by their own regulators. If, for ex-
ample, U.K. banks are required to increase capital, they may not only reduce
lending but focus continued lending on geographies or sectors where interest
margins are highest, which in turn may affect currency and trade flows. An in-
crease in U.S. capital regulation under Basel III, being evaluated in a CBA/FR
by a U.S. regulator, should take into account the simultaneous shift in lending
activity by U.K. banks, as well as the direct effect on U.S. banks. In a global fi-
nancial market, the externalities of regulation create modeling difficulties of
their own -adding yet more necessary assumptions regarding how the regula-
tions will actually affect the probability or impact of future crises.
6. Costs of Higher Capital Requirements: Less Lending?
Finally, the costs of higher capital requirements must be estimated. The
standard framework, employed by the Basel Committee and the FSA,33 ° is to
assume that a bank required to hold an increased amount of capital will raise
corporate borrowing costs and so cut lending. The reasoning is simple: banks
must pay their investors a minimum expected rate of return on their invested
capital; if more capital is required, the bank will have to generate greater re-
turn; to generate a higher return, a bank must charge more to its borrowers; at
a higher cost of borrowing, less lending will occur. The model further assumes
that with lower lending by banks, economic output will fall.
As with the models of the benefits of capital requirements, however, mod-
els of the effects on the amount of lending (and its knock-on effects on output)
require numerous contestable assumptions, and their outputs are sensitive to
those assumptions. Among the assumptions are: (a) the cost of bank equity
and whether it will fall in response to the change in capital levels required by
the rule; (b) the ability of borrowers to substitute among different sources of
financing (and at what cost); and (c) how non-bank sources will be affected by
an increase in bank capital requirements and the reduction in risks and effects
of financial crises."' Each has major impacts on the output of the cost model
alone.
329. Id. at 5o-51.
330. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 21-22; FSA 38, supra note 28o, at 39 & tbl.4 .
331. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 22, notes that reducing the assumed cost of bank equity from
the 1993 to 2007 average of 14.8% to io.o% cuts the impact of higher capital requirements
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The uncertainties associated with these assumptions are underscored by the
fact that one prominent set of economists believes the social costs of higher
capital requirements "would be, if there were any at all, very small." 332 The au-
thors point out that higher taxes, if paid by banks as a result of shifting from
debt to equity finance in response to capital requirements, are not a social cost,
because the shift reduces the distortive effects of a socially harmful tax code.333
The authors argue that moral hazard induces banks to remain larger than is so-
cially efficient, so that even if higher capital induced large banks to shrink, the
overall impact on lending would be offset by increases in lending by other
banks or financial institutions. 34 By contrast, the Basel Committee, based on
its modeling and inputs from self-interested banks, concluded that the pro-
posed requirements in Basel III would reduce steady-state output (gross do-
mestic product) by between 0.25 and 0.92 percentage points,335 which trans-
from a one-to-thirteen basis point impact to a one-to-seven basis point impact. The report
goes on to note that "there are good reasons to believe that the cost of capital would decline
in response to a reduction in bank leverage" due to increased bank capital requirements, and
that "in the limit, the change in the cost of capital could reduce to tax effects." Id. (citing
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theo-
ry of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (finding that, under stylized assumptions, a
firm's returns are invariant to how it finances itself, but for taxes)). As BCBS 173 notes, prior
research suggests that the long-run effect on banks' funding costs of higher capital require-
ments is likely to be smaller than the numbers used in BCBS 173-a four percentage point
increase is assumed to increase borrowing costs by fifty-two basis points in BCBS 173, supra
note 277, at 23 tbl.6, versus only twenty basis points in Douglas J. Elliott, A Further Explora-
tion of Bank Capital Requirements: Effects of Competition from Other Financial Sectors and Effects
of Size of Bank or Borrower and of Loan Type, BROOKINGS INST. 22 (Jan. 28, 2010),
http ://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2ol1/1/29%20capita%2oelliott/o
129_capital-requirements-elliott.pdf [http://perma.cc/9C6R-5GPF], and ten to eighteen
basis points in Anil K. Kashyap et al., An Analysis of the Impact of "Substantially Height-
ened" Capital Requirements on Large Financial Institutions 17 (May 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), http ://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/researchpapers/an-analysis-of
_theimpact of substantially-heightened-Capital-Requirements-on-Financial-Institutions
.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY6E-GHRE]. For a discussion of some of the drivers of disagree-
ments on the effect of capital requirements on lending costs, see Douglas J. Elliott, Higher
Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 20, 2013) http://
www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2o13/o/2o-bank-capital-requirements-elliott [http://
perma.cc/GJ7J-LRDL].
332. Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regula-
tion: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive, at i (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus.
Working Paper No. 2065, 2013), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research
/documents/Fallacies%2oNov%2o1.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LR5-97HX]. These authors also
rely on Modigliani & Miller, supra note 331.
333. Admati et al., supra note 332, at 19-20.
33.. Id. at 21-23.
335. BCBS 173, supra note 277, at 27 tbl.7.
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lates into $1.4 trillion in present value terms at the mid-point of this range for
the United States alone. As with estimates of benefits, respectable CBA/FR
opinions vary in their assessments of the present value of Basel III's costs by
more than $1 trillion.
D. Case Study #4: The Volcker Rule
The fourth case study also focuses on a rule emerging from the financial
crisis: section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, colloquially known as the "Volcker
Rule." That rule bans U.S. banks from speculating for their own account (that
is, from engaging in "proprietary trading" or holding "ownership interests" in
hedge or private equity funds, subject to a number of exceptions).336 This case
study reinforces the points made in the prior case study, and also illustrates
how difficult it is to assess many important kinds of financial regulations in
advance, given the lack of any past data on how new markets will operate.
Specific regulations implementing the Volcker Rule were approved (after
many delays) in December 2013 and went into effect on April 1, 2014. 337 The
formal releases published by the financial agencies in the Federal Register con-
tain no general CBA/FR, presumably because (1) as discussed in Part II.A, no
general CBA/FR mandate exists for those agencies; (2) the statutory require-
ment for and authorization of the rules is part of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956,338 which does not contain any equivalent to the requirement in the
securities laws that the SEC consider "efficiency" or in the commodities laws
336. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619,
124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 1851 (2012)). Section 619 is called the
"Volcker Rule" because former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker was a promi-
nent backer of the law.
337. The banking agencies and the SEC issued a joint final rule. Prohibitions and Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5,536 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 44
(OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 248 (Fed. Reserve); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 351 (FDIC); 17 C.F.R. Pt. 255 (SEC)).
The CFTC issued a final rule separately. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trad-
ing and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5,8o8 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 75).
338. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) initial-
ly contained a broad regulatory delegation of authority to the Federal Reserve Board to "is-
sue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out
the purposes" of the Act and to "prevent evasions thereof." Id. § 5(b), 70 Stat. at 137. That
provision remains in 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (b), with amendments to clarify that the authority in-
cludes the power to adopt capital requirements for bank holding companies.
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that the CFTC consider costs and benefits; 339 and (3) nothing in the language
of section 619 requires CBA.34' The formal rulemaking contained limited cost-
related information in its analyses under the RFA and the PRA34 ' but no in-
formation about benefits or non-compliance costs.
The OCC, however, did release separately a CBA/FR of the Volcker Rule. 42
It identified a number of "non-monetized" (qualitative) benefits: improved su-
pervision by bank regulators (due to metrics reporting required by the rule);
339. See 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2012) (requiring the CFTC to "consider the costs and benefits" of its
regulatory actions). This is true even though the SEC and the CFTC were also required to
adopt the Volcker Rule because their authority (and mandate) to do so is (unusually) in the
BHCA, not the statutes that traditionally authorize them to act. Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Analysis of 12 CFR Part 44, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Mar. 2014), http://www
.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/legislation-of-interest/volcker-analysis.pdf [http://perma
.cc/BA7-R4PG].
340. The specific section that authorizes the Volcker Rule, 12 U.S.C. S 1851 (2012), added to the
BHCA by the Dodd-Frank Act, contains a similarly broad grant of authority and does not
condition rulemaking on any particular finding or process, other than (1) to "consider" a
statutorily mandated January 2011 study of how to implement the section conducted by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council, see 12 U.S.C. § 185 1(b)(1)-(2)(A) (2012); Study & Rec-
ommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds
& Private Equity Funds, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (Jan. 2011), http://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%2osec%20%2o6 l9%2ostudyo/2ofinal%2o1%20
18%2011%2org.pdf [http://perma.cc/JFW4-E2XZ]; and (2) to coordinate rulemaking
among the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, OCC, SEC, and CFTC so as to "assur[e], to the
extent possible, that such regulations are comparable and provide for consistent application
and implementation.., to avoid providing advantages or imposing disadvantages to the
companies affected.., and to protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and non-
bank financial companies supervised" by the Federal Reserve, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(2012).
341. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading, 79 Fed. Reg. at 65,744 (conducting
analysis under the PRA); id. at 65,778 (conducting analysis under the RFA). The American
Bankers Association (ABA) and other plaintiffs sued to enjoin enforcement of the Volcker
Rule on the ground that the agencies' RFA analysis failed to consider the rule's "significant
economic impact on a substantial number of community banks." See Emergency Motion of
Petitioners for Stay of Agency Action Pending Review at 15, Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 13-1310 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.aba
.com/ssues/Documents/12-24-1 3ABAEmergencyMotionforStayofVolckerRuleOwnershipIn
terestProvision.pdf [http://perma.cc/6HSX-PNE8]. The Joint Volcker Rule Release specifi-
cally addressed potential impacts by exempting banks below various specified size thresh-
olds from reporting and compliance burdens. The ABA suit focuses on one indirect effect of
the rule, which is to ban "banking entities" (including all depository institutions, small or
large) from holding "ownership interests" in hedge and private equity funds (Subpart C of
the Volcker Rule), including debt instruments that give holders the right to remove a collat-
eral manager for a collateralized debt obligation-an entity that holds multiple trust-
preferred or other securities, which (as the ABA in its papers admits) collapsed in value dur-
ing the financial crisis. See id. at 2, 7.
342. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 339.
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better management of risk by bank managers (for the same reason); reduced
conflicts of interest; protecting "core banking services" and improved bank
safety and soundness (reduced risk of bank failures); reduced "tail risk" from
trading activities and reduced risks of financial crises; improved corporate gov-
ernance of banks resulting from reduced stock market liquidity; and reduced
harms caused by excess liquidity. 3 As the OCC noted, "benefits of the regula-
tion can be difficult to quantify including the value of enhanced economic sta-
bility."344
The OCC also identified a number of costs. For a subset, the OCC provides
quantified estimates: compliance costs ($405 to $541 million); additional capi-
tal costs for permissible investments in covered funds ($o to $165 million); the
OCC's own costs of supervising compliance with the new rule ($1o million);
and a one-time hit to the value of assets owned by banks but restricted by the
rule, resulting from reductions in demand for those assets due to the rule. For
the last type of cost, the OCC drew on academic research estimating a similar
haircut in corporate bond values when bonds are downgraded by credit rating
agencies and insurance companies (subject to regulations limiting their owner-
ship of junk bonds) are forced to sell such bonds, deriving a range of costs
from $o to $3.6 billion.
However, the types of costs that are likely to be the largest ongoing costs
were not quantified. Foremost among these non-quantified costs is the reduced
liquidity in markets where banks were significant trading participants, particu-
larly arising from inter-dealer trading, which is not treated as a permissible
source of "customer" demand under the rule."4 Banks, as a result, will not be
able to hold certain assets as "inventory," which will reduce liquidity in the
markets for those assets and make it harder for banks to share risk with other
banks when permissible customer-driven trading results in banks' taking on
large blocks of equities. As a result, banks may incur higher costs to hedge or
shed those risks, or face more difficulties in managing risks. Further, the reduc-
tion in liquidity caused by the ban on inter-dealer trading will likely reduce the
depth of those markets and the ability of issuers to raise capital in those mar-
kets. 46 Another potential cost of the rule is similar to one noted above for the
Basel III rules: migration of trading activity to non- or less-regulated "shadow"
343. Id. at 18-22. The FSOC also identified the benefit that the rule would reduce the risk that
banks have effective liability for nominally off-balance sheet funds they sponsor. FIN. STA-
BILIry OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 340, at 56.
34. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 339, at i.
345. Id. at 15.
346. Cf James D. Cox et al., A Better Path Forward on the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment,
BIPARTISAN POL'Y CENTER 8 (Oct. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111
-648.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 4 CPL-27Z9].
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banks, which could pose systemic risks, offsetting (and possibly exceeding) the
benefits of risk reduction within the banking system.
In sum, as with the foregoing case studies, the OCC's CBA/FR did not in-
clude a quantification of the benefits and only quantified a subset- and likely a
small portion- of the costs of the Volcker Rule. The result was that the OCC
confidently categorized the rule as "major" for purposes of the CRA,347 because
that categorization only requires bounding the rule's costs, but did not reach
any conclusion about the rule's net costs and benefits.
Could the agencies go beyond conceptual CBA and conduct a reliable, pre-
cise, quantified CBA/FR? The short answer is no. There is simply no historical
data on which anyone could base a reliable estimate of the benefits of prevent-
ing banks from engaging in proprietary trading or investing in hedge and pri-
vate equity funds. Any effort to quantify those benefits will run straight up
against the difficulties described in the case studies above. While Basel III capi-
tal rules address the "liability" side of a bank's balance sheet, and the Volcker
Rule addresses its "asset" side, both rules have as a core intended benefit the
reduction in the frequency and magnitude of systemic financial crises. Thus, as
with Basel III, any complete quantified CBA/FR of the Volcker Rule would re-
quire the same components discussed above for Basel III to estimate the costs
and frequency of financial crises (macroeconomic modeling, subjective data se-
lection, prediction of policy responses).
The difficulties with the Volcker Rule are compounded beyond Basel III,
however, for two reasons. First, the rule has additional, separate benefits, such
as the mitigation and reduction of conflicts of interest, which (as with the mu-
tual fund governance rules) can only be quantified by relying on causal infer-
ences with low-powered tools about complex institutional arrangements. Se-
cond, and perhaps more important, it remains unclear how, if at all, the
Volcker Rule will in fact reduce the risk or cost of financial crises. The Rule's
proponents (including Volcker himself) strongly believe that it will, by de-
creasing the role of speculation within banks and perhaps by limiting the abil-
ity of banks to attract and retain individuals with a risk-taking temperament. 8
But those judgments do not rest on historical data, nor is there any mechanical
relationship between an activity (proprietary trading) and failure, as with capi-
tal levels. Ironically, then, the primary category of benefits (reduced systemic
347. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 339, at 1, 23.
348. Shanny Basar, Paul Volcker Fights for Volcker Rule, FIN. NEws (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www
.efinancialnews.com/story/2o12-oz-14/paul-volcker-on-volcker-rule [http://perma.cc/8R2E
- 5PZ2]; Bill Moyers, Paul Volcker on the Volcker Rule, MOYERS & Co. (Apr. 5, 2012),
http ://billmoyers.com/segment/paul-volcker-on-the-volcker- rule [http ://perma.cc/sDUN
-TWXPI.
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crisis risk from less speculation by banks) is inherently speculative, as with any
novel structural rule or activity ban of a similar kind.
Quantifying the aggregate costs of the rule would be equally difficult.
While the OCC quantified a subset of costs, it did not quantify the costs that
are likely to be largest -especially the costs of lower liquidity. As the OCC not-
ed, it is possible to quantify those costs: there are research papers estimating
the cost of reduced liquidity for specific categories of assets. 49 But, as the OCC
also noted, any estimates produced by relating predicted reductions in liquidity
to this sparse research literature would be "difficult. '"35 0 Among other things, a
full set of cost estimates would require predicting the impact of the rule on li-
quidity across a range of financial markets (including anticipating entry by in-
stitutions not subject to the rule - institutions that could be expected to take
advantage of any competitive opportunities opened up by the exit of banks
subject to the rule). Those estimates would then have to be linked to estimates
of the impact on the cost of capital from any expected reduction in the liquidity
of one channel for capital raising, again taking into account possible substitu-
tion effects from other channels. Then, finally, the effects on output of any es-
timated capital cost increase would have to be quantified, using a macroeco-
nomic model. As with Basel III, the result would be complex, difficult,
constrained by limited data, highly contestable, and sensitive to modeling as-
sumptions.
E. "Gold Standard" Examples of CBAiFR
Perhaps other significant regulations - beyond those explored in the case
studies presented above- are more susceptible to quantified CBA/FR. Taking a
cue from the adversarial legal system, in which neutral judges rely on advocates
to advance the best evidence in favor of a cause, this section reviews two regu-
lations that CBA/FR proponents hold up as examples of "gold standard" quan-
tified CBA/FR3 ' - the SEC's cross-border swaps rules and the FSA's mortgage
market reforms - on the theory that they should provide the best evidence that
quantified CBA/FR is capable of being done in a reliable, precise way. These
rules are also high-profile and indisputably significant, and are of interest for
evaluating CBA/FR law because the agencies did conduct and publish CBA/FR
in response to CBA/FR law: the SEC was responding to the D.C. Circuit deci-
349. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 339, at 17 (citing Joel Hasbrouck,
Trading Costs and Returns for U.S. Equities: Estimating Effective Costs from Daily Data, 64 J.
FIN. 1445 (2009)).
350. Id. at 1, 23.
351. See CCMR REPOPT, supra note 4, at 13-16.
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sions reviewed above, and the FSA was complying with a U.K. statute requir-
ing CBA/FR, precisely the kind of mandate that CBA/FR advocates hope to
bring to the U.S.
Does either of those rules demonstrate that quantified CBA/FR is feasible
and desirable? Far from it-they instead show how easily CBA/FR can camou-
flage the effects of rulemaking, rather than discipline it. Both case studies show
that even motivated and relatively expert members of the public -specifically,
the Center for Capital Market Regulation, composed of leading financial in-
dustry participants and staffed by technically trained lawyers and economists -
can apparently misread the contents and achievements of a lengthy and tech-
nical cost-benefit analysis. The case study of the FSA's mortgage reforms also
illustrates that even the most creative and sustained effort to quantify the costs
and benefits of a fairly narrow but important financial regulation remained
fragile, imprecise, and incapable of significantly constraining regulatory judg-
ment, by the admission of the staff carrying out the analysis.
1. The SEC's Cross-Border Rules on Swaps
One of the few examples of CBA/FR of U.S. financial regulatory rules
praised by CBA/FR proponents was conducted by the SEC, in its proposed
rules on cross-border swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act (the Cross-Border
Swap Release)." 2 Those rules are designed to fill a regulatory gap3s 3 relating to
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, which exploded over the past two
decades and exacerbated the 20o8 financial crisis, causing the insolvency of one
of the world's largest insurance companies (AIG) and triggering a bailout
through an unprecedented series of actions by the U.S. Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.35 4
352. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (proposed May 23, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) [hereinafter Cross-Border Swap Release].
353. The gap was cemented by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
lO6-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365. The 262-page bill, attached as an appendix to a budget
bill, barred the SEC from regulating OTC derivatives as "securities" and the CFTC from
regulating them as "futures," leaving regulation only through general (and much less specif-
ic) "safety and soundness" oversight by regulatory supervisors of OTC issuers and users
(which was non-existent for companies that did not accept deposits, invest or deal in securi-
ties or futures, or underwrite or sell insurance, including companies that were affiliated with
regulated entities, such as AIG). See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING To SAVE
MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 333 (2012); SIMON JOHN-
SON & JAMES KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL
MELTDOWN 7-11, 78-82, 92, 121-26, 134-37, 169-70, 202 (2010).
354. See Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2oo8: Restruc-
turing of the Government's Financial Support to the American International Group, Inc. on March
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The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC and the CFTC 5s to register and
regulate entities active in the OTC swap markets, 3s6 and to establish rules for
clearing and trade execution, recordkeeping, real-time reporting, and disclo-
sure. Pursuant to this authority, the SEC (in conjunction with the CFTC) has
issued two releases defining terms3s7 and proposed or adopted ten sets of rules
on domestic swap activities., s8 The Dodd-Frank Act was clear that swap regula-
2, 2009, FED. RESERVE SYS. (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files
/129aigrestructureo3o22009.pdf [http ://perma.cc/V6J8-HNLW].
355. The CFTC now regulates "swaps," the SEC now regulates "security-based swaps," and both
have authority over "mixed swaps." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721, 761, 124 Stat. 1376, 1658-72, 1754-59 (2010). A "swap" is
a contract that requires conditional payments between counterparties derived from changes
in specified prices or events, generally related to financial markets, such as interest or cur-
rency exchange rates, but can also include "credit" events, such as the default by a borrower
on an unrelated "reference" security or loan.
356. Regulated entities include swap dealers, major swap participants, data repositories, clearing
agencies, and execution facilities. Id. Where regulated by the SEC, relevant entities have the
phrase "security-based" added to qualify "swap," but otherwise the definitions are identical
to those applicable to the CFTC for other swaps. Id. § 761. For definitions of"Swap Dealer,"
"Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Par-
ticipant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," see 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,751-53 (May 23,
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.Rt pts. 1, 24o).
357. Further Definition of "Swap," "Security-Based Swap," and "Security-Based Swap Agree-
ment"; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208
(Aug. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240, 241) (adopting product defini-
tions); Further Definition of"Swap Dealer," 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,596 (adopting intermediary
definitions); see also Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer,"
"Major Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 8o,174 (pro-
posed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 24o) (proposing intermediary defini-
tions).
358. Capital Margin and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed.
Reg. 70,214 (Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (proposing capital, margin,
and segregation rules); Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (adopting clearing agency standards); Process for Submis-
sions for Review of Security-Based Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Re-
quirements for Clearing Agencies; Technical Amendments to Rule 19b-4 and Form 19 b-4
Applicable to All Self-Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o, 249) (adopting clearing procedures); Registration of Security-
Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,784 (Oct.
24, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o, 249) (proposing registration rules for dealers
and major swap participants); Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Deal-
ers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (July 18, 2o11) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (proposing standards for external business conduct); Registra-
tion and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948 (Feb.
29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (proposing registration framework
for execution facilities); Trade Acknowledgment and Verification of Security-Based Swap
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tion should also cover cross-border activity that could affect the U.S. mar-
kets.35 9 To that end, the SEC proposed a rule in May 2013 to address cross-
border swaps comprehensively, issuing one large release collecting, discussing,
and analyzing all of the swap-related rules as they would apply to cross-border
activities. That release contained roughly 200 pages labeled "economic analy-
sis," a third of the total release-including both conceptual and limited ele-
ments of quantified CBA/FR- and cross-referenced lengthy CBA/FR in previ-
ously issued releases.36° By comparison to CBA/FR in most prior SEC releases,
the length of the CBA/FR is indeed impressive, which is part of why CBA/FR
advocates praised it.3 61 The SEC's CBA/FR was also praised because it focused
on full, quantified CBA/FR, "estimating the quantitative impact of each key as-
pect of the proposed rule, rather than simply assess[ing] firm-specific compli-
ance CoStS.,,3
6 2
However, a careful (if exhausting) review of the CBA/FR in the Cross-
Border Swap Release shows that it is comprehensive only in its qualitative eco-
nomic analysis of the proposed rules and contains little quantified information,
other than for a subset of compliance costs. As noted in passing towards the
beginning of the CBA/FR, "Many of the resulting costs and benefits are diffi-
cult to quantify with any degree of certainty, especially as the practices of mar-
ket participants are expected to evolve and adapt to changes in technology and
market developments.", 6' The SEC divides its CBA/FR into "assessment"
Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,859 (Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (propos-
ing trade acknowledgement rules); End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-
Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (pro-
posing end-user exceptions); Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, Duties,
and Core Principles, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,306 (Dec. 1o, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o,
249), corrected at 75 Fed. Reg. 79,320 (Dec. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o,
249) and 76 Fed. Reg. 2,287 (Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o, 249) (pro-
posing data repository rules); Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-
Based Swap Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,2o8 (Dec. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 242) (proposing reporting rules).
359. Dodd-Frank Act § 752.
36o. See 77 Fed. Reg. 70,214, 70,299-328 (Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o)
(showing that economic analysis takes up roughly 20% of the total release); 77 Fed. Reg.
66,220, 66,263-84 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (showing that eco-
nomic analysis takes up roughly 30% of the total release); 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,722-42
(May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (showing that economic analysis takes
up roughly 12% of the total release).
361. See CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
362. Id. (emphasis added). The CCMR Report does not provide any specific cites or examples
from within the Cross-Border Swap Release to back up this characterization, instead citing
to the release as a whole. Id.
363. Cross-Border Swap Release, supra note 352, at 386.
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costs -the costs of determining if a given entity is subject to swap regulation, a
subset of compliance costs - and "programmatic" costs and benefits due to
subjecting swaps to regulation., 6' The primary programmatic benefits the SEC
identified were promoting competition by increasing market access and trans-
parency, reducing search costs, and increasing price efficiency. 36s The primary
programmatic costs the SEC identified were reduced liquidity and depth in the
swap markets due to market participants' withdrawing because transparency
requirements will reveal valuable information, and a potentially increased in-
centive to "race to the bottom" as participants relocate cross-border operations
to jurisdictions with less regulation. 366
Almost no information relating to "programmatic" costs and benefits is
quantified. No models of competition, liquidity, or prices under the rules are
presented. Instead, the SEC repeatedly said that it lacks data and/or an inferen-
tial basis for quantifying those costs and benefits. Exceptions include, for ex-
ample, a quantification of the costs of building a compliant swap execution fa-
cility from scratch and maintaining it thereafter or modifying an existing
trading platform into compliance and maintaining it.36' But these exceptions
prove only the general absence of quantification, as they relate to a subset of
the costs of a subset of the rules proposed in the release - a subset of a subset of
a subset of what a full quantified CBA/FR would include.
This description is not meant to criticize the absence of quantification. The
SEC's decision not to quantify is fully justified, given the state of available in-
formation and research methods. The Dodd-Frank Act effectively required the
creation of entirely new OTC swaps markets. Private actors will be reacting to
these novel regulations in ways that cannot be reliably predicted. The realiza-
tion of the rules' major potential benefit - increased competition - depends up-
on latent demand for products (transparently cleared swaps). Private actors
had only limited incentives to provide these products under prior rules and the
value of the products will be altered by other new aspects of the rules, such as
segregation and capital requirements. The realization of the rules' major poten-
tial cost - reduced liquidity and depth relative to prior markets - will also be a
function of latent demand. The size of the cost will also turn on the importance
364. Id.
365. Id. at 413-16.
366. Id. at 416-18.
367. Id. at 5o9-1o. In the discussion of the benefits of the rules covering swap executive facilities,
there is no quantification, nor does the release quantify major potential non-compliance
costs of such rules, which are noted in qualitative terms in the release and include the possi-
bility that disclosure obligations will drive swap participants from the market, reducing li-
quidity, or force participants to fragment trades to discourage front-running, resulting in
greater transaction costs. Id. at 5o5-08 (benefits), 510-12 (non-quantifiable costs).
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of proprietary information that may be revealed in more transparent markets.
Another major potential cost-an increased incentive for participants to relo-
cate to other jurisdictions- depends on political and policy outcomes in other
countries, as well as the ability of international regulatory coordination to cope
with or blunt those incentives.
Although justified in this respect, the SEC's CBA/FR nevertheless must be
fairly viewed as conceptual, not quantified. Rather than showing quantification
is possible and desirable, as a matter of policy or law, the Cross-Border Swap
Release shows just the opposite. Yet CBA/FR advocates have singled out the
Cross-Border Swap Release for accomplishing something it did not accom-
plish.36s How could that be? Perhaps the praise was false, a mere rhetorical pre-
tense in service of the political goal of promoting CBA/FR.
But a more charitable possibility exists: perhaps CBA/FR advocates did not
see through the camouflage of the SEC's release. As noted, the CBA/FR is 200
pages long and incorporates lengthier CBA/FR sections in other related releas-
es. It is turgid, vague, and full of jargon. Discussions of less important assess-
ment costs are longer than discussions of more important programmatic costs
and benefits. Specific quantified amounts appear regularly, 369 so someone
skimming the analysis might surmise that it was filled with quantitative analy-
sis, while in fact the vast majority of the amounts relate to assessment costs or a
small subset of programmatic costs, not to programmatic benefits or the most
important programmatic costs. °70 The release contains lengthy discussions of
qualitative costs and benefits of a de minimis exemption from coverage by the
rules, while nowhere setting forth a detailed conceptual outline of how one
might (in theory) measure the costs and benefits of being covered by the rules.
Important points relevant to the limited quantification in the release are buried
in footnotes,' 7' while whole pages are taken up with text such as this:
368. See CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-16.
369. E.g., Cross-Border Swap Release, supra note 352 at 16 n.5, 34 n.76, 356 & n.1218, 359 &
n.1226, 364-66, 365 nn.1245-46, 366 n.1251, 371, 373, 388 n.13o1, 392-93. All of these estimates
relate to the less important assessment costs, the scope of or changes in relevant markets, or
other data, and none are estimates of the more important programmatic costs or program-
matic benefits.
370. Id.
371. For example, in assessing how much voluntary swap clearing is already occurring, the re-
lease notes that "if the counterparties choose to transact in a reference entity that is accepted
for clearing in a currency other than U.S. dollars, the transaction is no longer eligible for
clearing." Id. at 486 n.1618. This fact would be of significance for assessing the rules, since
one would expect many cross-border swaps to be denominated in other currencies. No data
on the currency profile of cross-border swaps is provided. As another example, the release
states in another foomote the fact that less than five percent of margin received by swaps as-
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Segregation requirements would limit the potential losses for security-
based swap customers if a registered security-based swap dealer fails.
The extent to which assets are in fact protected by proposed Rule 18a-
4(a)-(d) would depend on how effective they are in practice in allowing
assets to be readily returned to customers. In the cross-border context,
the effectiveness of the segregation requirement with respect to foreign
security-based swap dealers in practice may depend on many factors,
including the type and objective of the insolvency or liquidation pro-
ceeding and how the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, SIPA, banking regula-
tions, and applicable foreign insolvency laws are interpreted by the U.S.
bankruptcy court, SIPC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
relevant foreign authorities. In the Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Proposing Release, we stated that it would be difficult to measure the
benefits of the segregation requirements proposed by the Commission
under Section 3E of the Exchange Act; however, we believe that Rule
15c3-3, the existing segregation rule for broker-dealers, would provide a
reasonable template for crafting the segregation requirements for secu-
rity-based swap dealers. The ensuing increased confidence of market
participants when transacting in security-based swaps, as compared to
the OTC derivatives market as it exists today, should increase the desire
to trade security-based swaps and generally benefit market partici-
pants.372
Perhaps someone finds this and similar paragraphs illuminating. I do not.
Did including it in a 2oo-page section labeled "economic analysis" in a 650-
page release inform the public about the costs and benefits of requiring dealers
in cross-border swaps to segregate customer assets? In what way is it "econom-
ic" analysis, as distinct from the more general form of analysis that has long
been included in adopting releases? The paragraph would look out of place in
an economics journal. Even if these 210 words were boiled down to a more suc-
cinct, social-scientific style,3" would a law requiring such a statement discipline
the SEC, improve the public's ability to comment on the proposals, or correct
the SEC's potential cognitive biases? I cannot see how.
sociation members was segregated with a third-party custodian. Id. at 467 n.1549. This fact
directly bears on the potential gross benefits of a rule requiring segregation.
372. Cross-Border Swap Release, supra note 352, at 467-68 (footnotes omitted).
373. I think thirty-five words could preserve the meaning: "Segregation may protect customers,
depending on U.S. and foreign laws, and if so may increase market confidence and the value
of swaps, consistent with our experience with broker-dealer segregation, but those benefits
cannot be quantified."
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Again, I do not intend to criticize the authors of the Cross-Border Swap
Release; to the contrary, I commend them. They accomplished an important
goal - eliciting praise from a group of critics of the SEC's CBA practices - and
likely helped set up the SEC to defend itself against any court challenges to its
rules. The staff accomplished here what any rational actor at a regulatory agen-
cy would want to accomplish given the court decisions reviewed in Part II
above -decisions that have created a strong incentive for regulators to generate
precisely the kind of qualitative, lengthy, and largely opaque "gold standard"
CBA/FR included in the Cross-Border Swap Release.
2. The FSA's Mortgage Market Reforms
A second example held up as model CBA/FR is the set of mortgage market
rules passed by the FSA in 2011. The FSA was abolished in 2010 (effective in
2013) for its failures to foresee, prevent, and mitigate the 2008 crisis. 74 Among
its pre-crisis failures was allowing significant amounts of mortgage loans to be
made to borrowers who could not repay the loans other than by refinancing or
reselling their homes into what optimists hoped would be an ever-rising mar-
ket.37 Reforms adopted in 2011 require lenders to assess affordability of homes
before lending to buyers, to include the possibility of interest rate increases in
making those affordability assessments, and to evaluate interest-only mortgag-
es without assuming (as opposed to demonstrating) the possibility of a refi-
nancing. 7
6
a. The FSA's CBA/FR
Since 2000, UK law has required the FSA to publish a CBA/FR of its regu-
lations and guidance,3' such as the mortgage reforms. That 131-page CBA/FR
374. George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne Abolishes FSA and Boosts Bank, FIN. TIMEs, June
16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/o2o3b99e-797f-lidf-bo63-oo144feabdco.html
[http://perma.cc/BSR2-7GAS]. The theory of the split-up of the FSA was that it had ne-
glected systemic issues due to a "pre-occupation with consumer protection matters." Eilis
Ferran, Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance Mis-selling Scandal in the UK,
13 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 247, 248 (2012). Going forward, the Prudential Regulation Au-
thority is meant to engage in prudential supervision, while the Financial Conduct Authority
will govern consumer finance. Id.
375. Mortgage Market Review: Proposed Package of Reforms, Consultation Paper CPII/31, FIN. SERVS.
AuTH. 7 (Dec. 2011), https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-papers/fsa
-cpi-31.pdf [https ://perma.cc/K3YW-VVIUN].
376. Id.
337. See supra note 83.
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was attached as an annex to the reform proposal (a "consultation paper" in Eu-
ropean legal jargon).7 In it, the FSA summarized the benefit of the main re-
form (mandatory affordability analysis) as protecting some borrowers "from
mortgage impairment," and its cost as "prevent[ing] [other borrowers] from
taking out the mortgage they want.""'
In an effort to quantify and compare those primary benefits and costs, the
FSA used a multistep process. First, it applied a multivariate logistic model to a
large (n=730,000) sample of loans from 2005 to 2010 to estimate the probabil-
ity of loan "impairment."3s' It then used ordinary-least-squares regression of
the probability of impairment on factors it selected as contributing to impair-
ment to quantify the contribution each factor made to impairment risk. 8, It
used "judgment" to choose factors relevant to loan underwriting to identify a
cut-off where impairment risk increased "markedly, "s2 on the theory that this
378. Mortgage Market Review, supra note 375, at Ai:i.
379. Id. at AI:3. The FSA's conceptual CBA/FR is much more complex than depicted in the
text. In one figure alone, it identifies four channels for reforms to affect welfare by cutting
both affordable and unaffordable loans and increasing the suitability of loans made:
(1) reducing resources spent on loans in arrears or repossession; (2) changing welfare from
fewer loans; (3) changes in the buy-to-let mortgage market; and (4) lower home prices. Id.
at As:11. The reforms also affect competition and raise compliance costs, increasing mort-
gage prices and contributing to lower home prices. Lower home prices would cut the odds
of a new crisis, benefiting the economy, and would also affect the economy through the
rental, savings, and pension markets. All this would be happening simultaneously with
changes in the identified baseline, such as market corrections in the home loan market;
stricter prudential requirements, such as those imposed under Basel III; the collapse and re-
launch of a new securitization market; and changes in the supply and demand for housing
due to government policy changes, partly driven in turn by the macroeconomic loss. The
FSA's efforts to guesstimate the costs and benefits of the reforms aim at a subset of these
channels. Other effects (e.g., changes in monetary or fiscal policy, effects on the "buy-to-let"
market, effects on competition) are not quantified "because they are unlikely to be signifi-
cant or because data constraints prevent us from providing any meaningful estimate." Id. Al-
so not quantified were benefits from reduced transfers of homes from borrowers to mort-
gagors, because although reducing transfers "is likely to be regarded as socially beneficial...
it is difficult to assess the size of the benefit relative to the size of the transfer." Id. at Ai:27.
Nevertheless, despite this complexity, the bottom line of the FSA's CBA is driven by what is
described in the text. Id. at A1:8-9 (noting that "[o]verall CBA balance" is dominated by net
well-being benefit).
380. Impairment was defined as either being in arrears (that is, paying late) or having a home
repossessed. Id. at AS:27. The breakdown between these types was roughly 85%/15%. See id.
381. Id. at A1:32. For the other two reforms, the FSA used a separate "model" that simply identi-
fied a subset of loans that passed the affordability test but were made to borrowers with
high debt-service ratios (mortgage payments to after-tax income), which was taken as a
proxy for loan non-affordability. Id. at 141.
382. Id. at A1:4. This cut-off point was identified by looking visually at a plot of the average un-
derwriting risk scores by the lenders in its sample, identifying a region in which the scores
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was where the new affordability requirement would have affected sample
loans.
38 3
With those models, the FSA concluded that the rules would have prevented
roughly 200,000 loans from entering default ("unaffordable" loans), and con-
strained approximately 530,000 borrowers to take out smaller or delayed loans
than they could have taken out and repaid without the rules.38' The FSA then
assumed the rules would prevent similar future defaults, which the FSA as-
sumed would create solely social costs and so counted solely as benefits of the
rules. 3ss The FSA further assumed the rules would generate social costs but no
benefits if they prevented or delayed borrowers who could have afforded larger
or earlier loans from obtaining consumption benefits. 386
To quantify a comparison between these direct costs and benefits of the
new rules on borrowers, the FSA needed a common metric. Because the FSA
had no data on actual demand for loans in a hypothetical world without infor-
mation asymmetries (a market failure addressed by the rules),"" it estimated
effects not on welfare but on psychological "well-being," for which it had proxy
data, derived from a U.K. government household panel survey with data from
increased at an increasing rate, selecting the midpoint of the visually identified range, and
usually the average underwriting score for the lender so identified. Id. at A1:35. It then arbi-
trarily chose a range that bracketed this score by a round +/- o.1. Id. at A1:36.
383. Id. at A1:4. The FSA broke its sample into two sub-periods-2oo5 to 2007 and 2009 to
2010- to "construct different estimates of the impacts the affordability assessment would
have in boom and subdued periods" of lending. Id. at A1:39. The FSA does note that this pe-
riod experienced generally low (by historical standards) and falling interest rates, which
likely means its estimates of loan defaults are low by historical standards; this may have led
it to underestimate the benefits of its rules. Id. at A1:32.
384. Id. at A1:8. To do this, the FSA estimated the likely impact of the reforms on the size of
loans that would be made, breaking down loans into those of new buyers, home movers,
and re-mortgagors. Id. at Ai:69-71. For new buyers, loans were reduced until they "com-
pli[ed]" with the rules under the FSA's model, unless the reduction exceeded an arbitrarily
chosen 3o%, at which point the FSA assumed (absent data) the loan would be foregone. Id.
at 70-71. For other borrowers, they estimated the impact on the marginal increased loan of
the new rules. Id. Of these, the FSA estimated that 75,000 would obtain a smaller mortgage
while the rest would be pushed to delay their borrowing. Id. at Ai:79.
385. Id. at A1:76. The FSA partly motivates this strong pair of assumptions by further assuming
that "most borrowers would prefer to borrow affordably." Id.
386. Id. at Ai:26. "Others whose borrowing is affected by the [rules] would in any case not have
experienced mortgage impairment. These consumers experience only a reduction in well-
being (a cost), for example from having to buy a less desirable property, from delaying their
property purchase or, in the case of some re-mortgagors, from not obtaining desired addi-
tional lending to support consumption." Id. (emphasis added). The FSA implicitly defends
this assumption with the claim that "some of these [borrowers] would have been willing
and able to deal with high repayment burdens without much stress." Id. at A1:78.
387. Id. atA1:76.
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1991 to 2008.388 By regressing self-reported well-being scores on "housing-
related events" in a fixed-effects regression with other controls from the sur-
vey, the FSA generated parameters 389 for changes in well-being for events that
were (by assumption) related to unaffordable loans (for example, payment
problems) or affordable loans (for example, becoming a home owner rather
than a renter, moving into a larger home). The FSA found that effects on well-
being were "much greater" for payment problems and defaults than for fore-
390 hagone improvements in housing, such that the net effects on all affected bor-
rowers were positive overall, despite being expected to stop more affordable
loans than unaffordable loans.3 91
While this procedure allowed for a comparison of direct effects of the rule,
by design it did not monetize the effects for use in a full, quantified CBA. To do
that, self-reported well-being figures needed to be converted to pounds, to
compare to other costs and benefits. Nevertheless, the FSA exploited the hap-
penstance that the effects on well-being of loans' falling into arrears were simi-
lar in size to the effects of a person's becoming unemployed, a condition more
easily monetized by reference to income data.392 The bottom line was an aver-
age benefit of;£350 per borrower over the period 2005 to 2010.'93 Added to this
was an additional benefit of ten pounds per borrower in the form of fees and
repossession costs that the rules would have prevented. 394
Finally, the FSA estimated compliance costs for the new rules at between 47
and 170 million pounds per year, for an average of £1o9 million per year, based
on a combination of its own survey of lenders, input from a consulting group
(Oxera) that conducted its own surveys, and internal FSA data.391 Using the
FSA's discount rate of 3.5%,396 one can derive a present value of compliance
costs of between £1.3 and £4.9 billion. The FSA did not explain how it was
able to relate the per-borrower benefits it estimated from its main analyses to
388. Id. at A1:8o.
389. Id. at A1:82-84. The FSA refers to them as "weights." Id. at A1:83.
390. The FSA generated a variety of comparative statics for different subgroups of borrowers and
different types of housing-related events. Id. at A1:82-84. Because of the variety of compari-
sons possible, there is no single ratio that emerges from the analysis, other than the general
qualitative conclusion that effects of payment problems and defaults are "much greater"
than the effects of delayed or foregone housing improvements. Id. at A1:8 3.
391. Id. at Ai:84. Positive effects were larger during housing booms, with slightly negative effects
in subdued markets. Id.
392. Id. at Al:85-86.
393. Id. atAl:8, Ai:86.
394. Id. atAl:8.
395. Id. at Al: 8, A1: 102-0o9 .
396. Id. at Ai: 112.
124:882 201S
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
the per-year compliance costs it estimated. However, it did present a per-
borrower compliance cost (£120 per borrower), which can be related to its ag-
gregate average compliance cost estimate (£109 million per year), to derive a
per-year benefit from the earlier analyses of £300 million per year. Using the
FSA's 3.5% discount rate, that annual amount has a present value of
nine billion pounds. The bottom line implicit in the FSA's analysis, then, is a
total benefit (net of compliance costs) of six billion pounds.
Separately, the FSA used a macroeconomic ("NiGEM") 397 model to esti-
mate effects of the rules on output. With many assumptions,'3 8 the model pre-
dicted six categories of sequential monetary impacts.3 99 The long-run effects in
the sixth category- increased output from increased business investment-
more than outweighed categories (such as reduced home lending, home prices,
and household consumption) that would reduce output in the short run. The
net effect was estimated at over £300 million more per year of output. 4° ° Using
the FSA's discount rate of 3.5%, the present value of this increase would be
nine billion pounds,40 ' as much as the total direct benefits. Yet elsewhere,
without explanation or detail, the CBA/FR stated it had not included output in
its bottom-line summary of costs and benefits because "the margin of error in-
397. The National Institute for Economic and Social Research created the model, and describes it
as using "a 'New-Keynesian' framework in that agents are presumed to be forward-looking
but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events." See Model
Overview, NAT'L INST. GLOBAL ECON. MODEL, http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/nigem-intro
/nigemintro.php ?t=2&b=1 [http://perma.cc/8VXH-6QP6].
398. Mortgage Market Review, supra note 375, at A1:72. This modeling was off a baseline that took
into account the effects of Basel III estimated by the FSA, id. at A1:72 n.37, and so builds in
all of the uncertainties and assumptions of that exercise, see infra Part III.C, along with a va-
riety of other assumptions used to calibrate the NiGEM model, including assumptions
about economic growth, inflation, and home prices, and how those macroeconomic forces
interact. Id. at Ai:72-74.
399. These categories were (i) a reduction in home lending due to increased lending costs from
the rules, (2) reduced home prices, which lower household expectations of capital gains
from investments in homes, (3) increased household savings and reduced consumption to
offset the reduction in expected home investments, (4) decreased inflation and lower central
and interbank borrowing rates due to reduced consumption, increased savings, and lower
household borrowing, (5) increased business lending as banks use funds freed up by re-
duced household and mortgage borrowing, and because of the lower bank rate, and (6) in-
creased business investment due to additional business lending, which adds to productive
capacity and increases overall output. Id. at A1:72-74.
400. Id. at Ai:74.
401. This discount rate is mentioned in passing in another part of the FSA's CBA/FR, without
explanation of how it was derived. Id. at A1:112. The FSA does not translate its macroeco-
nomic impact estimates into present values.
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herent in the estimation of the macroeconomic impacts means that in reality
this impact could either be positive or negative."4"'
b. Assessing the FSA's CBAiFR
Any assessment of the FSA's CBA/FR should begin by acknowledging it is
better as an academic exercise - more complex, detailed, and creative - than an-
ything yet produced by any U.S. financial regulatory agency. It relies on aca-
demic working papers, several different datasets, and multiple modeling tech-
niques, and tackles a host of difficult estimation problems. It actually attempts
to quantify the benefits of a financial regulation-something that the rest of Part
III shows is rarely done. If CBA/FR has a role to play in the United States, the
FSA's CBA/FR is a useful example of a path forward, just as CBA/iFR advocates
suggest by calling it the "gold standard."
However, it should also be recognized that the FSA's job here was by many
measures easier than that faced in other regulatory contexts. The mortgage re-
forms were important and will have complex effects, but their importance and
complexity pale beside those of more general regulations such as Basel III or
the Volcker Rule. The mortgage reforms impose relatively light mandates on
the process and terms of one class of consumer financial product-an im-
portant class, to be sure-but one that is considerably simpler than, for exam-
ple, swaps or even common stock issued by a variety of public companies with
a variety of governance arrangements and disclosure practices. A home mort-
gage is a loan, with clear and definite terms, and a limited set of straightfor-
ward purposes. Other important transactions have similar characteristics -
consumer loans, credit card loans, student loans-and regulations of those
markets are also likely to be more tractable for CBA/FR than the more complex
regulations reviewed here.
4 °3
Despite being in a simpler regulatory context, a review of the FSA's
CBA/FR of its mortgage reforms nevertheless shows how fragile and unreliable
the analysis remains, and how susceptible such CBA/FR is to being used as
camouflage, rather than as discipline -particularly as it gets more complex and
ambitious (as it will have to do to approach the goals that its advocates have for
it). Below is a short list of weaknesses in the FSA's CBA/FR that illustrate both
its shortcomings and how it could just as easily mislead as inform the public.
First, the FSA is clear in its exposition that it used judgment in a number of
crucial places. Examples include: (1) it created its own loan impairment model,
402. Id. at Al:9.
403. This may suggest that if new CBA/FR mandates are to be adopted, which Part WV below ar-
gues against, they should be confined to the consumer protection context.
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where its staff effectively chose their own underwriting criteria, rather than re-
lying on industry models, due to data limitations; (2) it chose where the new
rules would begin to bind on lending decisions, using visual inspection of a
figure rather than more quantitative methods; and (3) it chose how to "weight"
the well-being results given the multiple comparisons it had with its data. An-
other important judgment the FSA made was to ignore the output of its mac-
roeconomic modeling, as noted above, despite the fact that the net benefits on
output of the rules were comparable to the direct benefits to borrowers. Each of
these decisions, while defensible, required judgment.
Second, the FSA's entire well-being analysis, which is its core method for
estimating the effects of the rules, was usable only because of the happenstance
that its output could be related to unemployment data. If the net effect on well-
being had been significantly larger or smaller, this method would have been
unavailable, and the FSA would have had to use another method to monetize
the well-being effects, something that is-as the FSA noted-"notoriously
problematic. '40 4 This difficulty calls into question the viability of this "gold
standard" CBA as a model for the future.
Third, the FSA made a number of assumptions that affected its CBA: (a) it
assumed that loans would not be made if they were reduced by thirty percent
in size (an arbitrary figure) due to the new rules, but would be made other-
wise;4 °s (b) it assumed that delayed loans would never be made;4 6 (c) it as-
sumed that repossession had no effects on well-being distinct from default, be-
cause it had too few observations in its well-being dataset to estimate a
different effect ;4 °7 (d) by using a fixed effects model to generate causal infer-
ences about loan rules and well-being, it assumed that unobserved variation in
individual respondents does not co-vary with home-related events;418 (e) it as-
sumed that data from 20o6 to 2011- a period of concededly low and falling in-
terest rates-predicts future home market conditions;49 (f) it implicitly as-
404. Mortgage Market Review, supra note 375, at A1:85.
405. Id. at Ai:7o n.33. The FSA defends thirty percent as more realistic than zero or ioo%, which
seems right, but better would have been to present a sensitivity analysis for this assumption.
406. Id. at A1:79 n.42. As the FSA laconically notes, "it is therefore likely that over the long run
we are over-estimating the impacts of the [rules] on lending volumes in the market." Id.
407. Id. at A1:83. This means that benefits are likely understated.
408. Id. at A1:82. This assumption seems implausible because borrowers will tend to "stretch" in
their borrowing for housing in response to career developments, which will correlate with
time, so any time trends in well-being reports will be reflected in the implicit before-and-
after comparisons.
409. Id. at A1:93. Better would have been to include some data from periods of high or rising in-
terest rates, but the FSA faced data limitations similar to those faced by all financial regula-
tors.
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sumed that its modeling of the effects of Basel III were correct, but as discussed
in Part III.C above, that is a fragile assumption; (g) it estimated compliance
costs from a small survey (n=15, response rate 6o%) of firms that would be
subject to the new rules, resulting in potentially biased data; 410 and (h) it as-
sumed that the social cost of transfers represented by repossessions and resales
of repossessed homes (as opposed to the transaction costs of those events,
which it did estimate) was zero.41 Each of these assumptions is defensible as a
matter of regulatory discretion, as each simplified the analysis or coped with
data limits. Together, however, they demonstrate the lack of reliability or pre-
cision in the overall analysis.
Two other strong assumptions are nowhere discussed or explained in de-
tail: that all "unaffordable" loans would produce only social losses, and that all
"affordable" loans would produce only social gains. Both assumptions seem
dubious. Some loans that turn out to be unaffordable represent gambles by
borrowers that turn out badly, but which, ex ante, even on a fully informed ba-
sis, the borrowers would take again. The new rules will likely prevent those
gambles, and while one can make good arguments in favor of preventing such
gambling, at least some normative approaches to welfare analysis would treat
preventing informed consumers from making knowing gambles as a welfare
harm. Some loans on which borrowers never default are nevertheless the prod-
uct of avoidable misunderstandings by borrowers, and others are the product
of deception and fraud by lenders: the fact that a borrower chooses not to de-
fault on such a loan does not imply that the borrower would take it out again,
were the borrower adequately evaluated and warned about the loan's potential
risks. Indeed, the FSA's own data showed that many non-defaulting borrowers
experienced high levels of stress and difficulty in making payments, suggesting
that they may regret their loans. The new rules will likely reduce some of those
loans, but none of the associated increase in well-being was counted in the
FSA's analysis. Nowhere does the FSA identify these possibilities in a clear
manner, and the technical language in which it presents its well-being analysis
may prevent many readers from even understanding the assumptions that have
been made, much less appreciate what effect they have on the bottom line.
Finally, despite the relative merits of the substance, the FSA's presentation
is not a model of clarity or candor in other respects. The assumptions listed in
the two paragraphs above are not collected in one place in the FSA's paper, but
41o. Id. atAl:87.
411. Cf id. at Ai:8 n.3, A1:27. The FSA noted this assumption was likely counterfactual, although
it did not elaborate on why-presumably because the non-market value of a home to the de-
faulting borrower exceeds the value of the home to the lender and/or a new buyer, on aver-
age.
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are mentioned in scattered locations, or are not explicitly noted at all. The sen-
sitivity of the bottom-line results of the CBA/FR to important assumptions is
not made clear.412 For example, the FSA does show that parts of its analysis are
sensitive to assumptions about future levels of lending activity. It does so by
breaking its historical data into two sub-periods: the "boom" period of the
2000s, when the new rules would have affected between 1.7% and 10.5% of
borrowers, and the "subdued" period after the collapse, when they would have
affected no more than 0.4% of borrowers. 43 Similarly, the FSA shows that in
the subdued period, seven percent of borrowers who would have been affected
by the reforms faced actual impairment in its historical data, while thirty per-
cent would have faced impairments in the boom period.414 The FSA does not,
however, translate this sensitivity into bottom-line effects on benefits (gross or
net). It does not present sensitivities to most of the assumptions discussed in
the prior two paragraphs, and because it does not translate per-borrower bene-
fits from its well-being analysis into present values, it does not allow readers to
compare those benefits with the possible range of macroeconomic effects of the
rules.
In sum, it is not clear that this "gold standard" CBA/FR, while distinctly
more ambitious and interesting than other examples of CBA/FR, was a net
benefit to an assessment of the mortgage rules. The FSA's analysis is thought-
provoking and may represent a step on a path toward regulatory capacity to use
CBA/FR to generate outputs that can help the public assess the value of regula-
tions such as the mortgage rules. Nevertheless, the bottom line of the FSA's
CBA/FR depends on assumptions and limited data to such an extent that, with
equally plausible assumptions or different data, it could have come out with a
different sign or order of magnitude attached to it. The FSA does include a
number of disclaimers precisely to this effect-writing that "certain data, for
example on relevant households' expenditure, are not available. . . [such that]
this CBA has been unusually difficult to prepare [and led to a] wide margin of
uncertainty around its results."41' Elsewhere, the FSA notes that the analysis "is
412. Compare with OMB Guidance, supra note 20, at 2 ("It is usually necessary to provide a sen-
sitivity analysis to reveal whether, and to what extent, the results of the analysis are sensitive
to plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric inputs.").
413. Mortgage Market Review, supra note 375, at A1:40. This estimate is for the affordability com-
ponent of the reforms alone; for the package of reforms, the results were similar. Id. at
Ai:62. The FSA also showed breakdowns by borrower type in the subperiods. Id. at Ai:41-
42, Ai:63-64.
414. Id. at Ai:65.
41s. Id. at A1:2. Another disclaimer: "No amount of quantification would remove the need to
make such a judgement. We illustrate, however, our quantification of the tradeoff. This
should not be interpreted as providing a precise measure of well-being effects, but rather as
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inherently highly uncertain," with the result that "[t]o a significant extent...
the decision on whether to proceed with the proposed rules has to be based on
social and political judgments."4 6 And further: "It is extremely difficult to
identify exactly how the responsible lending requirements will change borrow-
ing in the market or the likely scale of this. It requires some judgemental as-
sumptions on the basis of imperfect evidence."4"' None of this would be appar-
ent to anyone reading U.S. white papers advocating CBA/FR legal reform.418
Therefore, the FSA's CBA of its mortgage rules came with some unquantifiable
cost in increasing misunderstandings of what CBA/FR is capable of, while fail-
ing to improve the public's ability to evaluate the merits of the rules or achiev-
ing any other obvious benefit. It is an example of why quantified CBA/FR
should not be mandated, rather than an example of why it should be.
F. Summary of Case Studies
The substantive rules reviewed in the foregoing case studies are summa-
rized in Table 4.
supporting some reasonable assumptions about the relative weight attached to different
positive and negative effects, and illustrating that such relative weights might support dif-
ferent judgements." Id. at A1:8o.
416. Id. at Ai:5.While the FSA believed those judgments "are best informed" by its CBA/FR, it
presented no evidence to show that was true, or if so, how. Id.
417-. Id. atAl:3.
418. E.g., CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 13 (rebutting the belief that "quantifying the expected
benefits of a regulation is impossible," instead claiming that "rigorous cost-benefit analysis
is not only feasible but has been successfully employed by regulators both in the United
States and abroad").
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As reflected in Table 4, the case studies range across representative regula-
tory instruments4 9 : disclosure (SOX 404), governance (mutual fund rules), capi-
tal regulation (Basel III), and activity limits (Volcker Rule). The cross-border
swaps rules cover a large number of regulatory instruments, including disclo-
sure and capital requirements, but also rules requiring segregation, risk manage-
ment, margin limits, and fair dealing. The mortgage reforms represent a final,
important category of financial regulation -consumer protection, in the form
of required process and constraints on contract terms. The rules' benefits range
across public goods pursued by financial regulation: more competition, fewer
419. John Y. Campbell et al., Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 98-99 (2o11).
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Table 5 summarizes the conclusions of the case studies on the feasibility of
quantitative CBA/FR. As can be seen, it shows that any substantial financial
regulatory rules will face one or more of five serious challenges: (i) data limita-
tions, (2) causal inference challenges, (3) the need to incorporate judgmental
macroeconomic models, (4) the need to incorporate even more judgmental pol-
icy/political models, and (5) the need to make contestable, judgmental assump-
tions or modeling choices that have large effects on the outputs of the analysis.
Not every challenge is as acute for every kind of rule - political/policy modeling
is probably not a first-order component of an analysis of an anti-fraud or gov-
ernance rule, for example. But all rules face data challenges and are highly sen-
sitive to assumptions; all face causal inference challenges more severe in kind
than the ones faced in many non-financial contexts (as discussed more in Part
IV); and most require the analyst to embed (explicitly or not) a macroeconomic
model of the same judgmental nature as that used in setting monetary policy.
The central conclusion of the case studies is that quantitative CBA/FR is
not currently feasible with any degree of precision and reliability for repre-
sentative types of financial regulation. Anything presented as quantified
CBA/IFR is in fact judgmental in nature, not an actual alternative to judgment
but rather its equivalent in numerical form-"judgment in disguise." Such
quantitative CBAiTR as has been done is better understood as "guesstimated,"
and has been presented without clear disclaimers and sensitivity analyses. As a
result, it is more likely to mislead and camouflage than inform or discipline.
The only kind of CBA that is currently feasible for representative types of fi-
nancial regulation is conceptual CBA, augmented by limited elements of quan-
tified evidence that will be more illustrative than disciplinary.
IV. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CASE STUDIES?
The case studies in Part III suggest that the capacity of anyone- including
financial regulatory agencies, OIRA, academic researchers, CBA/FR propo-
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nents, litigators, and courts - to conduct quantified CBA/FR with any real pre-
cision or confidence does not exist for important, representative types of finan-
cial regulation. This Part discusses the reasons for and implications of this con-
clusion.
A. Why Is Quantified CBAiFR So Unreliable?
A straightforward implication of the case studies is that efforts by the fi-
nancial agencies at quantified CBA/FR will for the foreseeable future produce
only guesstimation. Back-of-the-envelope guesses at ranges of magnitudes are
currently feasible, but precise and reliable estimates are not. Too many varia-
bles are in play for any given rule, and too many contestable assumptions are
required, for anyone producing or consuming guesstimated CBA/FR to have
any confidence in any specific estimate of costs or benefits, even if expressed in
ranges or bounds. 1 While guesstimated CBA/FR can draw on social scientific
disciplines, such as financial economics, and while the agencies themselves may
reasonably attempt quantified CBA/FR on occasion as a way of helping ana-
lysts better understand the implications of a given regulation, quantified
CBA/FR will not be replicable, reliable, or predictive.
4a. Using partially quantified CBA to generate bounds is sometimes offered as a solution to the
problematic output of CBA. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2 (describing that estimates
of expected value are useful to identifying regulatory benefits). But bounds do not generally
make quantified CBA/FR useful, for two reasons. First, estimates of bounds themselves are
highly imprecise. For example, even the "easily" quantified subsets of costs for many finan-
cial rules, such as the direct costs of SOX 404, have wide confidence intervals; for SOX 404,
they range from $400,000 to $4 million per firm per year, and that range has changed over
time. See supra text accompanying notes 164-167. The lower bound on a lower bound (here,
that is, $400,000) is all that partial quantified CBA can typically produce to guide policy
judgment. Second, and more importantly, also as shown in Part III, when estimates of costs
and benefits are both highly uncertain and imprecise, as is common in CBA/FR, the lower
bound on the lower bound that can emerge from partial quantified CBA may not be a mean-
ingful aid to policy judgment. If we know, for example, that a subset of costs can be estimat-
ed at $2.2 billion, plus or minus $1.8 billion, but we do know the benefits, a CBA advocate
would argue that we have advanced the analysis because now we know that unless the bene-
fits exceed the lower bound of the lower bound (that is, $400 million), the rule is not justi-
fied. But if any expert would have already had a prior judgment that the unquantifiable costs
are likely to be an order of magnitude larger than $400 million, we have not significantly
advanced the analysis, because we already knew benefits would have to be more than $400
million (indeed, more than $4 billion -an order of magnitude larger than $400 million).
Quantification of the lower bound of the lower bound of the subset of costs may look pre-
cise (it produces a number), but it has not in fact improved our bottom-line estimate of the
net benefits and costs, because our rough estimate of the benefits would already have had to
be far higher before considering the rule. Put differently, only when partial quantification
produces a lower bound on a lower bound on costs that is surprisingly high (or vice versa, in
the case of bounds on benefits) will the exercise aid policymaking judgment.
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CBA/FR should be understood not as science but as number-laden guess-
work, and should be treated as such by the public, regulators, and courts.
While guesstimation can be a legitimate part of decision making, as one input
into a judgmental choice, it should not "guide" policy except in the loosest
sense. Basing policy on specific quantitative outputs would simply be a poor
exercise of judgment.
This conclusion-that quantitative CBA is not a good basis for setting poli-
cy- may contrast with practice in other regulatory domains, where quantitative
CBA appears to be used in setting policy.' Possibly the conclusions generated
by these case studies might be generalizable to some non-financial domains.
But it is worth considering whether there are features of CBA/FR that make it
more difficult to perform effectively than CBA in other domains, at least when
considering "typical" financial and non-financial regulations. While this topic
warrants considerably more analysis than is provided in this Article, here are
three tentative explanations for why CBA/FR is so hard, with the recognition
that some of what follows may also characterize some non-financial domains,
at least in part.
413
i. Finance Is Central to the Economy
Part of the explanation for how far we are from reliable and precise quanti-
fied CBA/FR estimates is that finance is at the heart of the economy. Any
change in regulation with a material impact on finance will have a material im-
pact on the economy, and large and complex effects on welfare. Recall from
Part III.E.2 that the FSA's mortgage reforms -relatively simple consumer pro-
tection regulations on the surface -were conceptually identified as having mul-
tiple, complex effects on the macroeconomy. 4' They would cut home lending,
lower home prices, reduce consumer spending, increase consumer saving, re-
duce consumer borrowing, and increase business lending and investment. The
FSA used one of a large family of materially different but respectable macroe-
42. Compare, e.g., SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 11, at 20-21 (advocating a
"suitably devised system of CBA," albeit with caveats), with Sinden, supra note 42, at 191-95
(critiquing the use of cost-benefit analysis).
423. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2289 ("A skeptic might conclude that because the range
of uncertainty [about the net costs and benefits of a regulation designed to reduce arsenic
intake] is so large, any number at all could be justified and the ultimate decision is essential-
ly political or based on 'values.' This view is not exactly wrong, but it should not be taken as
a convincing challenge to CBA."). Even the arsenic rule had considerably simpler potential
effects on welfare than several of the case studies reviewed in Part III (for example, SOX 404
or the Volcker Rule).
424. See supra text accompanying notes 373-375.
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conomic models to derive a positive net effect of $9 billion, which it then
claimed it was ignoring as too unreliable. Many rules would have more com-
plex effects.
Macroeconomic models that include finance are still highly contested. They
are the stuff of newspaper op-eds and blogs as much as consensus models in
academic journals.4" The ripple effects of financial regulation are too large and
complex, relative to its direct effects, to allow for reliable predictions of net ef-
fects. As noted in Part I.D, this reason explains why even CBA proponents con-
cede that monetary policy should remain unregulated by CBA laws. What ad-
vocates have not grasped, but Part III shows, is that important financial
regulation is always likely to interact with the economy-perhaps not to the
same extent as quantitative easing, but with enough impact to generate large
(and uncertain) effects on economic growth.
By contrast, consider the Department of Transportation's proposed rule to
increase rear visibility in motor vehicles.426 While there were uncertainties as-
sociated with estimating the rule's benefits -owing to the question of whether
to value children differently than adults - and the costs - owing to the possibil-
ity that compliance costs might fall over time and to the appropriate discount
rate to use in estimating future costs -estimating neither costs nor benefits re-
quired a macroeconomic model. 41z Indeed, it is hard to imagine a financial reg-
42S. Compare Cliff Asness et al., Open Letter to Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME ECON.
(Nov. 15, 2010, 12:O1 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2olO/i1/15/open-letter-to-ben
-bernanke [http://perma.cc/3VKA-UL8W] (posting an open letter from multiple econo-
mists, including former Chairman of Council of Economic Advisors, former Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, former Senior Economist of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, and former Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary, among others, stating
that "[w]e believe the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchase plan (so-called 'quantita-
tive easing') . . . risk[s] currency debasement and inflation, and we do not think they will
achieve the Fed's objective of promoting employment"), with Reply to Open Letter to Ben
Bernanke from Federal Reserve Spokeswoman, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME ECON. (Nov. 15,
2010, 12:oi AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2olo/il/i5/open-letter-to-ben-bernanke
[http://perma.cc/3VKA-UL8W] (defending the Federal Open Market Committee's "recent
actions" - that is, "quantitative easing" - as reflecting the Federal Reserve's "Congressional-
ly-mandated objectives [of] promot[ing] increased employment and price stability"). See
also supra notes 330-335 (noting disagreements among economists over whether an increase
in bank capital requirements will reduce socially beneficial lending).
426. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and Al-
most as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REv. 167, 185 (2014) (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186,
76,238). The proposed rule was adopted on March 31, 2014. See NHTSA Announces Final
Rule Requiring Rear Visibility Technology, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC & SAFETY ADMIN. (Mar.
31, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/lfKTYZA [http://perma.cc/EJS6-C2FN].
427. The DOT's CBA is confusing (and perhaps in error) in its presentation of cost estimates, 75
Fed. Reg. 76,237 (Table 15 and text); 75 Fed. Reg. 76,24o (Table 19 and text), in that it pre-
sents both a "primary estimate" and a "high estimate" of costs that are higher when using a
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ulation important enough to warrant significant CBA/FR costs that would be
as simple to model as this rule. Yet this rule is typical of many non-financial
regulations, which generate direct compliance costs and result in straightfor-
ward improvements in safety, with few knock-on systemic effects.
2. Finance Is Social and Political
A second reason why quantitative CBA/FR is hard is that the main units of
variation and change in finance are not things, or even individuals, but groups
of people -groups with not only economic but also social and political rela-
tions. Finance is about firms, corporations-groups of people coming together
to form and fund a business - and financial markets - groups of people rou-
tinely trading intangibles. These features of finance can be contrasted with
some non-financial domains, where objects of regulation are inanimate (for ex-
ample, chemicals, rear-facing car cameras) and regulations are designed to
achieve relatively simple ends (for example, changing the frequency and inten-
sity of the use of identified chemicals, or requiring installation of cameras).
While a chemical can interact with the environment in ways that are challeng-
ing to model and predict, those interactions are generally simpler than interac-
tions of groups of humans. Every human possesses agency and interacts with
others in non-linear, unpredictable ways. As stated by one theoretical physicist,
"Computational approaches [to modeling] have been very useful in physics be-
cause the knowledge of microscopic laws constrains theoretical modeling in ex-
tremely controlled ways. This is almost never possible for socioeconomic sys-
tems."42s
Chemicals can also be subjected easily to randomly controlled experiments,
but experiments are more difficult for humans and are frequently not feasible
for groups. Because finance affects the economy, modeling policy also becomes
necessary to quantify effects of financial regulation; finance is more routinely
and powerfully political than chemistry. Part of evaluating the costs of a crisis,
as Part III showed, requires predicting how governments will respond. No
similar efforts are required for most typical non-financial regulations.
429
7% discount rate than when using a 3% discount rate, and the text of the rule does not refer
to the numbers in the tables. It is also of note that rather than monetizing a cost of a child's
life differently from that of an adult, and then using the numbers so estimated in its analy-
sis, it used a conventional value of an adult life, concluded that its quantified CBA produced
a net cost, but then adopted the rule anyway based on what it determined was the non-
quantifiable additional value of a child's life. Id. at 76,238-39.
428. M. Marsili, Toy Models and Stylized Realities, 55 EUR. PHYSICALJ. 169, 173 (2007).
429. An exception is climate change, where the effects of U.S. regulations will depend upon how
other governments cope with climate change. Quantitative CBA may for that and other rea-
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3. Finance Is Non-Stationary
A third reason that may help explain why quantified CBA/FR is hard is that
underlying regularities that enable quantification are commonly "non-
stationary" in finance -more likely to change over time than in other domains.
The proverbial "rocket science," for example, uses relatively simple models of
inert objects moving through space, with key inputs - such as the gravitational
constant and gravitational acceleration 430 - that do not change. 43' By contrast,
most relationships in finance change through time, often rapidly. Consider the
striking decline from 1978 to 1999 in the dividend payout ratio or the steady
fall since 1930 in the ratio of directly to institutionally invested stocks in U.S.
retail portfolios, both changes with large implications for the costs and benefits
of many financial regulations. 432
One reason for the greater degree of non-stationarity in finance is that fi-
nance is non-physical, such that technology shocks have larger and more un-
predictable effects on optimal financial choices. This point is reflected in the
case studies in Part III: new technologies of derivatives and securitization were
significant causes of the last crisis, 433 which gave rise to several of the rules re-
viewed. While technological progress affects all regulatory domains, physics,
chemistry, and biology are more central to non-financial regulation than to fi-
nancial regulation, and regularities uncovered in those disciplines have proven
more durable than those found in finance. As summarized by the same physi-
cist quoted above:
Nature has been there since ever, but it has taken centuries to develop a
reasonable understanding of little parts of it. Many of the things which
are traded nowadays in financial markets did not exist few decades ago,
not to speak of internet communities. In addition, we face a situation in
which the density and range of interactions are steadily increasing, thus
sons be less useful for coping with climate change than for regulations responding to less
world-threatening problems. See Pindyck, supra note 226.
430. PAUL A. TIPLER, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 336-37 (4 th ed. 1999) (relating
gravitational constant to the force of gravity at various depths).
431. Other physical constants relevant to non-financial domains include the magnetic constant,
the electric constant, the mass of a proton, the gas constant, the speed of light, Planck's con-
stant, etc.
432. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics
or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2OOl); Zingales, supra note 420, at 392. More
companies are now paying dividends again, following the financial crisis, partly as a result
of the extremely low interest rate environment created by quantitative easing by the Fed.
433. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 38-51 (2011).
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making theoretical concepts based on effective non-interacting theories
inadequate.4'
No doubt there are other explanations for why quantitative CBA/FR is so unre-
liable; some have to do with historical unwillingness of the financial agencies
to invest sufficiently in the task. No doubt, too, there are areas of non-financial
regulation in which science is weak, and CBA there, too, cannot be reliably
used as a strong guide for regulation. But the problems in financial regulation
are real and likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
B. New CBA/FR Mandates Should Be Passed Only If CBAiFR Satisfies CBA
A second implication of the case studies in Part III is that new legal man-
dates for CBA/FR such as those reviewed in Part II are a bad idea, at least until
CBA/FR can be shown to pass its own test- that is, to be likely to result in
benefits that outweigh its costs. It is hard to understand how any CBA advo-
cate could argue to the contrary. Instead, CBA/FR should be conducted only to
the extent and in the manner the expert agencies choose, since they are in the
best position to decide whether CBA/FR will be, in a given instance, likely to
pass its own test. This conclusion is particularly true when it comes to quanti-
fied CBA, because of how unreliable quantified CBA/FR remains. CBA/FR
law's purpose - to discipline agencies and reduce agency costs - will not be fur-
thered by forcing analyses that amount to no more than guesstimation and
camouflage- again, "judgment in disguise."
Conceptually, what would the benefits of CBA/FR be, given the conclusion
of Part III? If CBA/FR were precise and reliable, it might generate the benefits
of disciplining agencies, informing the public through increased transparency,
and counteracting cognitive biases faced by the agencies. But CBA/FR's bene-
fits have been low, and are likely to remain low, for the reasons sketched in
Part IV.A above: CBA/FR is by definition about finance -and finance is at the
heart of the economy; is social and political; and is composed of non-stationary
relationships that exhibit secular change. These features undermine the ability
of science to precisely and reliably estimate the effects of financial regulations,
even retrospectively. Whenever agencies face such sensitive and speculative
forecasting abilities, quantified CBA is not capable of disciplining regulatory
analysis, and it will generate low benefits.
The analysis is even worse for CBA/FR mandates when one focuses not on-
ly on the abstract benefits they might create but also on the marginal benefits
they might create - over the baseline of the status quo. Other constraints - the
434. Marsili, supra note 428, at 173.
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general goals of the agencies, the screening and socialization of the agency
staff, and the political oversight of the agencies by Congress, through confir-
mations, budgets, hearings, and public criticism of the sort reviewed in Part
II -will prevent new regulation or deregulation that is so extreme in generating
costs without offsetting benefits that it could not be justified by the current art
of guesstimated CBA. Within the range of plausible regulatory action set by
those other constraints, the financial agencies retain too much discretion to se-
lect inputs and make assumptions in CBA/FR, meaning that numbers that
emerge in any effort at quantification are unlikely to demonstrate whether a
proposed change is net beneficial. Worse, the goal of disciplining agencies may
be undermined if the result is to encourage agencies to use CBA/FR as camou-
flage- to hide discretionary judgments under impressive numbers.
As discussed more in Part IV.D below, CBA/FR remains a useful conceptu-
al framework, quantified CBA/FR is a worthy long-term research goal, and at-
tempts to quantify may advance the research needed to achieve reliable, precise
estimates, making it a worthwhile project for agencies to pursue, in parallel
with their other activities.43 But the current benefits of CBA/FR remain low,
because its real effects remain far off in time; like any regulatory benefit, the
benefits of these real effects should be discounted to present value. Moreover,
CBA/FR will produce costs -resources consumed, regulatory delay, diffusion
of regulatory focus, and potential decreases in regulatory transparency -
particularly if regulatory agencies and any courts involved in reviewing agency
action do not have good incentives to be honest about the limits and uncertain-
ties of the results.
Empowering courts to review even conceptual CBA/FR policy analysis is
likely to be a bad idea. Judicial review is not likely to generate any significant
improvement in CBA/FR itself, as agencies will likely respond to the threat of
such review by hiding, not exposing, the weaknesses in their analyses. Nothing
produced by the back-and-forth between the SEC and the D.C. Circuit over the
mutual fund rules reviewed in Parts II and III meaningfully advanced public
understanding of the qualitative costs and benefits of requiring more inde-
pendent fund boards; the compliance costs on which the Chamber of Commerce
court focused were minor even by the lights of the Chamber of Commerce it-
435. Larry Tribe made the same point in this journal forty years ago when discussing CBA of en-
vironmental regulation. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 (1974) ("[E]ven before anyone is
very good at the task of attaching shadow prices to varying levels of constraints as elusive as
ecological diversity, the attempt to attach them rather than simply incorporating such con-
straints in an all-or-nothing fashion should lead to better decision processes even if not bet-
ter outcomes."). I thank Duncan Kennedy for the reference.
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self.436 The SEC's cross-border swap CBA, reviewed in Part III.E, provides a
clear picture of how little the threat of such review will accomplish, relative to
what conceptual CBA voluntarily presented by an agency might do.
Mandating an open interagency process for CBA- such as requiring a fi-
nancial agency to publish not only its CBA but also the views of OIRA on its
CBA-will also worsen outcomes.437 The result will be a bigger record that will
continue to be largely ignored by the public but used by litigators to pick at
particular agency judgments as arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The
benefits such a mandate might achieve can already be achieved if the financial
agency sees the process as valuable, as evidenced by the voluntary cooperation
between the CFTC and OIRA during the Dodd-Frank Act rollout.43s The cases
reviewed in Part II show how aggressive some D.C. Circuit panels have been in
using such review to overturn agency actions, particularly when an agency's
commissioners have been divided in making any regulatory change. Trebling
the number of pages or components of CBA available for judicial second-
guessing, and adding the possibility of interagency disagreement to the mix,
will incite more interventions, with no clear benefit to anyone other than litiga-
tors. 439
More extensive judicial review will have other pernicious consequences.
Not only will agencies rationally use CBA/FR as camouflage, but they can also
be expected to go to Congress to lobby for the establishment of rules through
detailed congressional mandates, which will likely receive greater deference
436. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also CCMC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30 (characteriz-
ing the costs as "minor"); supra notes 18, 89-io2 and accompanying text.
437. This was the view of none other than Douglas Ginsburg (now on the D.C. Circuit, author of
the Business Roundtable decision, see supra notes 103-126 and accompanying text), writing
about his experience as the first head of OIRA from 1984 to 1985. See Christopher C. De-
Muth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HhAV. L. REv.
1075, lo85-86 (1986) ("The private nature of the regulatory review process [i.e., OIRA's re-
view of executive agency rulemaking] has been a strength... because.., it can flourish on-
ly if the agency head or his delegate, and OMB as the president's delegate, are free to discuss
frankly the merits of a regulatory proposal .... The administration's deliberative process
would be significantly compromised if the preliminary rounds in any [interagency] disa-
greement were routinely publicized."). DeMuth and Ginsburg acknowledge that private in-
teragency review suffers from a legitimacy problem- it makes it hard for OIRA to rebut al-
legations that it acts to smuggle politics or private interests into the review process, out of
the public's eye -but they go on to argue that the problem is more apparent than real and in
any event justified by the benefits of the process. Id. at lO86-87.
438. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
439. See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA.
L. REv. 253, 256 (1986) ("[R]ulemakings are often more controversial than adjudications
[under the APA], whose very processes are hidden from outsiders.").
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from courts than rules adopted pursuant to congressional delegations of discre-
tion to achieve general goals." Both the litigation and the shift towards con-
gressional mandates will produce a general slowdown, not just of regulation,
but also of deregulation and regulatory reform, and will likely increase partisan
polarization in and deterioration of public opinion of the very courts charged
with that review.
The CBA of CBA just sketched is preliminary and incomplete. Completing
a CBA of CBA would require evidence: quantitative studies of the degree to
which CBA results in better regulations and more transparency in the regulato-
ry process, as well as quantified estimates of the costs -delay, confusion, cam-
ouflage, partisanship -that CBA can introduce. Until evidence is developed to
illuminate when CBA/FR passes its own test, we must rely on judgment, just
as agencies must when they regulate. As currently informed by the poor results
of judicially reviewed CBA/FR (discussed in Part II), it is hard to see how laws
that give courts a greater role in second-guessing the choice of when to conduct
CBA/FR, or the details of CBA/FR when it is used, could be judged a good
idea.44'
C. Existing CBA/FR Laws Are Little Better in Practice
A final implication of Part III is that existing interpretations of the APA and
the financial agencies' governing statutes should be restored to their state prior
to Chamber of Commerce, to reduce the influence of concentrated interests
through litigation and of politically partisan but unaccountable judges on regu-
latory outcomes. As shown in Part II, the D.C. Circuit's new interpretations of
the APA have permitted (some) panels to overturn regulatory changes on the
ground that a court would conduct its guesstimated CBA differently than an
44o. E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (upholding an SEC
rule promulgated under section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which directed the agency "to
develop and promulgate a rule requiring greater transparency and disclosure regarding the
use of 'conflict minerals' coming out of the DRC and its neighboring countries"), affd in
part, 748 F.3 d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This consequence appears to be a novel or at least recent
dysfunction in the administrative state. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 926 (2008) ("Because narrow delega-
tions with extensive substantive restrictions would eliminate agency discretion and expertise
in policymaking, it is rare that Congress specifies the actual content or substance of agency
decisions."); cf. Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A
Potential Collision in Clean Air Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 175, 179 (1992) (argu-
ing that in environmental regulation, judicial deference to regulatory discretion absent
statutory specificity had created incentives for Congress to impose specific mandates as the
best way to control agencies).
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agency's guesstimated CBA/TR. As shown in Part III, the state of CBA/FR is
such that one can reasonably argue that all guesstimated CBA/FR of major fi-
nancial regulations inevitably will contain multiple arbitrary assumptions and
judgments simply in order to allow for rough guesstimates to be made. A legal
system that simultaneously requires arbitrary judgments by agencies, and then
allows them to be overturned by a court for being arbitrary, depending on
which panel of the D.C. Circuit is randomly (that is, arbitrarily) chosen, is self-
evidently indefensible. 4 2
Even if one agrees with a given court that a given rule represents bad policy
(as I do with respect to the fund governance rules reviewed in Part III.B), bet-
ter means exist for those affected by such rules to protect their interests, such
as through the legislative process or by developing regulatory proposals to
await a new set of regulators-who, after all, are more frequently replaced by
politically accountable Presidents than are the judges on the D.C. Circuit. In
sum, the current, erratically applied law of CBA/FR raises agency costs as be-
tween citizens and their political agents, rather than lowering them as CBA/FR
is supposed to accomplish.
Often, the current state of the law on CBA/FR of financial regulation is
perceived in simple partisan terms - Republican judges will strike down regu-
lations adopted by regulators appointed by a Democratic President- and this is
viewed as good by Republicans (and financial institutions) and bad by Demo-
crats (and individual investors and bank customers). But in a few years the
same unfortunate dynamic may reverse, with Democratic judges striking down
deregulatory changes adopted by regulators appointed by a Republican Presi-
dent. Regardless of the current state of partisan power sharing, or of one's po-
litical inclinations, it should require more theory and evidence than CBA/FR
proponents have developed to leave financial regulation wrapped in the un-
lovely arms of litigators and the partisan lottery that is the D.C. Circuit." 3
To remedy the situation, two recommendations made by Kraus and Raso
for the SEC 4' should be extended to all financial agencies. First, an exemption
from the "sunshine" laws 45 should be added to permit closed-door, pre-
decisional discussions of CBA/FR among financial agency commissioners, be-
442. See id. at 2-3 for a different but complementary argument that courts should be more defer-
ential to agencies in contexts requiring arbitrary decisions.
443. For evidence that judicial review of agency action outside the financial regulatory context is
motivated by politics and judicial ideology, despite nominal legal standards requiring defer-
ence and permitting court intervention only if the agency acts "arbitrarily" or "capriciously,"
see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
444. Kraus & Raso, supra note 12, at 338-42; see also Fisch, supra note 116, at 718-21 (discussing the
application of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5 22(b) (2012), to the SEC).
445. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
1007
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tween commissioners and the economic staffs of the agencies, among the agen-
cies, and between the staffs of the agencies and the staffs of OIRA and the
OFR. Until CBA/FR is considerably more developed, such deliberations are
best conducted in a setting that encourages candor and creativity, rather than
defensive camouflage and obfuscation in anticipation of litigation or requests
under the Freedom of Information Act. 4 6 Such a reform would likely increase
the willingness of agencies to comply with existing requirements under the
CBA Executive Orders" 7 that they submit CBA of their annual regulatory
agendas to OIRA, requirements that have long been given short shrift by the
financial agencies." 8
Second, a "safe harbor" for CBA/FR should be added to the APA and the
financial agencies' governing statutes. The safe harbor can be modeled on the
CRA," 9 which courts have interpreted as barring judicial review of agency
compliance with the statute, including agency determinations of whether a rule
is "major." As Kraus and Raso put it, "private litigants must not be allowed to
throw [CBA/FR] back at the agency as 'party admissions against interest,' un-
dermining the validity of the very rules that the analysis informed."4"' Anyone
genuinely interested in fostering CBA/FR should recognize that, with the cur-
rent, politicized D.C. Circuit only likely to become more polarized after the
elimination of the filibuster, the absence of such a safe harbor may well lead
agencies to be overly cautious, long-winded, and opaque in their CBA/FR-
lawyerly virtues, not economic ones.
D. CBA/FR Remains a Potentially Valuable Component of Policy Analysis
A naive response to the case studies in Part III would be to jettison CBA/FR
altogether. If CBA cannot generate reliable, precise estimates of costs and bene-
fits, one might conclude that it has no value, even as a discretionary component
for policymaking. If CBA/FR cannot produce reliable quantification, then it
has only costs and no benefits. This response would be a mistake for four rea-
sons. First, it is possible that some financial regulations are susceptible of
quantified CBA/FR. There may be some relatively simple financial regulations
in which the costs and benefits will be more straightforward to estimate relia-
bly, particularly if the regulations are implemented in a careful way and com-
446. Id.
447. See sources cited supra note 81.
448. See sources cited supra note 82.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
450. Kraus & Raso, supra note 12, at 341.
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bined with a retrospective CBA/FR. The case studies in Part III are only a sam-
pling of rules.
Second, conceptual CBA/FR remains the best available overarching frame-
work for organizing and communicating the pros and cons of a proposed regu-
lation. Conceptual CBA/FR is a commonsense way to begin the analysis neces-
sary to evaluate a proposed rule by comparing it to the status quo and plausible
alternatives. Indeed, it is hard to imagine conducting any sort of policy analysis
without at least engaging in tacit conceptual CBA/FR. Organizing analysis in a
conceptual CBA framework will provide some benefit for public understand-
ing, even if the benefit is modest, and even if the negative effects of guesstimat-
ed camouflage can easily overwhelm that benefit.
Third, CBA may have effects other than the conventional set outlined in
Part I.C (discipline, transparency, and camouflage). CBA guidelines, such as
those in the OMB Guidance, 45 ' also serve a brainstorming function, as a check-
list to prompt analysts to be more creative in regulatory design and evaluation.
Precisely because conceptual CBA is not an entrenched and exclusive piece of
any one agency's historical lore, evaluating regulatory proposals within a CBA
framework can open up new channels of thought and nudge regulators beyond
a baseless enthusiasm for tried but perhaps less helpful models of regulation.
Conceptual CBA involves a common language and mode of thought that could
facilitate interagency dialogue by floating above any one statutory mandate or
set of agency-specific regulatory goals. Such dialogue can improve thinking
about CBA-related problems (for example, how to phase in or randomize regu-
lation so as to generate useful information while meeting legitimate expecta-
tions about equal treatment under the law).42 Thinking through conceptual
CBA for a rule can lead to novel insights about how the rule is (or is not) simi-
lar to rules issued by other agencies, or how it might generate unintended con-
sequences.
Fourth and most broadly, and with the greatest potential value, conceptual
CBA/FR can facilitate improvements in quantified CBA/FR. Quantified
CBA/FR, after all, would be highly valuable if it could generate precise and re-
liable estimates of the social costs and benefits of a regulatory change. Any-
thing that promotes the long-term research agenda needed for reliable, precise
quantitative CBA/FR has high potential value. To pursue that agenda, it would
451. See OMB Guidance, supra note 20, at 4-15.
452. CBA/FR advocates, see, e.g., CCMR REPORT, supra note 4, at 14, rightly point to the SEC's
pilot program on short sale rules, which randomly exempted a stratified sample from new
rules for purposes of evaluating the rules' effects in a statistically reliable way. See Office
of Econ. Analysis, Economic Analysis of the Short Sale Price Restrictions Under the
Regulation SHO Pilot, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies
/2oo7/regshopiloto2o6o7.pdf [http ://perma.cc/EE3U-VAUD].
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be useful for financial agencies to frame the questions that they face in evaluat-
ing regulations in terms of conceptual CBA, so as to stimulate and guide re-
search. Research in economics, sociology, psychology, and other relevant fields
proceeds along paths that are not random, but shaped by incentives, social
cues, and psychological rewards. If agencies ask pointed research questions in
their rulemaking proposals, they will encourage private researchers to answer
those questions. Private actors with an interest in the answers may fund such
research; tenure can be granted in part on the ground that an academic has an-
swered a socially valuable question; and grant proposals are more likely to be
funded if they relate to research topics that have direct potential value to regu-
latory agencies.
For conceptual CBA to be useful in this way, however, careful attention
must be paid to institutional details, where the devil always lurks. Conceptual
CBA/FR will not be useful in stimulating thought or guiding research if it con-
sists of a simple, abstract list of the benefits and costs of a category of regula-
tions. For example, it is correct in most instances for the SEC to include in the
category of qualitative benefits "investor protection" and "investor confidence,"
but it would be useless to leave things at that. How, precisely, does a rule im-
prove confidence -through which channels? How does improved confidence
constitute a social benefit - how does it affect the cost of capital? Nor will con-
ceptual CBA/FR be useful if it consists of lengthy and opaque boilerplate cir-
cumlocutions designed to deflect or confuse judicial review rather than actually
communicate to researchers or those who fund, evaluate, or publicize research.
A review of CBA conducted by the financial regulatory agencies demon-
strates that fleshing out the benefits of financial regulation is a largely incom-
plete conceptual task, one that I hope the case studies in Part III will help ad-
vance. Similarly, indirect or systemic costs of regulation remain undeveloped.
CBA/FR proponents have a strong point when they mock past CBA/FR efforts
as exercises in "paperclip counting.""' Those who are unhappy with the finan-
cial agencies are striving to promote quantified CBA through law in part be-
cause they rightly worry that regulatory practices that focus only on easily
quantified subsets of costs in isolation will achieve little good.
The question, then, is how to encourage financial regulators to engage in
meaningful, detailed conceptual CBA for its own sake-which should enhance
public understanding and may also assist regulators themselves-but also be-
cause more and better conceptual CBA should stimulate research on quantita-
tive CBA by making more apparent the key quantities to be estimated, and so
by stimulating academics to think harder about research designs that would
permit that quantification. How can lawmakers or law affirmatively encourage
453. CCMRREPoRT, supra note 4, at 9.
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the use of conceptual CBA to stimulate thought and innovation? While a de-
tailed set of proposals is beyond the scope of this Article,45 4 suffice it to say here
that the challenge is primarily managerial, not methodological, a challenge not
susceptible to simple legal commands or conventional judicial review. The
challenge is not going to be met by specifying in meta-regulations methods to
be used to conduct CBA/FR, but by using law and the lawmaking process to
encourage expert agencies to better manage their resources and rulemaking
processes in the short run -with the long-run goal of facilitating reliable, pre-
cise, quantified CBA/FR.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to fill a significant gap in writing about CBA. It
has shown how CBA/iFR analysis would be conducted if- as advocated by
some members of Congress, the D.C. Circuit, and legal academia - the law ex-
tended the current requirements that executive agencies engage in CBA to fi-
nancial agencies, and required those agencies to produce as part of their rule-
making quantified CBA that could be subject to review under the requirements
of the agencies' authorizing statutes and the APA. Detailed case studies of six
rules reveal that precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains unfeasible. Quanti-
fied CBA of such rules can be no more than "guesstimated," and is not a true
alternative to expert judgment-it is simply judgment in (numerical) disguise.
As a result, for the near future, at least, judicial review of quantified CBA of fi-
nancial regulation is not likely to generate benefits that exceed its costs. Until
CBA/FR passes CBA's own test, no new legal mandates should be adopted to
require such review and more serious attention should be given to how to im-
prove the capacities of the agencies to improve the reliability and precision of
CBA in practice.
011
4S4. I take up the task of making such proposals in a related paper. See Coates, supra note to.
